China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei Shirley A. Kan Specialist in Asian Security Affairs August 17, 2009 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL30341 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy Summary Despite apparently consistent statements in almost four decades, the U.S. “one China” policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. Apart from questions about what the “one China” policy entails, issues have arisen about whether U.S. Presidents have stated clear positions and have changed or should change policy, affecting U.S. interests in security and democracy. In Part I, this CRS Report discusses the “one China” policy since the United States began in 1971 to reach presidential understandings with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government in Beijing. Part II documents the evolution of policy as affected by legislation and articulated in key statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. Taiwan formally calls itself the Republic of China (ROC). This report will be updated. Policy on the “one China” concept covers three major issue areas: sovereignty over Taiwan; PRC use of force or coercion against Taiwan; and cross-strait dialogue. The United States recognized the ROC government in Taipei until the end of 1978 and has maintained an official relationship with Taiwan after recognition of the PRC government in 1979. The United States did not explicitly state the sovereign status of Taiwan in the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982. The United States “acknowledged” the “one China” position of both sides of the Taiwan Strait. U.S. policy has not recognized the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan; has not recognized Taiwan as a sovereign country; and has considered Taiwan’s status as undetermined. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P.L. 96-8, has governed the U.S. relationship with Taiwan, in the absence of diplomatic recognition. The TRA stipulates the U.S. expectation that the future of Taiwan “will be determined” by peaceful means. The TRA specifies that it is U.S. policy, among the stipulations: to consider any non-peaceful means to determine Taiwan’s future “a threat” to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and of “grave concern” to the United States; “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character;” and “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion” jeopardizing the security, or social or economic system of Taiwan’s people. The TRA provides a congressional role in determining security assistance “necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” In addition, just before issuing the August 17, 1982 Communique, President Reagan offered “Six Assurances” to Taipei, including questions about any U.S. role in cross-strait talks. Since the mid-1990s, U.S. interests in the military balance as well as peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait have been challenged by the PRC’s military modernization, resistance in Taiwan by the Kuomintang (KMT) party to raising defense spending, and moves perceived by Beijing as promoting de jure independence under the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) (when Chen Shui-bian was President in 2000-2008). President Clinton deployed two aircraft carriers near Taiwan during the 1995-1996 crisis. President Bush did not support Taiwan’s independence or membership in the U.N. and opposed referendums on membership in the U.N. for Taiwan during its presidential election on March 22, 2008. For that election, President Bush positioned two aircraft carriers near Taiwan, whose largely symbolic referendums were targets of the PRC’s belligerent condemnation. The referendums failed to be valid, and KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou won. After May 2008, President Ma resumed the cross-strait dialogue (after a decade)—beyond seeking detente. Still, Taiwan’s security is challenged by the build-up of missiles and other forces by the PRC’s military. Congress has oversight of President Obama’s policy, covering arms sales, bilateral contacts, Taiwan in international organizations, and implications of the changing cross- strait ties for a possible policy review. On March 24, 2009, to commemorate the TRA’s 30th anniversary, the House passed H.Con.Res. 55 and 30 Senators sent a letter to Obama. Congressional Research Service China/Taiwan Contents Part I: U.S. Policy on “One China”..............................................................................................1 Congressional Concerns........................................................................................................1 Key Statements and Ambiguity .............................................................................................4 Changed Context.............................................................................................................5 Definitions......................................................................................................................5 Unsettled Status ..............................................................................................................5 Peaceful Settlement.........................................................................................................5 Has U.S. Policy Changed?.....................................................................................................6 Issue Area 1: Sovereignty................................................................................................7 Issue Area 2: Use of Force.............................................................................................17 Issue Area 3: Dialogue ..................................................................................................24 Summary: Policy Issues ......................................................................................................26 Part II: Highlights of Key Statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei .................................29 Statements During Nixon Administration ............................................................................29 Kissinger’s Secret Talks with PRC Premier Zhou Enlai .................................................29 Nixon’s “Five Principles” in Secret Talks with Zhou Enlai ............................................30 Nixon on Withdrawing U.S. Military Forces from Taiwan .............................................30 U.S.-PRC Joint Communique (Shanghai Communique) ................................................31 Mao Zedong on Use of Force........................................................................................31 Statements During Ford Administration...............................................................................32 President Ford’s Address to a Joint Session of Congress ................................................32 Statements During Carter Administration ............................................................................32 U.S. Statement on Diplomatic Recognition of the PRC..................................................32 PRC Statement on Establishing China-U.S. Diplomatic Relations .................................33 ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo’s Statement ..............................................................33 PRC’s New Year’s Message to Compatriots in Taiwan...................................................33 U.S.-PRC Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations (Normalization Communique)....................................................................................34 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8 .........................................................................34 Statements During Reagan Administration ..........................................................................36 PRC Leader Ye Jianying’s Nine-Point Proposal.............................................................36 Letter from President Reagan to Deng Xiaoping............................................................37 Reagan’s “Six Assurances” to Taiwan............................................................................38 Message from President Reagan to Taiwan President.....................................................38 U.S.-PRC Joint Communique on Arms Sales (1982 Communique)................................39 President Reagan’s Statement on U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan.........................................40 Reagan’s Secret Memorandum on the 1982 Communique .............................................40 PRC’s Statement on the Communique ...........................................................................41 Assistant Secretary of State Holdridge and “Six Assurances”.........................................41 PRC Leader Deng Xiaoping on “One China, Two Systems” ..........................................42 Statements During George H. W. Bush Administration ........................................................42 Toast at the Welcoming Banquet in Beijing ...................................................................42 Taiwan’s National Unification Guidelines; Policy on the PRC.......................................43 Taiwan on the Meaning of “One China” ........................................................................43 President Bush on the Sale of F-16s to Taiwan ..............................................................43 “One China, Different Interpretations”