Antirealist Essentialism Jonathan Edward Banks e University of Leeds School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy August 2014 i ii iii e candidate confirms that this work is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others. is copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. © 2014 e University of Leeds and Jonathan Edward Banks. e right of Jonathan Edward Banks to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents act 1988. iv v Acknowledgements I would like to thank my sage supervision team, John Divers and Scott Shalkowski, who did an exemplary job moulding a less than exceptional mind into a (hopefully) competent young philosopher. Many hours of discussion have played an incalculable role not only in the production of this thesis, but in my development as a scholar. ank you to my examiners, Helen Steward and Fabrice Correia, for a stimulating viva and great feedback. I would also like to thank my fellow grad students both past and present for much help, friendship and lively debate (both philosophical and otherwise). Of particular note are Jordan Bartol, Dominic Berry, Richard Caves, Fran Fairbairn, Nanna Lüders-Kaalund, Kerry McKenzie, Bert Muckle, Dave Race, Efram Sera- Shriar, and Carl ‘Swiggles’ Warom. Many of you helped me out in my many hours of need, with a pint, a place to stay, or just some good company. I assure you, it never went unappreciated. Extra special thanks go to Dani Adams and Sarah Adams, with whom I have had the distinct pleasure of sharing my philosophical education. ese fantastic, clever people have read more of my work, and listened to more of my ramblings, than anyone. Also of extra special note are the contributions of omas Brouwer and Michael Bench-Capon, from whom I have probably learnt as much as I have from my supervisors. Much of this thesis owes a great debt to discussions with both of them, from the insights they shared with me, and the amount they taught me (oen quite explicitly). You sirs, are both scholars and gentlemen. I also received much help and support from the Philosophy department at Leeds. e department awarded me a fees scholarship; Nick Jones offered me work as his assistant; and the office staff were ever-helpful. I’d like to thank the faculty at Leeds for creating such an engaging research environment. In particular I’m grateful to Elizabeth Barnes, Ross Cameron, Nick Jones, Robin Le Poidevin, Heather Logue, Andrew McGonigal, Aaron Meskin, Jason Turner, and Robbie vi Williams for many useful discussions of my research, life as an academic, and how to be a better teacher. I’d also like to thank the late, great Nick Maloney of St Boniface’s College, Plymouth. He introduced me to philosophy with humour and candour. I never got a chance to properly thank him in person. I’d like to thank all of the students I’ve taught over the past five years, even the rubbish ones. Without the challenges and inspiration I encountered whilst teaching I would not have developed the passion for education that I hope will keep me striving to become a better teacher. To all of my friends outside of the academic bubble: I’m sorry for being a boring recluse for the last five years, and I’m sorry for how much you’re going to have to put up with me from now on. My wonderful family gave me a huge amount of support, both emotional and monetary. ank you for always having faith in my abilities, and unwaveringly supporting my passion. My final and greatest thanks go to Michaela Livingstone. She is my favourite person. She kept me sane when I would otherwise have struggled. She makes a great cup of tea. She is way better than Philosophy. vii Abstract is project is an investigation into the prospects for an antirealist theory of essence. Essentialism is the claim that at least some things have some of their properties essentially. Essentialist discourse includes claims such as “Socrates is essentially human”, and “Socrates is accidentally bearded”. Historically, there are two ways of interpreting essentialist discourse. I call these positions ‘modal essentialism’ and ‘neo-Aristotelian essentialism’. According to modal essentialism, for Socrates to be essentially human is for it to be necessary that he be a human if he exists, and for Socrates to accidentally have a beard is for it to be contingent that Socrates has a beard if he exists. According to neo-Aristotelian essentialism, objects have definitions in something like the way words do. For Socrates to be essentially human but accidentally bearded is for it to be part of the definition of Socrates that he is human, but not part of that definition that he is bearded. I argue that both are susceptible to antirealist interpretation. is thesis sets about showing that this is the case. In Chapters One and Two I investigate neo-conventionalist theories of modality, in the hope of using such a position to develop an antirealist modal essentialism. In Chapter ree I discuss the debate between modal and neo- Aristotelian essentialism and conclude that it is by no means settled. In Chapter Four I develop an antirealist neo-Aristotelian essentialism based on the mechanism of one of the neo-conventionalist accounts of modality. In Chapter Five I argue that this account is in a better position to give an essentialist theory of necessity than its realist counterparts. I conclude that, regardless of whether one is a modal or neo-Aristotelian essentialist, antirealist essentialism is a viable theory of essence that is worthy of consideration in contemporary debate. viii ix Contents Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................vi Abstract ...................................................................................................................... viii Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 1 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 2. Project Goals .............................................................................................................. 4 3. Essentialism ............................................................................................................... 5 4. Antirealism ................................................................................................................ 9 5. Conventionalism .....................................................................................................10 5.1 Traditional Conventionalism...........................................................................10 5.2 e Downfall of Traditional Conventionalism .............................................13 5.3 What Would a New Conventionalist Account Need to be Like? ................16 5.4 Conventionalism vs. Antirealism ....................................................................19 6. Chapter Outline .......................................................................................................21 Chapter One: Deflationary and Humean Neo-Conventionalism ..............................26 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................26 2. Neo-Conventionalism ............................................................................................27 2.1 Deflationary and Humean Neo-Conventionalism ........................................27 2.2 A Note on Naturalness .....................................................................................30 3. Truth by Convention ..............................................................................................33 3.1 Does Neo-Conventionalism Rely on Truth by Convention? .......................33 3.2 Does Type 2 Grounding Count as Truth by Convention? ...........................37 3.3 Is Reliance on Truth by Convention Problematic for the Deflationist? .....39 4. e Contingency Problem .....................................................................................42 x 4.1 Setting up the Problem .................................................................................... 42 4.2 e Einheuser Framework .............................................................................. 47 4.3. Applying the Einheuser Framework to Neo-Conventionalism ................. 51 4.4 e Contingency Problem: Continued .......................................................... 53 4.5 An Unsuccessful Response .............................................................................. 56 4.6 e Proposed Solution ..................................................................................... 57 4.7 Guarding Against the Original Contingency reat .................................... 59 5. Two Unanswered Questions for Deflationism and Humeanism ...................... 61 6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 63 Chapter Two: Sidellean Conventionalism ..................................................................... 64 1. Introduction ...........................................................................................................