Copyright by Michelle Christina Whyman 2016 The Dissertation Committee for Michelle Christina Whyman Certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: The Roots of Legislative Durability How Information, Deliberation, and Compromise Create Laws that Last Committee: Bryan Jones, Supervisor Sean Theriault Brian Roberts Christopher Wlezien Zachary Elkins The Roots of Legislative Durability How Information, Deliberation, and Compromise Create Laws that Last by Michelle Christina Whyman, B.A., M.A. Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Austin in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Texas at Austin August 2016 Acknowledgements I must begin by thanking my advisor, Bryan Jones, without whose encouragement I would not have pursued a Ph.D. He was always more than willing to back his students and support them in reaching their academic and professional goals. His office door was always open and he expertly guided me through the trials and tribulations of graduate school and this project. I am forever grateful for his help in setting me on this path. I extend my gratitude to the members of my committee. I owe Sean Theriault my deepest thanks for all the time he devoted to my education on Article I and the rich and detailed feedback he generously provided at all stages of this project. Additionally, I thank Chris Wlezien for his stalwart enthusiasm for this project from its inception, and Zach Elkins for inspiring me to examine the durability of political phenomena. I am also thankful to Brian Roberts, who regularly posed thoughtful, penetrating questions, and with whom I greatly enjoyed discussing this project. I thank him for coining the term, “Formula One Theory.” My colleagues at the Policy Agendas Project, Maraam Dwidar, Rebecca Eissler, E.J. Fagan, Jonathan Lewallen, Annelise Russel, JoBeth Surface Shafran, and Trey Thomas, read or heard my argument dozens of times. Their advice and support were helpful and much appreciated. Jeremy Hammett, Heather Hughes, Kristie Kelly, Rachel Navarre, and Justin Toungate, extended their friendship and encouragement at various stages of this journey. Robert Luskin was always ready with a glass of French wine, lively discussion, and excellent advice. Clare Brock’s sterling friendship and unfaltering support has meant the world to me. I am blessed to have found superb mentors and lifelong friends at the University of Texas at Austin. iv I have always known that my bases of support are in Ohio and Idaho. To my family there, Lauren Burnett, Christi Carlson, Bob Gardner, Sherry Gordon, Sandra Gustavson, Marilyn Harman, Stephanie and Russell James, Raymond Kaczur, Barbara Martien, Marge Pauls, Mona and Jim Rainwater, Tom Richter, and Judith Weiss, I say thank you for your ceaseless prayers and love. My Godparents, David and Linda Mihalic, Roberta Parsons, and Ralph and Chun Son Hildebrand, have lead by example and showered me with all the encouragement and love any daughter could wish for. Their support of me—and this project—saw me through all the highs and lows of graduate school. Words cannot express my gratitude to Linda Mihalic, to whom I dedicate this dissertation. She bent my twig towards God’s light and inspired me to grow into the person I am today. If I follow her example, I’ll never stop growing, learning, and working on myself. v The Roots of Legislative Durability How Information, Deliberation, and Compromise Create Laws that Last Michelle Christina Whyman, PhD The University of Texas at Austin, 2016 Supervisor: Bryan Jones This dissertation poses a simple question: “What makes law last?” My core argument is that when legislators seek out diverse sources of information, engage in deliberation, and reach a substantive compromise, they are more likely to enact durable law. To identify the systematic determinants of legislative durability, I hand-collected a dataset, drawn from the volumes of the United States Code, that documents the longevity of all 268,935 provisions of federal law passed between 1789 and 2012. Based on the combined results of logistic and duration analysis, I find that the most durable provisions are the subject of lengthy deliberation and are voted on before the last moments of a Congressional session. They are normally referred to multiple House and Senate committees and are enacted after Congress has gained institutional experience in a particular policy area. Durable laws also tend to be considered under open rules that facilitate the involvement of all legislators and typically exclude non-germane provisions. Finally, provision level durability is conditional on changes in control of Congress and the public’s preferences for a more or less active federal government. vi Table of Contents List of Tables ......................................................................................................... xi List of Figures ....................................................................................................... xii Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................1 Changes to the Status Quo ..............................................................................4 The Repeal of Glass-Steagall ..........................................................................7 Durability versus Flexibility .........................................................................13 Preview of Coming Chapters ........................................................................16 Chapter 2: Nullifying Law in a System of Separated Powers ...............................20 What We Know About Durability ................................................................20 Challenges to current approaches ........................................................24 The Primacy of Statutory Law ......................................................................26 Repeal versus Omission: Substance versus Implementation ........................28 Nullifying law in a System of Separated Powers..........................................30 Repeal ..................................................................................................31 The Power of the Purse ........................................................................33 Amendment ..........................................................................................34 Sunset Provisions .................................................................................34 Judicial Review ....................................................................................36 Executive Non-Enforcement ................................................................40 Repeals, Omissions, and Measuring Durability ...................................43 Chapter 3: Information, Deliberation, and Compromise .......................................45 Information, Deliberation, and Compromise ................................................45 Information and Deliberation ........................................................................49 The Role of Venue and Time ...............................................................54 Committee Referrals ...................................................................54 Truncated Debate ........................................................................58 The Role of Experience .......................................................................65 New Issues ..................................................................................65 vii Old Issues and Established Law .................................................69 Substantive Compromise ..............................................................................72 The Role of Policy Focus .....................................................................75 Logrolling ...................................................................................76 Omnibus Legislation ...................................................................78 Formula One Theory of Germaneness ........................................82 The Role of Procedural Tactics............................................................84 The Role of Enacting Majorities ..........................................................85 Small Enacting Majorities...........................................................86 Partisan Enacting Majorities .......................................................88 The Role of Restrictive Rules ..............................................................90 The Role of Control of Government ....................................................93 Unified and Divided Governments .............................................94 Shifts in Control of Government.................................................96 Polarization .................................................................................99 Chapter 4: The United States Code and the Durability of Federal Law ..............103 The United States Code ..............................................................................103 Historical Development of a Substantively Organized Code ............104 Positive Law Codification in the Modern Code ................................106 The Role of the Office of Law Revision Counsel..............................110 Building a Political Science Dataset From the United States Code............112 Identifying Repeals ............................................................................115