Annika Wennersten Back to the Woods or Into Ourselves? Kant, Rousseau and the Search for the Essence of Human Nature Dissertation presented at Uppsala University to be publicly examined in Geijersalen, Engelska Parken, Hus 6, Thunbergsvägen 3P, Uppsala, Friday, 27 November 2015 at 10:15 for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The examination will be conducted in English. Faculty examiner: Ina Goy (Universität Tübingen, Philosophisches Seminar). Abstract Wennersten, A. 2015. Back to the Woods or Into Ourselves? Kant, Rousseau and the Search for the Essence of Human Nature. 262 pp. Uppsala: Uppsala University, Department of Philosophy. ISBN 978-91-506-2486-1. This thesis contributes to a field of Kant’s practical philosophy that has received renewed attention, namely his moral anthropology. While it is true that Kant, in some of his best- known writings, literally says that the fundamental ground of morality must be pure and thus entirely free from admixture with anthropological principles, he nevertheless admits that these “subjective conditions” in human nature that “either hinder or help people in fulfilling the laws of the metaphysics of morals” make up the foundation of all applied ethics. In other words, in order to know if and to which extent human beings are susceptible to moral commands, we need to know our abilities as well as our limitations. Kant wrote several works about these topics and his long-term teaching of anthropology shows that he had a continuing interest in the theory of man. Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that Kant, during the mid-1760s was highly influenced by Rousseau. It is hardly a coincidence that Kant’s first reference to the “unchanging nature of human beings” appeared at the same time as Rousseau proclaimed the need of finding the true nature of man – the unmasked being who has not been damaged by social prejudice. In order to understand man and his moral capacities we need to find his true essence or what really constitutes humanity. Accordingly, a careful examination of the multifaceted characteristics of human nature is needed in order to understand the very concept of a moral being and to account for his moral progress. I will argue that Kant’s early insights about this need runs like a thread through his entire course of philosophy and that Rousseauian ideas actually affect also his critical ethics. They agree that man is sociable, but also suspicious. He has good predispositions but is likewise susceptible to corruption. My analysis will shed light on man’s eternal balance between conflicting forces and on the means needed for the progress towards the vocation of humankind. This reveals the need of knowing oneself and explains why the question: “what is the human being?” ought to be taken seriously. Keywords: Kant, Rousseau, Moral Anthropology, Human Nature, Radical Evil, Sociability, Gesinnung, Character, Denkungsart, Propensity, Compassion, Self-Love, Self-Conceit, Ambition, Humility, History Annika Wennersten, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Metaphysics, Box 627, Uppsala University, SE-75126 Uppsala, Sweden. © Annika Wennersten 2015 ISBN 978-91-506-2486-1 urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-262830 (http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-262830) Contents Acknowledgements ......................................................................................... 7 Abbreviations .................................................................................................. 9 Introduction ................................................................................................... 11 Human Nature as Philosophy ................................................................... 15 Association through Anthropology? .................................................... 17 General Overview of the Thesis .......................................................... 18 Rousseau and Anthropology in Kant’s Philosophical Timeline ............... 30 PART I: Natural and Moral Beings ......................................................... 39 1. The Science of Man .................................................................................. 41 1.1. Natural Beings ................................................................................... 44 1.2. Social Beings ..................................................................................... 49 1.3. Moral Beings ..................................................................................... 57 1.4. Ideal Beings ....................................................................................... 65 1.5. Summary: Human Beings ................................................................. 67 2. Freedom, Will and Motivation .................................................................. 68 2.1. The Free Being .................................................................................. 69 2.1.1. Practical and Transcendental Freedom ...................................... 72 2.1.2. Justification of Freedom ............................................................ 76 2.2. The Faculty of Desire ........................................................................ 79 2.2.1. Inclinations and Other Incentives .............................................. 82 2.2.2. Feelings and Pleasure in Motivation .......................................... 86 2.3. Will and Choice ................................................................................. 91 2.4. Summary ........................................................................................... 94 3. Character ................................................................................................... 97 3.1. The Need for an Internal Foundation .............................................. 100 3.1.1. Problematic Claims with Regard to Character ........................ 102 3.1.2. Character and Will ................................................................... 104 3.2. Kant’s Dual Conception of Character ............................................. 106 3.2.1. Denkungsart-Sinnesart in the Third Antinomy ........................ 107 3.2.2. Denkungsart-Sinnesart in the Second Critique ........................ 109 3.2.3. Denkungsart-Sinnesart in Anthropology ................................. 113 3.2.4. Denkungsart-Sinnesart in the Religion .................................... 115 3.3 Summary: How to Understand Kantian Character ........................... 118 PART II: Good and Evil .......................................................................... 121 4. Gesinnung and Kant’s Theory of Evil .................................................... 123 4.1. Kantian Evil ..................................................................................... 124 4.1.1. Evil as Propensity .................................................................... 127 4.1.2. The Universality Claim and the Missing Proof ....................... 130 4.1.3. Evil as Anthropology ............................................................... 134 4.2. Gesinnung ........................................................................................ 138 4.2.1. The Standard Interpretation ..................................................... 141 4.2.2. Gesinnung and Hang ................................................................ 144 4.2.3. Gesinnung, Hang and the “Change of Heart” .......................... 148 4.2.4. Gesinnung, Hang, “Germ of Good” and Personality ............... 151 4.2.5. Gesinnung, Character and Denkungsart .................................. 153 4.2.6. Gesinnung and Maxims / Early vs. Late Conception of Gesinnung .......................................................................................... 156 4.3. Summary ......................................................................................... 159 5. Rousseau’s Divine Principle ................................................................... 163 5.1. The Problem of Infallibility ............................................................. 165 5.2. Internal Order of the Sentiments ..................................................... 168 5.3. Early Sentiments of Injustice .......................................................... 173 5.4. The Problem of Corruption ............................................................. 176 5.5. Conscience, Freedom and the General Will .................................... 179 5.6. Summary ......................................................................................... 183 6. Ambition, Self-Regard and Evil ............................................................. 185 6.1. The Different Forms of Self-Regard ............................................... 189 6.1.1. Self-Love and Self-Conceit ..................................................... 192 6.1.2. Self-Love and Egoism ............................................................. 195 6.2. Ambition and Self-Conceit .............................................................. 197 6.3. Evil, Self-Love and Self-Conceit .................................................... 200 6.4. Summary: Amour Propre and the Rest ........................................... 203 7. Cultivating the Conditions of Compassion ............................................. 207 7.1. A Novel Kantian View of Compassion? ......................................... 208 7.2. Compassion and Its Conditions ....................................................... 210 7.2.1. The Naturalness of Compassion .............................................. 212 7.2.2 The Importance of Humility ....................................................