Why China Wants to Expand Its Arctic Footprint (NASA) “Why China Wants to Expand Its Arctic Footprint” is republished with permission from Stratfor Worldview. Copyright Stratfor 2019. Why China Wants to Expand Its Arctic Footprint • The Arctic’s growing strategic importance will Asia and Europe will ultimately drive interest in the oblige Beijing to continue its efforts to assert itself region, creating competing demands for sovereignty, in the region from a position of constraints. governance and right of passage. • Because China lacks an Arctic shore, it will The Big Picture rely on bilateral and multilateral cooperation, particularly with Russia and the Nordic countries, Persistent warming and changing meteorological and adopt a soft approach to ensure its say in the conditions have transformed the Arctic Ocean into development of the region. a more strategic region, as its diminishing icecaps open up access to natural resources and new ship- • Russia’s economic quandary and standoff with ping corridors. As regional powers like Russia, the the West could provide Beijing a window into United States and Canada vie for dominance in the region, but such cooperation will be subject the area, the more distant China is racing to legit- to future shifts among the United States, Russia imize its presence wherever it can and secure its and China. interests by expanding its access and capabilities in the region. The Arctic’s formidable natural barriers have de- terred most human activity for millennia. But with Entering the fray is China, albeit from a position of the ocean expected to be ice-free in summer by weakness. Unlike the five Arctic states, China’s lack 2030, the Arctic is now squarely in the geopolitical of a coastline on the ocean deprives it of a legal spotlight, as powers near and far rush to secure basis to articulate claims for access to the region, their positions in an emerging competition. By some as well as the ability to project power alone. At the estimates, the Arctic contains 30 percent of the same time, the Arctic’s strategic value — and the world’s undiscovered natural gas and 13 percent of cost to China if doesn’t get a slice of the pie — is its oil reserves. What’s more, the receding ice could simply too great for Beijing to settle for the status of soon provide access to minerals, fish and other a mere stakeholder, like South Korea and Japan. In resources. At the same time, potential shipping the end, the growing importance of Arctic resources routes — including the Northern Sea route and the and sea routes, as well as the emerging military Northwest Passage along the Russian and Canadian competition between Russia and the United States, coasts, respectively — will become available, along obliges Beijing to sail north. But ins tead of pro- with perhaps the Transpolar Passage in the more jecting power outright, Beijing is carefully pursuing distant future. At present, the Arctic’s climate will multilateral mechanisms and bilateral cooperation largely hamper hydrocarbon exploration, the use of with friendly Arctic states to gain access to the area. sea routes and the construction of infrastructure for In so doing, China might ultimately help change the many years to come, but the promise of energy and strategic map of the North Pole. mineral riches and shorter maritime routes between STRATFOR • 2 A “Near-Arctic State” neglected and landlocked northeast provinces of Jilin and Heilongjiang. While territorial disputes have created a vociferous debate over the ownership of natural resources in With these interests in mind — alongside fears that the South China Sea, much of the undiscovered oil it could be sidelined from the Arctic contest as a and gas reserves in the Arctic are believed to lie in non-littoral state — Beijing has moved to assert uncontested areas, making it possible for outside its position where possible in the already-crowded nations like China to enter the region. And although North Pole. So far, China has taken only baby the Northern Sea route is still not a routine mari- steps in the region, as high transit costs due to the time passage, ships sailing from the northeastern need for ice-breaking services from Russia have Chinese port of Dalian to Rotterdam could shorten prevented the route from becoming commercially their travel time by as much as 10 days, or 5,000 viable, yet Beijing has markedly increased its efforts nautical miles, if they opted for it rather than pass- to establish itself in the strategic region. ing through the Strait of Malacca and then the Suez Canal. For China, the route would not only eliminate Since its first research expedition to the Arctic in some of the country’s exposure to security risks and 1999 and its construction of the Arctic Yellow River supply disruptions associated with existing shipping Station on Svalbard in 2004, China has intensi- lanes but also spur development in the relatively fied its soft approach and scientific involvement in the region. It has elevated its role in climate Arctic Sea Ice and Shipping Corridors Minimum sea ice extent and modeled future extent by year CHINA RUSSIA Black Sea Sea of Okhotsk le irc C Northern Sea Mediterranean c Sea ti rc Route A Laptev Sea Barents FINLAND Sea 2010 SWEDEN 2000 2020 NORWAY 2012 Norwegian Sea North Sea Bering Sea Greenland 2050 Sea 2100 2030 Transpolar Alaska GREENLAND ICELAND Route (Denmark) Baffin Bay Labrador Pacific Sea Northwest Atlantic Ocean Passage Ocean Hudson CANADA Bay Data: NGA, NSIDC, NOAA UNITED STATES Copyright Stratfor 2018 STRATFOR • 3 change affairs, forged closer scientific cooperation eral resources and attempting to gain oil exploration with Nordic countries and taken further steps to rights in Iceland — Russia’s economic challenges join the Arctic Council as a permanent observer. and standoff with the West have provided China Beijing is also in the process of constructing two with a window into a relatively closed region. more icebreakers, including a nuclear-powered icebreaker. Beyond that, the country has also quick- As the dominant Arctic power thanks to its long ened the pace of its Arctic exploration, traversing coastline from the Barents Sea in the west to the the Northwest Passage with an icebreaker and the Bering Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk in the east, Northern Sea route with commercial ships. Less Russia is well-placed to benefit from its position, conspicuously, Beijing has expanded its economic especially as melting sea ice will allow it to sail along footprint in Nordic states from Iceland to Sweden its northern coast. At the same time, however, the to Russia, allowing it to leverage its influence for Arctic is naturally of great concern for Russia in future expansion in the region. All of these efforts terms of security. For this reason, Moscow tradition- culminated in the publication of the country’s ally has been suspicious about Beijing’s increased first white paper on the Arctic at the beginning Arctic involvement, its partnership with other states of 2018. Titled “The Polar Silk Road” and linked and its desire to internationalize the Arctic due to to Beijing’s signature Belt and Road Initiative, the fears that China will eventually challenge its own policy paper outlined the country’s aspirations as a sphere of influence. The Kremlin, for instance, has “near-Arctic state.” refused to permit Chinese research vessels to enter Russia’s Arctic economic exclusive zone at least Camaraderie at the High Table twice, while it also opposed Beijing’s application for observer status in the Arctic Council — only relent- As with other aspects of the Belt and Road Initiative, ing when it also endorsed Japan’s application to the the Polar Silk Road is more of a concept and loose body in an apparent bid to balance China’s entry. But framework than a clearly defined national strategy. with the decline of Russia’s options as a result of its Moreover, the ambiguity — whether intentional economic crisis in 2013 and Western sanctions over or not — of the self-proclaimed designation of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, Moscow has beaten a “near-Arctic state” gives Beijing the ability to cul- path to Beijing’s door at a time when Arctic develop- tivate its role at its convenience. Such an identity, ment is becoming a greater priority. however, does not automatically grant China the right to access resources and sail without restric- For Moscow and Beijing alike, Arctic development is tions in the region due to its lack of legal recourse a marriage of convenience — much like their co- to Arctic territory and the absence of international operation in many other theaters. Whereas Beijing agreements on Arctic sovereignty and right of compensates for Moscow’s lack of funding and passage. To achieve its objectives, Beijing initially infrastructure development capacity with its rich sought to frame Arctic affairs as an international capital and construction expertise, Russia is satiat- issue, but that strategy risks drawing suspicion from ing China with its long-desired access to resources a number of littoral states, particularly Russia, thus and fewer restrictions on passage to the Northern undermining Beijing’s attempts to form a closer Sea route. In line with such cooperation, Chinese partnership with regional states. But as Beijing has entities have purchased about a 30 percent stake worked to nurture ties with these regional states — in Yamal LNG in a deal that could eventually meet cooperating, for instance, with Greenland over min- 10-25 percent of China’s total liquefied natural gas import demands. Both countries are expected to STRATFOR • 4 For Moscow and Beijing alike, Arctic development is a marriage of convenience — much like their cooperation in many other theaters.