Taking Relationships Seriously: The Place of Personal Relationships in Kantian Moral Theory A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA BY Marilea Elizabeth Bramer IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Michelle Mason and Sarah W. Holtman December 2008 © Marilea Bramer 2008 i Acknowledgements I could not have completed a dissertation about the value of personal relationships without being involved in some wonderfully supportive and sustaining personal relationships myself. I would like to thank my undergraduate instructors from the College of Saint Catherine who helped me discover my love for philosophy and who encouraged me to apply to graduate school. In particular, I’d like to thank Amy Hilden, Bill Myers, Bill McDonough, and Garry Pech. I’d like to thank my advisors, Michelle Mason and Sarah Holtman, for challenging my philosophical skills and providing much-needed words of encouragement during the challenging times of the dissertation writing process. The rest of my dissertation committee (Valerie Tiberius, Naomi Scheman, and Bill Doherty) were invaluable resources who have improved my dissertation in innumerable ways. I’d also like to thank Michelle, Sarah, Valerie, and Naomi for providing me throughout my academic career at the University of Minnesota with such diverse models of ways to be a successful female academic. Much thanks is also owed to Britt Johnson, Devora Shapiro, Alana Yu, Lindsay Craig, Ian Stoner, and Susan Hawthorne for many hours of stimulating philosophical discussion and for many discussions that were not even remotely philosophical in nature but which were nevertheless much needed and sustaining. My family has also been unfailingly supportive of my philosophical efforts. My parents, Gary and Mariann, and my brother, Tim, have always supported my projects, even if they didn’t entirely understand them. They have also provided me with numerous philosophical questions about the nature of close personal relationships that will keep me writing for years to come. To my wonderful husband, Benjamin, for his love, support, and encouragement throughout the entire graduate school process, much gratitude is owed. Benjamin never failed to express confidence in me and my abilities, even when I did not have confidence in myself. I could not have done this without you. ii Dedication To Benjamin, whose love and support sustains me and has made this and so many more of my life’s projects possible. To Gruff, who was the best dog and philosophical companion a person could have. You are sorely missed. iii Marilea Elizabeth Bramer 348 words Abstract Our personal relationships with intimates—family, friends, and significant others—are an important part of our lives. This intuitive importance gives rise to a tension between moral theory and personal relationships that such theories should respect and, ideally, resolve. An adequate moral theory should acknowledge the value we place on personal relationships while also recognizing their limits. This requires that a moral theory be able to explain both of the following: 1) our obligations to intimates and to strangers, and 2) the moral failings particular to personal relationships, such as domestic violence. Though they meet these requirements, impartial moral theories like Kantian moral theory have been criticized for failing to account for the value we place on personal relationships and actions done for intimates. As an alternative, some philosophers have turned to an ethic of care, where the central value is the care given in personal relationships. Against critics of impartiality, Kantians have responded that Kantian moral theory does not exclude personal relationships and that we are permitted to act for reasons that come from personal relationships, like love. In this dissertation, I argue that their defense does not show the true importance of personal relationships in Kantian moral theory. After closely examining the Categorical Imperative as explained in the Formulation of Humanity as an End and the Kantian concept of respect, I argue that Kantian moral theory in fact requires us to give intimates special consideration. With this understanding of Kantian moral theory, I defend a general duty of beneficence. The special consideration we give to intimates does not, under Kantian theory, come at the expense of our obligation to strangers, as it does in an ethic of care. Fruthermore, Kantian moral theory can account for the difference between the types of domestic violence outlined in the sociological literature. An ethic of care cannot give such an account. Because of this, Kantian moral theory offers more guidance regarding iv our moral responsibility as a society to stop domestic violence. Thus, Kantian moral theory more adequately explains our obligations to intimates and strangers than does an ethic of care. v Table of Contents Introduction: I. Foreword 1 II. The Tension between Personal Relationships and General 1 Obligations to Others A. The Intuitive Tension 3 B. The Philosophical Tension 6 III. Outline of Chapters 10 Chapter One: The Problem of Impartiality and Personal Relationships I. Introduction 16 II. Impartial Moral Theories and Their Critics 17 A. The Psychological Objection 22 B. Responding to the Psychological Objection 26 C. The Normative Objection 32 1. The Incompatibility Criticism 34 2. The Relationships-as-Normative Criticism 40 a. An Ethic of Care 41 D. Responding to the Normative Objection 46 III. Conclusion 55 Chapter Two: Duties to Others I. Introduction 58 vi II. Special Obligations to Intimates (Relationship Obligations) 59 III. Kantian Moral Theory 63 IV. Using the Categorical Imperative 70 V. Kant and Personal Relationships 80 VI. Using the Categorical Imperative- an Alternate Picture 86 VII. The FHE and Relationship Obligations 96 VIII. Is Our Relationship Obligation a Kantian Duty? 105 IX. Conclusion 109 Chapter Three: Beneficence and Personal Relationships I. Introduction 110 II. An Ethic of Care and its Challenge to Kantian Moral Theory: 112 The Principle of Beneficence III. The Kantian Duty of Beneficence 116 IV. Rethinking the Tension 121 V. Kantian Moral Theory, Beneficence, and an Ethic of Care 124 VI. A Criticism from the Perspective of Care 133 VII. Conclusion 137 Chapter Four: Violence in Personal Relationships and Societal Responsibilities I. Introduction 138 II. Violence in Personal Relationships 140 vii III. The Ethics of Care and Intimate Partner Violence 149 A. Noddings’s Original Analysis 150 B. General Criticisms of an Ethic of Care Response to Abusive 152 Relationships C. A Current Response to Abusive Relationships from an Ethic of Care 154 II. Contrasting the Kantian Explanation of IPV with an Ethic of Care 162 Explanation III. The Duties of Society in Response to IPV 169 IV. Conclusion 185 Conclusion 188 Bibliography 195 1 Introduction I. Foreword Our personal relationships with intimates—the relationships we have with family, friends, and significant others—are an important part of our lives. At the very least, a moral theory ought to be able to accommodate such relationships. By “accommodate,” I mean that a moral theory ought to allow us to be the kinds of people who can have what we think of as genuine or good personal relationships with others. Moreover, an adequate moral theory should reflect the importance we give to personal relationships and the actions done as part of those relationships. Given common understandings of impartiality, it is tempting to suppose that a moral theory which requires impartiality would not be able to accommodate personal relationships. Some philosophers have made this argument against impartial moral theories, including Kantian moral theory. When considering the requirements of moral duties outlined in Kantian moral theory, we may think these duties conflict with our desire to give special consideration to the individuals in personal relationships with us. My goal in this dissertation is to provide a way of thinking about what Kantian moral theory requires of us and what we should do for intimates that alleviates the apparent tension between Kantian moral theory and the value of personal relationships in our lives. II. The Tension between Personal Relationships and General Obligations to Others Almost all people are involved in some kind of close personal relationship with friends, family members, or both. By “close personal relationship,” I mean those kinds 2 of relationships where we are especially emotionally close to someone. These relationships are often characterized by our desire to interact frequently with the person and the high level of intimacy and trust that we share with the other person. Often, we have these kinds of relationships with our spouses or partners, friends to whom we are especially close, and some family members. This is the kind of relationship I have in mind when I speak of personal relationships, and I refer to individuals in these relationships as “intimates.” We do not have this kind of relationship with all of our friends or family; there are certain friends and family whom we like, but the relationship itself is not one in which we are highly invested. We may even enjoy spending time with these people, but we are not especially close to them. The focus of my dissertation is personal relationships between intimates. These relationships create in us the desire to go out of our way to do actions that benefit the individuals in these relationships with us. We help them with various projects, buy presents for them, take them out dinner on birthdays and for holidays, and spend our free time with them. Sometimes (though rarely) we may do these things because we feel obligated, but generally we do these things because we want to do them. We show partiality toward or preference for intimates because we see them as special to us and as an important part of our lives. While we think we have special responsibilities or obligations to those in personal relationships with us, most of us would also agree that we have some responsibilities or obligations to strangers.