A JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY September 1985 Volume 13 Number 3 297 David Lowenthal Leo Strauss's Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy 321 Jan H. Blits Socratic Teaching and Justice: Plato's Clitophon 335 Kit R. Christensen Individuation and Commonality in Feuerbach's Man" "Philosophy of 359 Allan D. Nelson John Stuart Mill: the Reformer Reformed 403 Michael P. Zuckert Appropriation and Understanding in the History of Political Philosophy: on Quentin Skinner's Method Book Reviews 425 J. E. Parsons, Jr. Locke's Education for Liberty by Nathan Tarcov 429 Charles Butterworth The Modern Self in Rousseau's Confession: a Reply to St. Augustine by Ann Hartle 432 Nicholas Capaldi Hume's Philosophy of Common Life by Donald W. Livingston 434 Francis Canavan Selected Letters of Edmund Burke edited and with an introduction by Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. 435 Dennis Teti American Conservatism and the American Founding by Harry V. Jaffa interi .retation Volume 13 JL number 3 Editor-in-Chief Hilail Gildin Editors Seth G. Benardete* Charles E. Butterworth Hilail Gildin Robert Horwitz Howard B. White (d. 1974) Consulting Editors John Hallowell Wilhelm Hennis Erich Hula Arnaldo Momigliano Michael Oakeshott Ellis Sandoz* Leo Strauss (d.1973) Kenneth W. Thompson Associate Editors Fred Baumann Patrick Coby Christopher A. Colmo Derek Cross Edward J. Erler Maureen Feder-Marcus Joseph E. Goldberg Pamela K. Jensen Will Morrisey Charles Rubin Leslie Rubin John A. Wettergreen Bradford Wilson Catherine Zuckert Michael Zuckert Assistant Editors Marianne C. Grey Laurette G. Hupman Design & Production Martyn Hitchcock Annual subscription rates individual $13; institutional $16; student (3-year limit) $7. interpretation appears three times a year. Address correspondence Queens College for interpretation, , Flushing , N.Y. 11367, U.S.A. Authors submitting manuscripts for publication in interpretation are requested to follow the MLA Style Sheet and to send clear and readable copies of their work. Copyright 1985 Interpretation Socratic Teaching and Justice: Plato's Clitophon Jan H. Blits University ofDelaware Clitophon raises a criticism of Socrates that many of Plato's readers no doubt share. While Socrates is excellent at urging men on to virtue, he is useless at teaching them what it is or how to attain it. Instead of leading men to virtue, his exhortations lead only to more exhortations. How, then, are we to understand them? Are we to suppose that this is all there will be to our life's work, to exhort those who have not been exhorted, and for them to exhort still others? Or is it possible to accomplish virtue in deed? Socrates' Whatever must finally be said in defense of ability to teach, the dra matic situation of the Clitophon underscores Clitophon's criticism. Socrates has previously discussed justice with him, and those conversations have had two principal effects. They have aroused and confused Clitophon. Socrates first aroused his desire for virtue by convincing him that to become happy one must become virtuous, but then confused him by first telling him that justice consists in helping friends and harming enemies but later indicating that the just man never harms anyone but benefits everyone in everything. Similarly, Socrates ini tiates the present conversation with Clitophon and directly provokes his renewed request to be taught about justice, yet makes no attempt either to resolve his per plexity or to explain why he is unwilling or unable to do so. Remaining silent throughout all but the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates seems to go out of his way to incite Clitophon's criticism only to corroborate it by his silence. Could justice?1 his refusal to teach Clitophon about justice be itself an act of undeserved for a and a half. Although the I . The Clitophon has languished in obscurity century brief and brisk dialogue was traditionally considered the introduction to the Republic (see Diogenes Laertius, ill. 60; Proclus, In Timaeum i.7b), nearly all scholars since the early nineteenth century have either dismissed it as spurious thereby defending Plato against the unanimous tradition of anti ground that it is a fragment or sketch of an quity 0r else defended it on the trivializing preliminary unfinished Platonic work. The first group of scholars considers Clitophon's criticism of Socrates refuted. Neither sees problemat wholly unfounded; the second, easily group anything fundamentally Socrates' ical in teaching Clitophon justice, nor does either believe that Plato does. Both groups, it teaching. should be noted, agree with Clitophon that justice is a doctrine or a Leading examples of scholars who regard the dialogue as spurious include Schleiermacher, Intro Pseudo-Platonica of those who duction to the Dialogues ofPlato (1836) and W. A. Heidel, (1896); Plato," Cleitophon of consider it incomplete, George Grote, Plato (1865) and G. M. A. Grube, "The Classical Philology, XXVI (1931). The dialogue is ignored by Jowett, Apelt and, more recently, Hamilton and Cairns in their translations of Plato, but included in The Loeb Classical Library, though not without a vigorous warning. Plato Said (Chicago: of For a brief and depreciating treatment, see Paul Shorey, What University see Clifford "The Chicago Press, 1933) p. 422; for an intelligent and informative treatment, Orwin, Cleitophon," (Decem Case against Socrates: Plato's Canadian Journal ofPolitical Science, XV4 ber, 1982), 741-53- 322 Interpretation I. THE PROLOGUE: TEACHING AND PRAISING (406a-407a) The dialogue begins strangely and abruptly as Socrates reports what might seem to be mere gossip concerning himself and Clitophon. "About Clitophon, Aristonymus," son of he tells Clitophon, "someone recently described to us that in a conversation with Lysias he found fault with spending time with Socrates but Thrasymachus" praised highly being together with (4o6ai-4). Socrates reports what some anonymous informant told him and unnamed others about what Clito phon had said to a mutual friend or companion behind his back. Yet he reports the gossip in a pointedly impersonal way. By referring to both himself and Clito phon the only two men present in the third person, he in effect separates what is being said from those discussing it. Speaking as though he were telling what some third person had said about a fourth, he manages to remove both the present speaker and listener from the subject matter of their conversation. Socrates, almost a parody of the just man, seems to have forgotten his own good in speech. Clitophon replies confidently but cautiously. He is sure that Socrates is simply feigning indifference to his criticism and responding with a personal attack of his Socrates' own. He therefore immediately tries to correct him. Whoever infor mant was, he explains, he did not correctly relate the conversation with Lysias, did" "for in some things indeed I did not praise you, but in others I (4o6a6-7). Whereas Socrates spoke of both Clitophon's praise of Thrasymachus and his blame of Socrates, Clitophon speaks only of what he had said about Socrates. His remarks, in contrast to Socrates', are entirely personal. And just as Clito phon replaces his reported praise of Thrasymachus with his unreported praise of Socrates, so, too, he suppresses the fact that he had criticized Socrates in any thing, acknowledging only that he had not praised him in everything. He is care blame.2 ful to emphasize his praise and minimize his Saying frankly that Socra tes is clearly rebuking him while pretending to be unconcerned, he eagerly offers to repeat the original conversation, especially since they are now alone. He hopes to convince Socrates that he does not hold so low an opinion of him and thus induce him to be more friendly in return. Socrates readily accepts Clitophon's offer, but not in the spirit in which it was made. Concluding the scene-setting prologue, he says it would be shameful of him not to bear with Clitophon when Clitophon is so eager to benefit him, for it is clear, Socrates says, that when his better and worse points have been made known to will him, he practice and pursue the one and avoid the other, according to his strength. Socrates thus places Clitophon in the position of his teacher. What matters to him is not whether Clitophon will praise him, but that he might 2. He does not explicitly acknowledge blaming Socrates until the very end of the dialogue (4ioe5). Socratic Teaching and Justice: Plato's Clitophon 323 improve him. Socrates, however, limits the possible benefits of Clitophon's teaching. He says he will practice and pursue his good points and avoid his bad but not that will ones, he develop any good points he does not already possess. The most he might learn from Clitophon that could cause him to change his ac tions is the need to practice greater self-restraint. But even this lesson's effect may be greatly limited inasmuch as Socrates promises to act to the full extent of his not to strength, the full extent of his knowledge. His strength may fail his knowledge. He may not always be able to act as he knows he should. II. CLITOPHON'S PRAISE: EDUCATION AND NEGLECT (407a-e) Clitophon begins with his praise, the first half of which is a set-piece he has memorized3 and which he introduces in a way that anticipates his central criti cism. He says he was often amazed at hearing Socrates, who seemed to him to speak most nobly compared to other human beings, when, rebuking human be ings, he sang his words like a god upon a tragic stage (407a8). In saying this Clitophon suggests that Socrates, at his best, resembles the tragic poets who, when faced with a difficulty, have recourse to a deus ex machina. Socrates ap pears at just the opportune moment to do what ordinary men cannot do, but then disappears again just as suddenly, without giving an adequate account of what he had said (cp.