THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TO POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN CENTRAL AMERICA 1979-1990, CASE STUDIES: NICARAGUA, EL SALVADOR AND GUATEMALA Danuta Paszyn School of Slavonic and East European Studies University of London M. Phil. Thesis ProQuest Number: 10016707 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest. ProQuest 10016707 Published by ProQuest LLC(2016). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 ABSTRACT This thesis analyses Soviet policy towards Nicaragua during the ten year rule of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) and towards the guerrillas fighting for political and social change in El Salvador and Guatemala respectively. It covers the period from the Sandinista victory in July 1979 until the loss of power in February 1990. The Soviet-Nicaraguan relationship is analysed in the context of both parties' relation with the United States, which conditioned the evolution of Soviet-Nicaraguan links. Much of the existing literature, particularly work published in the United States, on Soviet policy towards Central America tends to treat the subject in isolation and as a result we often come across distortions as to the motives behind the Soviet policy towards the region. In addition, the study pays attention to the important and independent role played by Cuba in Central America which so far has been much underestimated. While the treatment of Soviet policy towards Central America has been overshadowed by Soviet-Nicaraguan relations, the USSR's attitude towards the armed struggle in El Salvador and Guatemala has been neglected. It is crucial to look at this in more detail in order to assess adequately the Soviet aims in the area. The study aims to counter the tendency found in the western literature which over­ emphasizes the ideological and strategic factors motivating Soviet policy towards Nicaragua and Central America as a whole. The analysis concludes that the USSR was primarily driven by political and tactical objectives to cause problems for the United States in its "strategic backyard". This was Moscow's reaction to its perception of being undermined by the United States in its own spheres of influence. 3 Table of Contents Chapter 1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 5 Chapter 2 Soviet Interests and Communist Tactics in Central America prior to the Sandinista Victory of 1979................................................................................................................. 15 Chapter 3 Soviet Reaction to the Opportunities Created by the Nicaraguan Revolution ........... 42 Chapter 4 The Extent of Soviet Military and Economic Assistance to the Sandinista Regime prior to Gorbachev Assuming Office .................................................................................63 Chapter 5 The Impact of Gorbachev's Policy of Perestroika and "New thinking" on Soviet-Nicaraguan Relations .............................................................................................. 90 Chapter 6 The Soviet Attitude to the Struggle of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador .......................................................................................... 137 Chapter 7 The Soviet posture vis-a-vis the Guatemalan revolutionary process .............................. 166 Chapter 8 Conclusion ..........................................................................................................................179 Bibliography .......................................................................................................................18G CHAPTER 1 mTRQPUCTIQN This thesis sets out to analyse the Soviet approach to the Nicaraguan leftist government that came to power in the revolution of July 1979 and the revolutionary process, accelerated by the events in Nicaragua, in El Salvador and Guatemala. It focuses on a historical period between July 1979 and February 1990, when the Sandinistas lost their power. The main objective of this study is to establish the chief determinants underlying the Soviet involvement in the US "strategic backyard" and the extent of this involvement. The Literature Hitherto western studies dealing with Soviet policy towards the Central American crisis have concentrated on Soviet-Nicaraguan relations. Only scant attention has been paid to the Soviets and the guerrilla struggle in El Salvador and Guatemala; and mostly with reference to the White Paper or to the Kissinger Report. ( 1 ) Jiri Valenta in his chapter entitled 'Soviet Strategy and Policies in the Caribbean Basin' in Rift and Revolution - The Central American Imbroglio edited by H. Wiarda, ( 2 ) and more recently Jan Adams in her book, A Foreign Policy in Transition - Moscow's Retreat from Central America and the Caribbean, 1985-1992 ( 3 ) have briefly and superficially treated the issue, but, exaggerated the Soviet involvement and influence. To assess the Soviet aims and tactics in the region, a broader perspective is needed which requires a more detailed analysis of the Soviet attitude to the revolutionary process in the respective countries. Most of the literature tends to see Soviet behaviour towards Central America as aggressive and expansionist, and portrays the United States and other countries in the region as mere passive observers. Any serious analysis of Soviet policy in the region must be set in the context of both parties' (Soviet and Nicaraguan) relations with the United States; otherwise it would not be possible to treat the subject with objectivity. Indeed, this approach was adopted by Nicola Miller in her book ( 4 ) which contains a chapter on Soviet relations with Nicaragua. This approach is also prevalent, though more focused on the consequences of the US policy towards Nicaragua which led to closer links between the Nicaraguan government and the Soviet bloc, in the chapter entitled 'Diversifying Dependence: Nicaragua's New Economic Links with Socialist Countries', written by Ruben Berrios and Marc Edelman in Vital Interests - The Soviet Issue in US Central American Policy, edited by Bruce D. Larkin. ( 5 ) Thus, this study will further contribute to the redressing of the existing imbalances. Few analysts have recognised not only the extent to which Cuba acted as an independent actor in the Soviet/Central American equation but also its influential role over the USSR policy towards Central America and the Caribbean (at least until 1988). One notable example is Peter Shearman in his monograph. The Soviet Union and Cuba\ ( 6 ) and more recently a new light on this relation was shed by luri Pavlov a former Soviet Foreign Ministry official, in his work: Soviet-Cuban Alliance I959-199I. ( 7 ) Others have either misunderstood or wittingly underplayed Cuba's role in Central America. They tend to characterize the Soviet low-key approach to Nicaragua, and the revolutionary movements in El Salvador and Guatemala in terms of a tactical move by using Cuba as its proxy. For instance, off en-quoted publication of Robert Leiken, Soviet Strategy in Latin America. ( 8 ) or a book edited in 1986 by Dennis L. Bark entitled: The Red Orchestra - Instruments o f Soviet Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean. ( 9 ) It is misleading to make such characterisations. In this thesis the argument is that Cuba acted as a partner, influencer and a source of reliable advice; not a surrogate. Cuba was pursuing its own policy goals which harmonised with those of the Soviet Union and, thus, Moscow gave it lots of leverage as well as the necessary support to carry out this :hP policy. It should be remembered, however, that the revolutionary success in Central America was of higher strategic and ideological importance to Cuba than to the USSR. Those analysts who depict Cuba as a Soviet proxy also tend to see the Soviet policy towards the area in strictly ideological and geo-strategic terms and fail to take into account the changes in the ideology and the perceptions of policy-makers which was already under way in the Kremlin prior to Mikhail Gorbachev's accession to power. Parallels have often been drawn between the development of USSR-Nicaraguan and USSR-Cuban relations. This is clearly indicated by the Valentas in 'Soviet Strategy and Policies in the Caribbean Basin' in Howard Wiarda (ed.). Rift and Revolution - The Central American Imbroglio. ( 10) For example, to quote the Valentas: The Nicaraguan pattern of rapid revolutionary transformation and Soviet involvement in the early 1980s is very reminiscent of the Cuban pattern in the early 1960s'. (11) This approach is a simplistic generalization and fails to take into account the multiplicity of factors both external and internal, constant and variable, which help to shape any nation's foreign policy at a given time. By the time the Nicaraguan revolution had taken place the Soviet perception about the Third World 'socialist-oriented' states and the liberation struggle was beginning to change, driven by both internal and external consideration.