Succeeding in 21st Century Battle Network Competitions John Stillion and Bryan Clark Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 1 • Battle Network (BN) definition: – A combination of distributed target acquisition sensors (finders and damage assessors), command and control (deciders), weapons (shooters), and the electronic communications linking them together. • Essential BN attributes: – Enable shooters to engage targets they cannot “see” far more effectively than would otherwise be possible – Enable finders to achieve much higher levels of effectiveness as a group than they possess organically – Enable deciders to coordinate and prioritize tactical engagements at a much higher level of efficiency to achieve the desired operational effects – Enable those assessing the results of these operations (damage assessors) to determine their relative success with far greater accuracy than would otherwise be possible • BNs first emerged about 100 years ago but were relatively rare until recently due in part to the high cost of transmitting and processing information – This limited the number of BNs and the instances of BN competition • Declining cost and increasing power of information transmission and processing systems will likely spur BN proliferation, and with it BN competition 2 • Network attributes depend heavily on operational metrics • Tempo of operations influences decision to exploit or disrupt opposing network • “Virtual Attrition” is often more cost-effective than platform destruction • Competitions accelerate and culminate, then jump to new mode • In some cases one side or the other is “saved by the bell” when a conflict ends just before a competition jumps to a new mode 3 • Submarines vs. ASW – Examine competition with focus on BMC2, multi- domain elements, success of networked vs. autonomous attackers • IADS vs. Air Attack – Explore how “cutting-edge” technologies advantage first one side, then the other in Battle Network Competitions 4 • Submarines and commercial/escort ships are relatively slow – Dependent on cueing to get in position – Difficult to evade attack – Results in “slow-motion” operations (better to exploit comms) • Submarines have limited situational awareness – EM sensor range <10 nm; sonar ranges <30 nm normally – Difficult to determine if incoming weapon will be successful • Submarines lack self defense – Some decoys, but little else to defeat torpedoes and depth charges Fundamentals of ASW-sub competition remain largely unchanged. 5 Maximum stealthy sub speed / Merchant ship speed Subs maintain speed disadvantage & larger ships less ships vulnerable. & larger disadvantage speed maintain Subs 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00 1940 1942 1944 1946 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 Mean Transoceanic Merchant Ship Size Sub speed disadvantage (u/v) 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 0 50000 100000 150000 200000 250000 Mean Merchant Ship Size (tons) 6 Sep ’39– U-boat bases Sep ’39– Mar ’40 Sep ’39 & after Mar ’41 Jun ’44 Apr ’41–Jun ’44 Jun ’44– Apr ’45 U-boat bases Jul ’40–Dec ’41 Jan ’42– Jul ’40–Jun ’44 Jan ’44 Transatlantic convoys 1939–1945 Jan ’42–Sep ’42 Apr ’41–May ’43 Coastal convoys mid-1942–1945 U-boat patrol areas Jul ’43–Jun ’44 Long range & slow speed of adversaries shaped competition. 900000 120 Bombing of French U-boats to European U-boat bases coast and southern Atlantic 800000 Supply submarines start ops off Azores 100 700000 Overall shipping losses=shipping 600000 80 construction monthper lost or present boats U Start max submergen More escorts 500000 ce through for convoys Bay of U-boats deploy to Evasive convoy routing Biscay coast of France 60 based on shore HFDF “Wolf Pack” tactics start 400000 U-boats evacuate begins German decryption of French bases U-boats shift to convoy orders H-K groups sink surfaced night attack S-band radar 300000 Convoy escorts Naval Enigma code broken supply submarines 40 due to sonar threat Subs shift to Hedgehog fully Shipping losses (tons) losses Shipping proficient with U.S. coast U.S. coast fielded radar S-band GSR U-boats begin using convoys 200000 H-K carrier groups deployed X-band GSR deployed Norwegian bases Enigma HF/DF, radar on L-band GSR Invasion of code X-band radar 20 U-boats begin escort deployed “Saved by Norway & upgraded Allies crack new Enigma deployed 100000 using French bases low countries Escort CV Hedgehog code the Bell” Leigh Light & L-band radar a/c Continuous air escort New convoy codes Snorkel deployed 0 0 Sep-39 Jan-40 May-40 Sep-40 Jan-41 May-41 Sep-41 Jan-42 May-42 Sep-42 Jan-43 May-43 Sep-43 Jan-44 May-44 Sep-44 Jan-45 May-45 Shipping losses (tons) U-boats at sea in Atlantic U-boats sunk per month Key metric for allies: overall shipping losses. Overall shipping losses (X 1000 tons) 1200 120 Losses on U.S. East Coast and Carribean (X 1000 tons) Losses per month per U-boat (X 100 tons) Coastal vessels stay in inland U-boats at sea in Atlantic waterways, protected by minefields 1000 100 U-boats sunk off East Coast and in On U.S. entry into war, Caribbean 6 aircraft and ~12 By 1 April, 170 planes and 94 escort ships available escorts of various types monthper lost or present boats U (but not equipped) on East Coast 800 80 During May radar-equipped aircraft begin deploying to East Coast U-boats shift back to central and eastern Atlantic Coastal convoys start on East coast Enigma code broken 600 60 Radar equipped aircraft and Shipping lossesShipping escorts start deploying Coastal convoys start in Caribbean 400 40 Enigma code Effective weapons upgraded (hedgehog/mousetrap) deployed 200 20 0 0 Jan-40 Apr-40 Jul-40 Oct-40 Jan-41 Apr-41 Jul-41 Oct-41 Jan-42 Apr-42 Jul-42 Oct-42 Jan-43 Apr-43 Jul-43 Oct-43 Jan-44 1942 spike around U.S.; stopped by convoys w/out sinking subs. 120 Bombing of French U- U-boats to European coast boat bases and southern Atlantic Supply submarines start ops off Azores More escorts 100 for convoys Evasive convoy “Wolf Pack” routing based on tactics start shore HFDF begins U boats present or lost per monthper lost or present boats U German 80 U-boats shift to decryption of Start max submergence surfaced night attack convoy orders U-boats deploy through Bay of Biscay due to sonar threat to coast of France Convoy escorts U-boats evacuate 60 boat per monthper boat proficient with - French bases radar H-K groups sink S-band radar supply submarines Naval Enigma Hedgehog fully code broken Subs shift to 40 U.S. coast fielded S-band GSR U.S. coast U-boats begin using convoys deployed X-band GSR deployed Norwegian bases Enigma H-K carrier groups HF/DF, radar L-band GSR code X-band radar Shipping losses per U losses Shipping U-boats begin on escort deployed Invasion of upgraded deployed Norway & low using French bases Escort CV Hedgehog 20 countries Leigh Light & L-band Allies crack new Snorkel deployed radar a/c Enigma code Continuous air escort New convoy codes 0 Sep-39 Feb-40 Jul-40 Dec-40 May-41 Oct-41 Mar-42 Aug-42 Jan-43 Jun-43 Nov-43 Apr-44 Sep-44 Feb-45 Shipping losses per U-boat per month U-boats at sea U-boats sunk per month Key metric for Axis: U-boat productivity. North Atlantic convoy results Convoys % Convoys Convoys Ships Ships Sunk % Ships Sunk Sighted Sighted HX (9 kts) 23 923 8 12 35 1.3 SC (7 kts) 24 991 14 45 58 4.6 ON (9.5 kts) 24 897 11 29 36 3.2 ONS (7 kts) 23 836 11 31 48 3.7 Japanese convoy results 1400 25.0 1200 Number of convoys 20.0 1000 Percentage of M/V sunk 800 15.0 600 10.0 400 Numberof convoys 5.0 Percentage of ships lost 200 0 0.0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Convoy size But convoys alone reduced submarine effectiveness. 11 Location of attacks Independent Coordinated U.S. attacks, Atlantic and Mediterranean; Jan 1943–Feb 1944 Number of incidents 176 18 Number assessed as sunk or probably sunk 9 3 Percent successful 5 17 U.S. attacks, Atlantic and Mediterranean; March 1944–May 1945 Number of incidents 41 38 Number assessed as sunk or probably sunk 5 21 Percent successful 12 55 Probability of regaining contact Single Ship Coordinated Jan 1943–July 1943 0.54 0.8 Aug 1943–Feb 1944 0.68 0.9 Engagement platform sensors not able to gain & maintain contact. Lethal # of charges Weapon Weapons effectiveness per barrage radius (ft) / barrage 1st half ’43 2nd half ’43 1st half ’44 2nd half ’44 1st qtr ’45 Depth Charge 21 9 5.4 4 6.4 5.1 7 Mousetrap 0 24 7.5 15.4 28.1 23 Squid 0 16 33.3 62 Depth Charge (1939) Hedgehog (1941) Mousetrap (1942) Squid (1943) Smaller, aimed contact weapons more effective. 13 Sep ’39–Mar ’41 Jun ’44–Apr ’45 Brest Lorient Jul ’40–Dec ’41 St. Nazaire La Pallice Bordeaux Apr ’41–May ’43 “Virtual attrition” in Bay of Biscay much more important than kills. 50 U-boats return to 120 max submergence 45 U - 40 / losses boat 100 35 Bombing of French U- U-boats ordered to surface U deployed of Percentage 80 boat bases in day, submerge at night 30 duration (hours) duration U-boats start max New detector slows boats, submergence Covert detection increases Time to introduce RWR kills, but only modestly increases presence in Bay takes half as long as 25 60 increase presence in Bay and reduces Atlantic previous time Radar detector protects presence U-boats but reduces 20 productivity U-boats fight back with FLAK 40 - 15 boats Enigma code broken Naxos S-band GSR boat presence / transit presence boat - deployed, not effectively X-band radar in Bay in U Hedgehog deployed deployed 10 20 Enigma code upgraded S-band radar H-K groups start Naxos S-band GSR L-band radar L-band GSR deployed 5 more effective deployed in Bay Leigh Light deployed deployed in Bay S-band radar deployment starts 0 0 Jan-42 Mar-42 May-42 Jul-42 Sep-42 Nov-42 Jan-43 Mar-43 May-43 Jul-43 Sep-43 Nov-43 Jan-44 Uu-boat losses per month Transit Duration (hours) U-boats at sea in Atlantic Percentage of deployed subs in Bay Metric was kills; should be “virtual attrition” of U-boat presence.