The Mechanisms of Generational Change: Triggers and Processes Peter Hart-Brinson University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire Prepared for 2018 ASA Annual Convention, Philadelphia, PA Abstract The persistent use of generational labels like “Millennials” by media commentators, research firms, and even sociologists shows that the processes by which generations and generational change are created remain poorly understood. Although social scientists agree upon the basic formula for sound generational analysis [cohort replacement x (impressionable-years hypothesis + persistence hypothesis)], this consensus obscures fundamental terminological problems and conceptual dilemmas that continue to stifle generational research. This paper describes the four interlinked mechanisms that are required to produce generational change and argues that studying the relations between two of the linked mechanisms—structural triggers and agentic processes—helps to overcome the persistent ambiguities in generational theory and can provide a measure of clarity for an empirical research program on generational change. A catalog of generational triggers is developed, and the utility of the mechanism-centered approach to generational analysis is illustrated with familiar examples. Introduction To the extent that most sociologists read much about generational change, it probably takes the form of popular commentaries on the distinctive characteristics of Millennials (soon to be followed Generation Z, who are about to have their turn as the target of older cohorts’ mix of 1 disdain about youth and nostalgia about their own past) or the annual Beloit College Mindset List, which helps to introduce professors to their new first-year students and their supposed realms of life experience. There is a considerable disconnect between this popular discourse and the scholarly fields of cohort analysis (following Ryder 1965) and the classic literature on generational change (e.g. Elder 1974; Kertzer 1983; Schnittker, Freese and Powell 2003; Schuman and Scott 1989) that spans fields from aging and the life course to collective memory. Nevertheless, some fundamental similarities between these two discourses on generations sometimes lead scholars (e.g. Milkman 2017; Pelz and Smidt 2015; Ross and Rouse 2015; Twenge, Campbell and Freeman 2012) and polling firms like the Pew Research Center to adopt the generational labels established by the marketing consultants and pop culture critics (most notably Howe and Strauss 2000; Strauss and Howe 1991); in doing so, they implicitly legitimate a theory of generations that has been described best as “grotesque ineptness” (Jaeger 1985, p. 282). This problem is more than just a question of labels and disciplinary boundary work; it also a manifestation of unresolved ambiguities in how we theorize generations and how we conduct research on generational change. Contemporary scholars inherit these ambiguities from generational theory itself and from how the concept has evolved operationally over decades of research; moreover, to the extent that they remain unacknowledged, they continue to lead research astray and perpetuate the problem. How we can begin to resolve these ambiguities and develop a scientifically-sound research agenda on generational change is the subject of this paper. I begin by describing two competing paradigms in generational analysis, focusing on Mannheim’s (1952 [1928]) generational theory since it is the primary theoretical foundation for most social scientific 2 analyses of generational change. Then, I describe three unresolved conceptual ambiguities in generational theory that contribute to theoretical and methodological uncertainty about how to carry out research on generational change. Next, I adopt a mechanism-centered approach to the problem of generations and describe the four interlinked types of mechanisms that are required to produce generational change, and I propose that studying the relations between two of the mechanisms can help to manage the uncertainty. Finally, I develop a catalog of generational triggers and illustrate the merit of taking a mechanism-centered approach to generational change with common examples. Two Generational Paradigms In his intellectual history of the generation concept, historian Hans Jaeger (1985) demonstrates that most research and theorizing about the concept of generations has fallen into two broad paradigms, which he calls the “pulse-rate” and “imprint” hypotheses. Most sociologists are familiar with both. The paramount example of the imprint paradigm is Karl Mannheim’s (1952 [1928]) “The Problem of Generations,” which serves as the theoretical foundation of almost all sociological research. The mode of discourse about generations that one encounters in popular culture—contrasting Millennials, with Generation X, with Baby Boomers, and so on—exemplifies the pulse-rate paradigm. Both paradigms agree that young cohorts develop distinctive worldviews and behaviors, which persist throughout the life course, because of the social conditions they encountered during their formative years. The essential difference can be put simply: the imprint paradigm assumes that generations emerge only in response to a specific “trigger” (Mannheim 1952 [1928], p. 310) while the pulse-rate paradigm assumes that a 3 society’s entire population can be divided into a series of (mutually exclusive) generations that emerge at regular intervals, indexed to the rhythm of the life course. Let us quickly dispense with the pulse-rate paradigm. Its foremost contemporary proponents are the popular historians and marketing consultants, William Strauss and Neil Howe. In their master treatise (Strauss and Howe 1991), they attempt to explain America’s history and future (from 1584 until 2069) according to a four-part repeating cycle of generations that are 22 years in length, each of which is characterized by a signature “peer personality.” These authors are widely credited with coining the term “Millennial,” and they have together authored seven books on generations and founded a consulting firm to help organizations adapt to generational change. This theory builds on José Ortega y Gasset’s attempt to explain Western Europe’s entire history in terms of a 15-year generational cycle beginning in the year 1626— René Descartes’ 30th birthday. It barely warrants mentioning how comically flawed each thesis is from its opening premises: the arbitrary starting dates, the lack of evidence that life stages are of a fixed length, the reality of changing life expectancies and the social construction of the life course. Indeed, this absurdity prompts Jaeger to remark that “the grotesque ineptness of this thesis prohibits any closer scrutiny” (p. 282). Yet, every time labels like “Generation X,” “Millennials,” and the “Greatest Generation” are uttered, they breathe fresh life into the pulse-rate paradigm. Quite simply, there is no credible evidence that a society’s entire population is organized neatly into a succession of cohorts of roughly equivalent length that are indexed to the length of life stages, but polling firms and academics who adopt the terminology perpetuate the myth that there is. In contrast to the social astrology of the pulse-rate paradigm, the imprint paradigm is our social astronomy, grounded in sound theory and ample evidence. Both paradigms share the view 4 that society can be divided into a series of cohorts, that members of young cohorts develop distinctive worldviews and patterns of behavior to the extent the structural and historical conditions during their impressionable years (late adolescence to early adulthood) are different from those of their elders, and that these worldviews and patterns of behavior remain relatively stable even as they age. It is the shared characteristics of the two paradigms that continue to offer a veneer of plausibility to the pulse-rate paradigm, but the differences are equally consequential: the imprint paradigm assumes that generations must be made out of cohorts and that they are made by some combination of structure and agency—of changed historical events and social structures that make an “imprint” on impressionable minds, combined with the social activity of young people interacting with one another and with other cohorts. Karl Mannheim’s “The Problem of Generations” remains the most influential statement of the imprint paradigm. Crucially, Mannheim distinguishes between the cohort (“generation location”) and the actual generation: Whereas mere common ‘location’ in a generation is of only potential significance, a generation as an actuality is constituted when similarly ‘located’ contemporaries participate in a common destiny and in the ideas and concepts which are in some way bound up with its unfolding. (Mannheim 1952 [1928], p. 306) In other words, simply sharing the same generation location in socio-historical time is only a necessary precondition for an actual generation to emerge; it also requires exposure to social conditions or events (triggers) that cause young cohorts to perceive and experience the world differently than their elders (or, as Mannheim calls it, “the social and intellectual symptoms of a process of dynamic de-stabilization” (p. 303)). 5 Moreover, each generation as an actuality is made up of multiple “generation units,” each of which is a concrete group who responds to the shared conditions of the actual generation in different ways. The interactions of these generation units with one another and with members of other cohorts produces the