Confucius 9781441115683_FM_Final_txt_print.indd i 8/18/2001 5:40:39 PM BLOOMSBURY GUIDES FOR THE PERPLEXED Bloomsbury’s Guides for the Perplexed are clear, concise and accessible introductions to thinkers, writers and subjects that stu- dents and readers can fi nd especially challenging. Concentrating specifi cally on what it is that makes the subject diffi cult to grasp, these books explain and explore key themes and ideas, guiding the reader towards a thorough understanding of demanding material. Bahá’í Faith: A Guide for the Perplexed , Robert H. Stockman Kabbalah: A Guide for the Perplexed , Pinchas Giller Mysticism: A Guide for the Perplexed , Paul Oliver New Religious Movements: A Guide for the Perplexed , Paul Oliver Zoroastrianism: A Guide for the Perplexed , Jenny Rose 9781441115683_FM_Final_txt_print.indd ii 8/18/2001 5:40:40 PM A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED Confucius YONG HUANG LONDON • NEW DELHI • NEW YORK • SYDNEY 9781441115683_FM_Final_txt_print.indd iii 8/18/2001 5:40:40 PM Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square 175 Fifth Avenue London New York WC1B 3DP NY 10010 UK USA www.bloomsbury.com First published 2013 © Yong Huang, 2013 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Yong Huang has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identifi ed as Author of this work. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury Academic or the author. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. EISBN: 978-1-4411-4468-3 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Huang, Yong. Confucius : a guide for the perplexed / Yong Huang. p. cm.—(Guides for the perplexed) Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 978-1-4411-1568-3 (hardcover : alk. paper)—ISBN 978-1-4411-9653-8 (pbk. : alk. paper)—ISBN 978-1-4411-8052-0 (ebook epub : alk. paper)— ISBN 978-1-4411-4468-3 (ebook pdf : alk. paper) 1. Confucius. I. Title. B128.C8H88 2012 181’.112—dc23 2012010203 Typeset by Newgen Imaging Systems Pvt Ltd, Chennai, India Printed and bound in India 9781441115683_FM_Final_txt_print.indd iv 8/18/2001 5:40:41 PM For my two children, Yian and Elaine 9781441115683_FM_Final_txt_print.indd v 8/18/2001 5:40:41 PM 9781441115683_FM_Final_txt_print.indd vi 8/18/2001 5:40:41 PM CONTENTS Preface ix 1 The life of Confucius: “A homeless dog” 1 1. Introduction 1 2. Shining ancestry and humble childhood 2 3. Confucius establishes himself 7 4. The height of Confucius’s political career 9 5. “A homeless dog” on the way 15 6. Return to home state 28 7. Last years 32 8. Conclusion 35 2 Morality: Why you should not turn the other cheek 37 1. Introduction 37 2. Repay injury with uprightness 38 3. Why it is not in the interest of a person to be immoral 45 4. Is a virtuous person supposed to make others virtuous? 53 5. Conclusion 63 3 Virtue: How to love virtue as you love sex 65 1. Introduction 65 2. Taking delight in being moral 66 9781441115683_FM_Final_txt_print.indd vii 8/18/2001 5:40:41 PM viii CONTENTS 3. Being virtuous as being distinctively human 71 4. Is a virtuous person foundationally egoistic or self-centered? 78 5. A “dilemma of virtue”? 83 6. Conclusion 90 4 Moral education: How to teach what can only be learned by oneself 91 1. Introduction 91 2. An apparent paradox in Confucius’s philosophy of education 92 3. Confucius as a moral educator 96 4. Can virtue be taught and how? 104 5. The role of government in moral education 111 6. Conclusion 117 5 Filial piety: Why an upright son does not disclose his father stealing a sheep 119 1. Introduction 119 2. Filial piety I: reverence and love 120 3. Filial piety II: self-cultivation 126 4. Filial piety III: remonstration with parents 131 5. Why a fi lial son does not disclose his father’s stealing a sheep 139 6. Conclusion 148 Notes 151 References 163 Index 169 9781441115683_FM_Final_txt_print.indd viii 8/18/2001 5:40:41 PM PREFACE There is no shortage of introductory books in English on Confucius or Confucianism, and so it seems a bit perplexing to add one, par- ticularly in a series entitled “Guides for the Perplexed”: When I teach Chinese philosophy in the United States, students often fi nd Confucius and Confucianism (in comparison to other schools of thought such as Daoism and Buddhism, which may sound exotic and therefore perplexing) too bland to be interesting. What Confucius says, if not outright wrong, seems to be mostly com- mon-sense platitudes. So I decided to write this book in a slightly different way. The book is not written to satisfy people’s curiosity about some archaic ideas of Confucius which are merely of historical interest. Instead I aim to show what Confucius can still teach us about our moral life in a contemporary (and, given the readership of this book, Western) world, despite the fact that he lived more than two and half millen- nia and half the globe apart from us. Thus, I do not follow the quite familiar practice of providing a systematic overview of Confucius’s otherwise rather unsystematic concepts, such as humanity and pro- priety, superior persons and inferior persons, love and the golden rule, and knowledge and wisdom, as they appear in the Analects . Instead, with the exception of Chapter 1, which is about Confucius’s life, in each chapter, I discuss one of his views which, while initially appearing perplexing, proves to be the most enlightening answer, or at least more enlightening than those found in Western philosophi- cal traditions, to a question we have either in our everyday life or in our moral refl ections. Or so I shall argue. In Chapter 2, thus, I discuss Confucius’s view about what to do with wrongdoers. In stark contrast to Jesus, who teaches us to turn the other cheek, or to use a phrase from the Analects , to return evil with a good turn, Confucius asks: if so, what do we return good with? Instead, Confucius teaches us to return good 9781441115683_FM_Final_txt_print.indd ix 8/18/2001 5:40:42 PM x PREFACE with good and return evil with uprightness. From the Christian viewpoint, the attitude that Jesus recommends is certainly more ideal and noble than Confucius’s. Defenders of Confucius, in turn, often argue that Jesus’s teaching is too idealistic to be practical, while Confucius was a moral realist. In this chapter, I argue that this is a misunderstanding. The main reason Confucius is against returning evil with a good turn is that it is not conducive to making the wrongdoer cease to be a wrongdoer, if it does not encourage the person to commit further wrongdoings. In Confucius’s view, an upright person is one who is also inclined to make others upright. So when he asks us to return evil with uprightness, he is asking us to do what can make the wrongdoer cease to be a wrongdoer. In Chapter 3, I discuss Confucius’s answer to the question “why be moral (or virtuous)?” by exploring his view that one ought to love virtue as one loves sex. In Confucius’s view, to be virtuous is a joyful thing. Of course, a person who asks the question “why be moral?,” normally an egoist, may state that he or she cannot fi nd joy, but instead can only fi nd pain, in being moral. Confucius’s response is that this is because they lack the relevant virtuous knowledge (not knowledge about virtue). Such knowledge requires not only the intellectual part of what is called xin ㉒ in Chinese (normally translated as heart-mind) but also its affective part, so that anyone who possesses such knowledge will be inclined to be moral and thus can take delight in being moral. The egoist may further ask: even if I can fi nd joy in being moral, why do I have to fi nd joy in being moral, as I can also fi nd joy in being immoral? Confucius’s answer is that being virtuous is a distinguishing mark of being human, and so anyone who is not virtuous is a defective human being. In Chapter 4, I discuss the Socratic problem of whether virtue can be taught. Confucius’s ethics is often regarded as a virtue eth- ics. However, one unique feature of Confucian virtue ethics, in comparison to virtue ethics familiar in the Western philosophical tradition, is that it avoids what Kantian critics call self-centered- ness. For example, Aristotle makes it clear that a virtuous person is a genuine self-lover, a lover for his or her internal character, vir- tue, which is in contrast to the self-lover in a vulgar sense, a lover for his or her external well-being. While a virtuous person is con- cerned with both his or her own well-being and that of others, his or her own well-being in question is internal, while that of others 9781441115683_FM_Final_txt_print.indd x 8/18/2001 5:40:42 PM PREFACE xi in question is external. Since for Aristotle internal well-being is more important than external, a virtuous person is self-centered.