Akrasia: Plato and the Limits of Education? Colm Shanahan Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Dublin, Trinity College Supervisor: Prof. Vasilis Politis Submitted to the University of Dublin, Trinity College, August 2017 Declaration I declare that this thesis has not been submitted as an exercise for a degree at this or any other university and it is entirely my own work. I agree to deposit this thesis in the University’s open access institutional repository or allow the library to do so on my behalf, subject to Irish Copyright Legislation and Trinity College Library conditions of use and acknowledgement. Signed: __________________________ Date:_____________ (Colm Shanahan) Summary In this dissertation, I shall argue for the following main claim: (1a) the motivational neutrality of reason. I will show that this concept reveals that, for Plato, (1b) reason is itself a necessary condition of the possibility of akrasia, and a central explanatory element in his account of akrasia. In presenting the soul with the capacity to take account of the whole soul, the motivational neutrality of reason seems to be the precondition of moving from having such a capacity, in a speculative manner, to generating desires and actions based upon such considerations. If this were not so, then how could the rational part of the soul, for example, put its good to one side, where such is required, to achieve the good of the whole soul? This distancing from the good associated with the rational part of the soul is precisely the grounding upon which the rational part of the soul generates the space to assess the goods of the other soul parts. In this way, the rational part of the soul must bring this motivational neutrality to the soul. It is by such that a desire for food, for example, can be assented to in the presence of the greater good of learning; that is, where the former desire represents the greater good of the soul. In this case, even if the desire for food is pursued on the basis of generating the optimum conditions for the greater good of learning, it nevertheless remains that that the soul can act for the greater good of the soul, and this can be achieved by forgoing the greater good of learning. This is an instance in which there is a positive outcome to the motivational neutrality of reason. However, since this motivational neutrality facilitates the selection of the lesser good at the cost of the greater good, this positive outcome is not the only possible outcome. Since the motivational quality of the greater good is present – but in a way that removes its motivational aspect – it does not necessarily have to exert force over the soul. This opens the floodgates for taking motivation from the lesser good, even when such is not concomitant with the good of the whole soul. In this way, the motivational neutrality of the rational part of the soul brings with it the capacity to assess the goods of each soul part as goods. It is by such that the greater good of the whole soul can be determined by assessing these goods’ values in relation to each other, and this is what is weighted against the good of the whole soul. Yet, this means that, after the floodgates have been opened, the lesser good can be chosen in the presence of knowledge of the greater good. From this it follows that the pursuit of the lesser good can be knowingly opted for, in spite of the fact that this does not serve the good of the whole soul. This ascribes a necessary role to the rational part of the soul in generating akrasia. This necessary role is a functional one, in which the rational part of the soul facilitates the very antithesis of the good of the whole soul – the lesser good, or the bad of the soul. As such, any explication of Plato’s conception of akrasia requires taking account of the rational part of the soul in generating the conditions by which the lesser good can be opted for. Hence, I attribute a central explanatory element to the rational part of the soul in accounting for akrasia. To outline this thesis, I will be relying, in the first instance, on the Protagoras and Meno, and, thereafter, the Symposium, Republic, and Phaedrus. I will refer to the Protagoras and Meno to generate a sense of the view that the motivational neutrality of reason shall be contrasted with. In the case of the Symposium, Republic, and Phaedrus, I will show how the concept of motivational neutrality is utilised by Plato. I will be particularly concerned with showing how, with the case of Alcibiades, Plato presents us with an instance in which reason is outlined as the key to generating the akratic experience. Indeed, this insight in the Symposium will set the grounding for my interpretation of the Republic and Phaedrus. By holding 1a, I will engage with the debate in the literature about the relationship between reason and the non-rational parts of the soul, particularly: (i) whether the non-rational parts are good-directed, and, (ii) whether they have a conception of their own good, independent of reason. In this debate, there are two polarised views: on the one side, the appetitive part’s desires are brute and do not take a good as their object. On the other side, these same desires are good directed and have a proper conception of their own good. I shall argue for a middle position which holds that: while these desires are good-directed, only reason has a proper conception of the good of the non-rational parts. I will also argue that the non-rational parts have, nevertheless, a primitive conception of their own good, such that they can recognize when they are opposed by something outside of themselves. The non-rational soul parts operate within specific modalities that confirm ‘good-directedness’ without them having to be ascribed anything such as an understanding of good per se. The capacity to recognise anything as being in opposition to them confirms that the non-rational parts of the soul are good-directed and that this good- directedness represents their ‘good’. Yet, it is also clear that Plato does not hold this good-directedness to be equivalent to the quality of good-directed desires that the rational part operates with. The middle position I shall hold differentiates between the good-directed natures of the rational and non-rational parts of the soul by arguing that the specific modalities of good that the non-rational parts operate within are such that they display no awareness of the good of the whole soul. This is so because they do not have the capacity to consider a good that is not their own. The good of the non-rational parts of the soul can be opposed by the goods of the other soul parts but there is nothing to suppose that the non-rational parts of the soul understand the grounding of this opposition to be predicated upon a ‘rivalling’ good. This demonstrates the primitive nature of their good-directed desires: they are good-directed, but from within a limited conception of good which does not elicit a good of the whole soul and, as such, does not elicit the greater good of the soul. It is precisely this capacity of the rational part of the soul to assess the good of the other soul parts that allows it to pursue the good of the whole soul. This is an outcome which may well entail the curtailment of its own desires/goods, and so the rational part of the soul must be attributed the motivational neutrality with which to assess the merit of any good claim. In this way, the rational part of the soul has the ability to step outside of the motivational force of any good claim in order to determine if it represents a good. This is the most defining characteristic of 1a, and it is this ability that allows the soul to knowingly take motivation from the lesser good. Hence, 1a holds that reason is what facilitates akrasia. The defence of 1b will build on 1a, and on the defence of 1a (as in B above). I shall argue that akrasia remains unaccounted for in Plato’s corpus so long as the role that reason plays in facilitating the akratic experience is not discerned. This is a most unsatisfactory outcome since, by my reading, the building blocks for an understanding of akrasia are to be found in Plato’s work. Understanding the limited nature of the good-directed quality of the non-rational soul parts suggests that they are not good-independent. Rather, it suggests that, if they are to generate a real good, this will merely be a chance occurrence. It is the task of the rational part of the soul to utilise this ‘chance’ and to ensure that only goods that are congruent with the good of the whole soul should be pursued. However, this capacity requires the removal of the motivational force of the good of each soul part, and it is this that opens up the possibility of the akratic experience. As such, the very nature of 1a requires 1b, since the capacity to understand akrasia necessitates the discernment of the rational part’s culpability in generating akrasia. The rational part of the soul does not, therefore, necessarily pursue rational ends or ends that represent the greater good of the whole soul.