Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change Series I. Culture and Values, Vol. 11 Ethics at the Crossroads Volume I Normative Ethics and Objective Reason Edited by George F. McLean The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy 1 Copyright © 1996 by The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy Gibbons Hall B-20 620 Michigan Avenue, NE Washington, D.C. 20064 All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Normative ethics and objective reason, vol. I of Ethics at the crossroad / edited by George F. McLean. p.cm. — (Cultural heritage and contemporary change, George F. McLean, gen. ed.; Series I. Culture and values ; vol. 11) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Ethics. 2. Objectivity. 3. Decision-making (Ethics). I. McLean, George F. II. Series. III. Series I, Culture and values ; vol. 11) BJ1012.E8935 1995 vol. I 92-13187 170s—dc21 CIP [170’.44] ISBN 1-56518-022-4 (pbk.) 2 Table of Contents Introduction 1 Part I. Ethics as Response to Changing Situations 1. Pragmatic Tests and Ethical Insights 9 by Abraham Edel 2. Naturalism, Situation Ethics and Value Theory 29 by Joseph Fletcher 3. The Character of Moral Reasoning 39 by Vincent C. Punzo 4. Humanism and Ethics 51 by Howard L. Parsons 5. Moral Agreement Under a Diversity of Values 87 by Peter Caws Part II. Ethics as Objective and Normative A. Objective Foundations: Dignity of the Person and the Morally Good 6. The Person, Moral Growth and Character Development 99 by George F. McLean 7. The Foundations of Moral Judgment 131 by David Schindler 8. The Human Good and Moral Choice 163 by John Farrelly 9. What Makes the Human Person a Being of Moral Worth 207 by William E. May B. Natural Law and Normative Reasoning 10. Reason as Norm 225 by Vernon J. Bourke 11. A Contemporary Natural-Law Ethics 241 by Germain G. Grisez 3 C. Normative Reasoning and Life in Society 12. Ethics and Prudence 259 by Patrick J. Coffey 13. Positive Law in Natural Law 265 by John T. Noonan Appendices I. John Paul II, Splendor Veritatis 275 II. Paul Ricoeur, Reflection on Splendor Veritatis 357 Acknowledgements 4 Introduction George F. McLean The basic contention of these volumes is that morality, and hence ethics, is bi-polar: objective and subjective. Just as a magnet is defined by two poles which at the same time are distinct and complementary, in ethics the subjective and objective dimensions differ in their dynamic but are indispensable one or the other. One cannot exist without the other, for they are defined by their mutual relationship. In the search for clarity and consistency, the greatest intellectual temptation for the ethicist is to oversimplify, that is, to so emphasize either the objective or the subjective as radically to marginalize or even to eliminate the other. The real challenge is to recognize and integrate both. Ethics would be much simpler if it could be reduced to either: a) matter-in-evaluation (or Spirit-in-dialectic) progressing inexorably to some such destiny as total empirical or pragmatic control, the classless society, or the ultimate Synthesis; or, b) the aloof individual facing anguished existential decisions with the sole concern of being "authentic". However, ethics begins to engage reality--and, in turn, gains its own reality--only when it takes into account not either nature or freedom, but both. Only then can it engage the ambiguities and frustrations of life as human, which consist precisely in the relation between the two. As in a marriage, not only must the identity and relative autonomy of the two partners be respected and safeguarded, but their mutuality and inter-dependence must be insured and fostered. These volumes, are entitled Ethics at the Crossroads because they concern, not a monistic ethics, but the complex search to integrate both dimensions. For some, that option threatens the security they have found in more simplistic models. Nevertheless, rational justification can be found for the objective-subjective vision of ethics. This Introduction to Volume I, Normative Ethics and Objectivity, will suggest some of the reasons for positing an objective dimension to ethics. Volume II, entitled: Personalist Ethics and Human Subjectivity, will explore the dimension of subjectivity. Volume III, entitled Ethics and Culture will search to bring together these two directions in a higher synthesis in terms of culture. The introduction of each volume will provide a brief overview and rationale of the structure of its chapters. Most basically, the call for objectivity is based on the fact that human action must reflect the reality of the human condition. In other words, human reason must understand, and human freedom must accept, reality--including human reality--as it is. The facts of our environment, the nature of the human person, and their weight relative to human freedom may be debated, but not the need to take them into account. Inasmuch as the reality in question is, or has reference to what is human, it takes on a moral character. There are three basic dimensions to this. 1. The human as being-in-the-world. One basic reason why morality must have an objective dimension is that the human person is part of a cosmos or world which is given. As material, the human is subject to the basic forces and laws of nature; he or she exists within space and time. Though one may manipulate these, one cannot successfully disregard them. If anything, this view has been reinforced by the modern ecological movement which insists on obligations regarding the environment and the duty to respect the eco-system. Even the religiously inspired view which saw man as "master" of the world, now insists much more on man as "steward". Other ways of expressing the same basic idea are: the human person as "incarnate" (the Geist im Welt of Rahner), 5 or as contextualized (the human organism reacting to its environment). However this be expressed, the consequence is the same: reason must take account of one's situation in the world in order to discover a moral path. This intra-world reality of the human does not deny or exclude the spirituality of human kind or its transcendent destiny (see the appendix by G. Stanley in Volume II). The present volume insists that to be integrally human, the reality and impact of one's physical world must be taken into account. 2. Human consciousness as objective. Another way of reaching the same conclusion is through the relatively more "subjective" path of an analysis of human consciousness. The experience of human consciousness is initially and predominantly consciousness-of-objects, with an implicit consciousness-of-self. In other words, at least initially, our awareness is directed more outwardly than inwardly. It takes several years for truly reflexive knowledge (being aware of one's awareness: knowing that one knows) to mature. Our language manifests this when we say often "I know (or perceive) this or that", but only rarely "I know myself". It is characteristic of this consciousness-of-objects that one is aware of them as given. The objects of the consciousness include what we call cosmos or world. Gradually one grows aware of self-as-body with material characteristics, especially the fact of its being given. Finally, consciousness of one's emotions (feeling states) reveals that most often feelings are connected with transactions with the world: pleasure and pain often are derived from contact with objects which then become objects-of-desire and which are seen as good or bad inasmuch as they attract or repel. Our moral concepts of good or bad find their roots in these experiences. 3. The human as necessarily social and cultural. A critical dimension of the world in which the human finds him- or herself contextualized is that of other humans, i.e., society. One is brought into being by others--one's parents--whom one does not choose. Not only is one inexorably subjected to space and time, one has no say over whom one's parents are to be or the society into which one is brought. For years one literally is at the mercy of others, both for physical survival and growth and for one's cultural development. At least initially, one's biology or genetic constitution, as well as one's physical and cultural conditioning, are given--one has no choice in the matter. One's very human subjectivity--the subject of volume II--to the extent that it is formed and developed by language, is influenced largely by others. Much of our identity--our language, beliefs, character, tastes, and physical and mental health--is an effect of others. Even where we enjoy some autonomy, the opinions and influence of our community and cultural traditions weigh heavily on our moral decisions. "No man is an island": not only are we physically incarnate in a material world, but humanly we are contextualized in a world of other people, present and past. Both these dimensions--material and social--are objective, i.e., realities which in most respects are less the effect of freedom of choice on the part of the individual concerned than the contrary. Extensively, in the exercise of one's freedom, they constitute that to which, and according to which, one must respond. Since then individuals find themselves necessarily in the world and in society, and are explicitly more conscious of objects than of themselves, what is the meaning of this for morality and ethics? In the final analysis--everything. Even the most subjective of ethical theories will insist that individuals must be true to themselves. Certainly, that means being true to the total reality of one's existence, including the elements which are pre-determined and pre-determining.