Balogh István The Theory of “Strategic Blowback” US Strategy Towards Iran 1993-2010 Nemzetközi Tanulmányok Intézet Témavezető: Dr. N. Rózsa Erzsébet egyetemi magántanár 2013 © Balogh István ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Nemzetközi Kapcsolatok Doktori Iskola Nemzetközi és biztonsági tanulmányok alprogram Ph.D. értekezés Balogh István The Theory of “Strategic Blowback” US Strategy Towards Iran 1993-2010 Budapest, 2013 Table of Contents Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................. 7 List of Figures and Tables ................................................................................................. 8 List of Abbreviations ......................................................................................................... 8 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 9 I. Hypotheses and Methodology: TowardS an Alternative Approach to Foreign and Security Policy Strategy .................................................................................................. 14 1. Why the US and Iran? ................................................................................................. 14 2. Time Frame ................................................................................................................. 17 3. Hypothesis 1a – The Theory of “Strategic Blowback” ............................................... 18 4. Hypothesis 1b – The Strategy of “Seeking the Least Resistance” .............................. 28 5. Theoretical Foundations – Ontological Assumptions ................................................. 34 5. 1. Ontological Assumptions I: Neoclassical Realism ............................................. 37 5. 2. Ontological Assumptions II.: The Universality of Strategic Thought? - Foreign and Security Policy as Strategy ................................................................................... 44 5.2.1. The Nature and Philosophy of Strategy – Hegel, Tolstoy, Black Swans and the Unpredictable Ways of Destiny ......................................................................... 48 5.2.2. From Military Strategy to Grand Strategy – The “Demilitarization” of Strategy ................................................................................................................... 54 6. Methodology and Selection of the Empirical Sample – Epistemic Assumptions ....... 63 II. A Case Study of the Theory of Strategic Blowback: The US and Iran ...................... 66 1. The Clinton administration (1993-2001) .................................................................... 66 1.1. Missed Opportunities Under the Oslo Process..................................................... 68 1.1.1. Explaining Outcomes – Strategic Blowback under the Oslo Process ........... 75 1.2. The Policy of Dual Containment .......................................................................... 84 1.2.1. Explaining Outcomes – Strategic Blowback as a Result of Dual Containment ............................................................................................................................... 104 1.3. Détente Between the US and Iran under the Khatami Presidency ..................... 108 1.3.1. Explaining Outcomes – Strategic Blowback Under Khatami’s Détente ..... 113 2. The Bush Administration (2001-2009) ..................................................................... 119 2.1. Neoconservatism and the Bush Doctrine ........................................................... 121 2.2. The Bush Doctrine and Iran ............................................................................... 141 2.2.1. Explaining Outcomes – Strategic Blowback, Iran and the Bush Doctrine . 155 2.3. The Return to Containment: 2006-2009 – Business as Usual ............................ 164 2.3.1. Explaining Outcomes – Strategic Blowback and Containment .................. 178 5 3. The Obama Administration (2009–2010) ................................................................. 182 3.1. Overtures of the Obama administration ............................................................. 186 3.1.1. Explaining Outcomes – Strategic Blowback and the Diplomatic Opening Towards Iran .......................................................................................................... 189 3.2. The policy of containing Iran ............................................................................. 202 3.2.1. Explaining Outcomes – Strategic Blowback as a Result of Containment .. 209 III. Conclusion – A Case for a Strategy of Seeking the Least Resistence .................... 212 Appendix: Relevant Speeches of President George W. Bush Mentioning Iran 2001–2009 in Chronological Order ................................................................................................. 218 List of References ......................................................................................................... 227 Primary Sources and Legislation .................................................................................. 227 Secondary Sources ........................................................................................................ 238 Statistical Data .............................................................................................................. 274 List of the Author’s Related Publications ..................................................................... 283 6 Acknowledgments The author is indebted to the numerous people who directly or indirectly helped him complete his dissertation. The author has interacted with a great number of people regarding his research and it would be impossible to list everyone here. Thus, the following is by no means a full a list of those people and institutions to whom the author wishes to express his gratitude: Erzsébet N. Rózsa, Lázló Kiss J., Tamás Magyarics, Péter Rada, Péter Marton, László Csicsmann, András Rácz, Zoltán Gálik, Gergely Romsics, Tamás Matura, Zsolt Rostoványi, András Blahó, György Nógrádi, István Benczes, Erzsébet Kaponyi, Ferenc Gazdag, Botond Zákonyi, József Ruppert, Balázs Forgács, Gergely Varga, Péter Wagner, Tamás Csiki, Viktor Marsai, András Hettyey, the Department of International Relations and Security Studies at the National University of Public Service, the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, the Corvinus Society for Foreign Affairs and Culture, Csaba Rada, Viktor Friedman, Ágnes Béres, Bence Németh, Miklós Varga, Béla Soltész, Ádám Banai, Tibor Szilvágyi, Jeff Michaels and Sean Healy. Anyone who has been involved in research or producing scholarly work knows the toll the process takes on one’s personal environment. Thus, last – but most definitely not least – I would like to express my gratitude to my Parents and Family. They took their share of the burden resulting from my research and were nevertheless a constant source of encouragement and affection. Thank you all. 7 List of Figures and Tables Figure 1. The Positive and Disproportionate Relationship Between the Variables of H1a and H1b ........................................................................................................................... 26 Figure 2. The Relationship Between the Hypotheses of the Dissertation ...................... 34 Figure 3. The Multidisciplinary Approach Applied by the Dissertation ......................... 36 Figure 4. The Ontology of Neoclassical Realism as Applied to the US-Iran Conflict ... 43 Figure 5. The “Demilitarization” of the Concept of Strategy ......................................... 59 Figure 6. Direct High-Level Communication Channels Between the US and Iran 2001- 2007 ............................................................................................................................... 142 Figure 7. Illegal Transshipment Routes to Iran ............................................................. 174 List of Abbreviations AIPAC: American Israel Public Affairs Committee CENTCOM: US Central Command CIA: Central Intelligence Agency (US) CISADA: Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Sanctions Act DoD: Department of Defense EU3: United Kingdom, France and Germany FATF: Financial Action Task Force FPA: Foreign Policy Analysis GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council GSD: Gulf Security Dialogue GWOT: Global War on Terror IFSA: Iran Freedom Support Act ILSA: Iran and Libya Sanctions Act IRISL: Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines ISA: Iran Sanctions Act MKO: Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization MNF-I: Multi-National Force-Iraq MOIS: Ministry of Intelligence and Security (Islamic Republic of Iran) NSC: National Security Council (USA) NSS: National Security Strategy NPT: Nonproliferation Treaty OTFI: Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (Treasury Department, US) P5+1: The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany TRR: Tehran Research Reactor USGAO: US Government Accountability Office WINEP: Washington Institute for Near East Policy 8 Introduction “There are few nations in the world with which the United States has less reason to quarrel or more compatible interests than Iran.” (Kissinger [2001]: p. 196. also quoted in Balogh-Láng [2007b]: p. 37.) Henry Kissinger’s words describe well the contradictory and ambivalent nature of relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The conflict between Iran and the US has been high on the international political agenda ever since the rupture in