A PUBLICATION OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR AND WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM A PUBLICATION OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR AND WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM BAGHDAD, Iraq (April 5, 2008) - 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, provides security on a street in the Sadr City District of Baghdad. Photo by Sgt. Mark Matthews, U.S. Army. Summer, 2007 – Summer, 2008 Special Groups Regenerate By Marisa Cochrane The greatest threat to stability in Iraq is violence by Iranian-backed militias, known as Special Groups. As Coalition and Iraqi Forces refocused their efforts on combating such groups, they launched a number of offensives in the spring of 2008 that left these Iranian-backed networks fractured and brittle. In the wake of these operations, much of the enemy leadership fl ed to Iran to reconsolidate and retrain. Now, as US Commanders plan for their return, past enemy behavior can help predict the options available to Special Groups. This report offers a comprehensive look at this pattern as well as current trends in Iranian-backed enemy activity and the likely enemy response. Having consolidated their networks in Iran, it is highly likely that Special Groups will return to Iraq and rebuild their networks, adopting new tactics to escalate violence accordingly. U.S. Forces and their Iraqi counterparts must thwart such actions by continuing to dismantle Special Groups by targeting leaders, fi nanciers, trainers, and facilitators; by preventing Special Groups and JAM from to reestablishing their criminal rings; by continuing to improve the Iraqi Security Forces; and by accelerating reconstruction efforts to improve basic services and reduce popular support for the militia. Disorder and weak government allow Special Groups to operate effectively as a Hezbollah-like organization. PAGE 1 • AUGUST 29, 2008 A PUBLICATION OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR AND WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM INTRODUCTION they will seek to reconsolidate and reconstitute their networks in Iraq. Hence, a key issue for ince early 2007, U.S. forces have Coalition and Iraqi forces right now is how to aggressively targeted Iranian-backed predict and prepare for the enemy response. They militias known as “Special Groups.” The must shape conditions in Iraq in such a way that pace of operations against these networks will minimize the threat of violence as JAM and S Special Groups fighters return from Iran. U.S. intensified dramatically in mid-2007; and by the fall, the Special Groups network was starting Forces must also respond in such a way that the to unravel. As a result, in late 2007, Iranian- actions of the reconsolidated JAM and Special backed Special Groups embarked upon a period Groups organizations do not compromise its of regeneration and preparation. They sought strategic objectives, which include a secure Iraq to consolidate their networks and shift their with a legitimate and capable government. A tactics in response to increased study of the last year of Special Groups activity indicates a pressure by Coalition Forces. n According to some By early 2008, Special Groups deliberate pattern of enemy began to escalate their attacks estimates, 5,000 fighters activity that may prove helpful on Coalition and Iraqi Forces, have sought refuge in predicting the enemy reaction in what appeared to be the first across the border, where and mitigating its effects. actions of an impending enemy they are regrouping and This report documents offensive coordinated with Jaysh training. Their motives the pattern of Iranian-backed al Mahdi (JAM). Their efforts militia activities over the were disrupted, however, as and aims likely have not past year. After defining JAM Prime Minister Maliki launched a changed; therefore, it is and Special Groups, the first surprise military counter-offensive almost assured that they section of this document in Basra in late March 2008. will seek to reconsolidate examines the pattern by which As Special Groups and and reconstitute their these hostile organizations regenerated their capacities in Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) partners networks in Iraq. reacted to the Basra offensive late 2007 and early 2008. At that and attempted to stir up violence time, Iranian-backed groups across the south, Coalition and Iraqi Forces were consolidating, training, moved to contain the violence. Subsequent preparing for a future offensive. The essay also security offensives in Baghdad and Maysan documents their deliberate escalation of violence Province left Iranian-backed enemy networks from January to March 2008, in advance of their fractured and brittle. Indeed, much of the JAM offensive. While Special Groups attempted to and Special Group leadership has fled to Iran commence their offensive in late March, Prime in order to evade capture. According to some Minister Maliki’s decision to launch a security estimates, 5,000 fighters have sought refuge operation in Basra sparked an abrupt response across the border, where they are regrouping by these Iranian-linked cells, diverting them and training.1 Their motives and aims likely have from their plan. The second part of this report not changed;2 therefore, it is almost assured that details the Government of Iraq counteroffensive against JAM and Special Groups, as well as their Marisa Cochrane is the Research Manager at the Institute fight for Sadr City and the enemy’s flight to Iran. for the Study of War, www.understanding.war.org. Her Finally, the report concludes with an assessment research focus includes security operations in Baghdad and of current trends in enemy activity and a Basra, as well as Shi’a militia activity throughout central consideration of measures to thwart their eventual and southern Iraq. She holds a Bachelor’s Degree in return from Iran. International Studies from Boston College and she has also studied at the London School of Economics. PAGE 2 • AUGUST 29, 2008 A PUBLICATION OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR AND WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM JAM AND SPECIAL GROUPS A number of JAM loyalists heeded Sadr’s calls; however, long-standing splinter cells, such as he Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) is the militia of Special Groups, used this window to continue the Sadrist Trend, the Shi’a political faction and escalate their violent activities. that is led by Muqtada al-Sadr. JAM first Special Groups are Shi’a militia cells that became prominent in April 2004 when receive funding, training, and weapons from T Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods it fought against US forces in East Baghdad and in Najaf. From 2006 to mid-2007, JAM Force (IRGC-QF), the Iranian Special Forces militias engaged in a territorial struggle with that export the Islamic Revolution to other al-Qaeda in Iraq and other Sunni groups for countries. Special Groups are not responsive control of Baghdad. During this time, JAM to the directives of Moqtada al Sadr. (For a expanded its territorial control, moving into detailed account of the formation of Special mixed or predominantly Shi’a neighborhoods and forcefully displacing or killing the local Sunni population. JAM was initially able to gain control in many of these areas of Baghdad on page 13 by offering the Shi’a population protection from AQI and social services not provided by the government. JAM groups were largely self-financing; and they supported their operations primarily through racketeering networks. At the height of their expansion in late 2006 and early 2007, JAM militiamen relied upon corruption, intimidation and extortion of the Shi’a population to enhance their power and wealth.3 During this period, Sadr’s control over his militia was diminishing and pre-existing splinters in the movement became evident. A number of these splinter groups were formed as early as 2004.4 Sadr’s departure for Iran in January 2007, just before the surge began, accelerated the fracturing of the groups. Groups, see Iraq Report 6, “Iran’s Proxy War.”) In 2007, Muqtada al-Sadr twice instructed The constituencies of the JAM and Special his militia to stand down, first at the beginning Groups nevertheless overlap a great deal, and the of the Baghdad Security Plan, Operation Fardh leadership likewise blends together. Many of the al-Qanoon, in February 2007, and later in August top Special Group leaders were close associates 2007, when he declared another six-month of Muqtada al-Sadr, including commander Qais ceasefire in the wake of violence in Karbala Khazali. Khazali, who headed Special Groups during the Shabaniyah festival and pilgrimage. until he was captured by Coalition Forces in PAGE 3 • AUGUST 29, 2008 A PUBLICATION OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR AND WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM March 2007, has a long personal history with the level of resistance U.S. forces expected to Muqtada al-Sadr and the Sadrist movement, but encounter in Sadr City was high, and the political a differing vision of its proper directtion. This ramifications for doing so were significant. was evident in the departure of Khazali as Sadr’s U.S. forces instead adopted a strategy to spokesman and close aide following the JAM contain the violent elements in Sadr City, rather uprising in Najaf in 2004. Moreover, as the than conduct full-scale clearing operations at Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces have placed that time. They conducted targeted raids against increasing pressure on JAM, many of its fighters criminal and extremist elements, capturing have turned to Iran for support.5 Special Groups numerous Jaysh al-Mahdi extremists and operate almost exclusively in JAM-dominated Iranian-backed Special Groups members. While neighborhoods. During the recent security these efforts helped to reduce levels of violence offensives in Basra and Baghdad, the distinction throughout Baghdad, the Jaysh al-Mahdi, Special between groups was blurred at best.6 This was Groups, and other Shi’a criminal elements especially evident in Sadr City, where Iranian- operated freely in Sadr City and could project backed militia elements fought alongside their force from there.