“EXECUTE AGAINST JAPAN”: FREEDOM-OF-THE-SEAS, THE U.S. NAVY, FLEET SUBMARINES, AND THE U.S. DECISION TO CONDUCT UNRESTRICTED WARFARE, 1919-1941 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Joel Ira Holwitt, B.S., M.A. ***** The Ohio State University 2005 Dissertation Committee Dr. John F. Guilmartin, Adviser Approved by Dr. Allan R. Millett Dr. Kevin Boyle Adviser Graduate Program in History Copyright © 2005 by Joel Ira Holwitt ABSTRACT On 7 December 1941, the U.S. Navy began unrestricted warfare against Japan, attacking “noncombatant” Japanese merchant ships. The decision violated international law and directly cost the lives of thousands of civilian Japanese sailors as well as possibly hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians on shore. The conditions for unrestricted warfare were created during the interwar period by impractical naval treaties that did not prohibit armed merchant ships that could easily sink surfaced submarines attempting to conduct search-and-seizure operations. Many U.S. naval officers understood the importance of commerce warfare and they suggested changes like prohibiting armed merchant ships in order to permit legitimate submarine warfare. However, the U.S. Navy’s fleet submarine was designed not as a commerce raider but as a warship that could operate in support of the battle fleet in the Pacific Ocean. Fortunately, the abilities required for such a difficult mission gave U.S. submarines the versatility to shift from naval warfare to commerce warfare when the time came. The decision to conduct unrestricted warfare began to coalesce with the acceptance of Plan Dog as the United States’ national military strategy in December 1940. By late September 1941, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold R. Stark and ii his Director of War Plans, Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, had decided to commence unrestricted warfare almost immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities. They did so with no documented approval from their civilian chain-of-command and in contravention of repeated public statements by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who urged defense of absolute freedom-of-the-seas. Stark, Turner, and other naval leaders had a number of reasons for conducting unrestricted warfare. Chief among these was a pragmatic strategic objective: to economically strangle Japan by completely cutting off the shipping lanes. The American strategy was also influenced by decades of naval training, as well as culturally inculcated Eurocentricism and racism. Although there were a number of ramifications of U.S. unrestricted warfare, the most important and lasting ramification was the end of previous paradigms of freedom- of-the-seas and the introduction of a new and more pragmatic freedom-of-the-seas that classified merchant sailors as combatants and their cargoes as legitimate military targets. This study is the story of that transition. iii Dedicated to my family: My mother, Dr. Dara S. Holwitt; My father, Dr. Eric A. Holwitt; And my brother, Greg S. Holwitt iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I was very fortunate to have three outstanding scholars on both my dissertation and thesis defense committee: • Dr. John F. Guilmartin: As another service academy graduate, a military officer, and a military historian who has devoted his life to public service, Dr. Guilmartin set a terrific example for me and he proved to be a wonderful mentor and advisor. While giving me plenty of freedom to pursue my project in the way I wanted, he also set a high academic standard and remained a steady voice of encouragement and constructive criticism. • Dr. Allan R. Millett: A retired Marine Corps colonel and a topflight scholar, Dr. Millett never let me forget that I was at first a worthless ensign and then an almost-as-worthless lieutenant (junior grade), but also one from whom the Navy expected a solid record of achievement. Dr. Millett pushed for results, and he usually got them. • Dr. Kevin Boyle: Although not a military historian, Dr. Boyle set a tremendous example as a professional academic historian who loves his work. Despite his achievements, Dr. Boyle remains a paragon of humility v and is one of the genuinely nicest people I have ever met. He taught me why academic history is not culturally irrelevant, when done right. I am also very grateful to Dr. Fred J. DeGraves, professor of Veterinary Preventive Medicine, who served as my outside reader for my dissertation defense. Professor DeGraves asked probing questions and brought a valuable outside view to my topic. The professors on my doctoral candidacy committee also held me to a high standard of academic ability and scholarship. In addition to Dr. Guilmartin and Dr. Boyle, I would like to thank: o Dr. David Stebenne, who stepped in at the last minute to serve as my second reader in the field of U.S. military history. Professor Stebenne did not cut me any slack during the exams, for which I am very grateful. His comments and his high standards before, during, and after the exam pushed me to work harder, smarter, and better. o Dr. Mark Grimsley, who helped prepare me for the military history field and provided a very different but important view on where the scholarship of military history should be going. o Dr. James Bartholomew, who took a student who hardly knew anything about Japan, and within three months helped me learn as much as possible about Japan from the Meiji Restoration onwards. o Dr. Philip Brown, an expert on Early Modern Japan, who still kept me honest when discussing more recent events in Japanese history. Dr. vi Brown also stepped in at the last minute, and I am very grateful for his flexibility and high academic standards. o Dr. Robert Lawson, the graduate school’s representative, who might not have been a historian, but still pressed me to push beyond my own intellectual limits and strive for more. o Rob Padilla and Evan Dicken, two fellow graduate students who prepared me for the Japanese field of the candidacy exam. I am deeply indebted to both of them for their good humor and their wise tutoring. I am also indebted to my other professors at the Ohio State University: Dr. Geoffrey Parker, Dr. Matt Goldish, Dr. Warren Van Tine, Dr. Judy Wu, Dr. Randy Roth, and Dr. Alan Beyerchen, all of whom inspired me to become a better historian. I also had the honor to be with a number of intelligent and high-caliber graduate students in the military history program. These students advanced my knowledge of military history while providing a constructive atmosphere to genuinely explore the field. In particular, I am indebted to: Major John Plating, U.S. Air Force; Captain Steven Barry, U.S. Army; Captain James Doty, U.S. Army; Captain Franz Rademacher, U.S. Army; Mark Mulcahey, Leif Torkelsen, Jon Hendrickson, Todd Aoki, Josh Howard, and Jeff Jennings. A number of people aided me in my project. No historical work, based heavily on archival sources, can succeed without the help of the talented archivists at numerous archives around the country. In particular, the following archivists helped me greatly: • Barry Zerby, Archivist, Modern Military Records, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD vii • Rebecca A. Livingston, Archivist, Old Military and Civil Records, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington DC • Dr. Evelyn M. Cherpak, Head, Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport, RI • Kathy Lloyd, Head, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington DC • Wade Wyckoff, Archivist, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington DC • Dr. Regina Akers, Archivist, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington DC • Bob Clark, Supervisory Archivist, and Robert H. Parks, Mark A. Renovitch, Alycia J. Vivona, Karen P. Anson, Virginia H. Lewick, Archivists, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, NY • Dr. Marvin Russell, Dr. Milton Gustafson, Mr. Matthew J. Olsen, and Mr. Louis Holland, Archivists, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD • Christine Weideman and Danelle Moon, Archivists, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library In particular, I owe a great debt of thanks to Mrs. Kathy Lloyd, Wade Wyckoff, and Dr. Regina Akers at the U.S. Naval Historical Center. I first met these wonderful people while I was a midshipman at the U.S. Naval Academy. They mentored me when I served two summer internships at the Naval Historical Center in 2001 and 2002. It is viii because of their education and aid that I was able to navigate the mazes of archival sources as quickly as I did. I was extremely fortunate to be assisted by three outstanding naval historians: Dr. William McBride and Commander Craig Felker of the U.S. Naval Academy and Dr. Randy Papadopoulos of the U.S. Naval Historical Center. Dr. McBride taught me while I was a midshipman at the U.S. Naval Academy, and he provided me with a great deal of inspiration, help, and ideas. Commander Felker courteously sent me relevant sections from his PhD dissertation related to interwar U.S. submarine warfare and training. Dr. Papadopoulos graciously took time from his busy schedule to talk with me about previous research on this topic and also gave me one of his unpublished papers related to the topic. I am also truly grateful to a number of people who let me stay at their home while I was researching for my thesis, including my Naval Academy sponsor family, the Fitzgeralds: Dr. Jeff, Mrs. Lynda, Matt, Danny, and Buddy; one of my Naval Academy roommates, Peter Buryk and his wife, Missy; my aunt, Elisa Holwitt Duch and her family; and my grandmother, Beverly Holwitt. Historical projects also need some sort of inspiration. Part of that inspiration came in October 2001, when I met Captain Slade Cutter and his wife, Ruth, by sheer chance after having read the Captain’s oral history.