Security and Intelligence Series December 2014 Special Analytical Report SEERECON From the Balkans to ISIS Militant Islamism in Southeastern Europe Copyright © 2014 by Gordon N. Bardos SEERECON LLC All rights reserved From the Balkans to ISIS: Militant Islamism in Southeastern Europe Contents Acknowledgments ii Abbreviations iii Executive Summary iv I. Introduction 1 II. The Origins and Ideology of Militant Islamism in Southeastern Europe 2 III. The Infrastructure of Militant Islamism in Southeastern Europe 18 IV. Iran in the Balkans 30 V. A Micro-Case Study of Terrorist Networks: The Bosnian Connections to the WTC Attacks 35 VI. Policy Recommendations 40 Appendix 1: Balkan Jihadi/Extremist Threat Matrix 47 Appendix 2: Balkan Jihadi Fatalities in Iraq and Syria 51 Appendix 3: Estimating the Size of the Militant Islamist Movement in Southeastern Europe 53 Appendix 4: Balkan Militant Islamist Websites/Electronic Media 60 Bibliography & Sources 90 i From the Balkans to ISIS SEERECON Acknowledgments This report is an updated, expanded and revised version of work that has previously appeared in a number of publications. For their kind permission to use these materials, I thank Dr. Rachel Eh- renfeld of the American Center for Democracy (ACD), and Mr. James Denton, publisher of World Affairs Journal (Washington, DC.) ii SEERECON From the Balkans to ISIS Abbreviations AID—Agencija za Istraživanje i Dokumentaciju (“Agency for Research and Documentation”), a secret intelligence service affiliated with Izetbegović’s Islamist party AIO—Aktivna Islamska Omladina (“Active Islamic Youth), a Bosnia-based youth organization composed of indigenous members of the Al Qaeda unit in the Bosnian jihad. BIF—Bosanska Idealna Futura, incorporated in the US as the Benevolence International Foundation BIK—Bashkesia Islame e Kosoves (Islamic Community of Kosovo) ISIS—“Islamic State of Iraq and Syria” IZBiH—Islamska Zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine (Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina) LISBA—Levizja Islamike Bashkohu (Islamic Movement Unite) OHR—Office of the High Representative RS—Republika Srpska (Republic of Srpska, the Serb entity in Bosnia & Herzegovina) SDA—Stranka Demokratske Akcije (“Party of Democratic Action”), Alija Izetbegovic’s Islamist political party. SHC—Saudi High Commission for Relief of Bosnia & Herzegovina SJCRKC—Saudi Joint Committee for the Relief of Kosova and Chechnya TWRA—“Third World Relief Agency,” an Austro-Bosnian Al Qaeda front group VEVAK—“Vezarat-e Ettela’at va Amniyat-e Keshvar,” the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and National Security, also known as MOIS. iii From the Balkans to ISIS SEERECON Executive Summary • Militant Islamism in southeastern Europe remains a distinctly minority-phenomenon. The available empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests only 5-10 percent of the Balkan Muslim populations adhere to it in some form. The majority of Balkan Muslims reject the views, atti- tuders and actions described in this report. • Nevertheless, over the past several years the Balkans has emerged as a new front for militant Islamism. In June 2010, Islamist extremists bombed a police station in the central Bosnian town of Bugojno, killing one police officer and wounding six others. In February 2011, a Kosovo radical killed two US servicemen at Frankfurt Airport. In October 2011, a Sandžak Wahhabi attacked the US Embassy in Sarajevo. In April 2012, suspected Islamist extremists murdered five Macedonian citizens outside Skopje. In the first six months of 2012 alone, some 200 Iranian “businessmen” entered Bosnia, including an individual Israeli intelligence has tracked in Georgia, India and Thailand (all countries in which terrorist attacks have targeted Israeli officials over the past two years). In July 2012, Hezbollah operatives bombed a bus full of Israeli tourists in Burgas, Bulgaria. In March 2013, a Hezbollah operative was discovered monitoring Israeli citizens in Cyprus. In November 2013, a terrorist group composed of former Syrian jihad volunteers was uncovered in Kosovo. Two Balkan jihadis also carried out suicide-bombings in 2014. • The ideology of these groups and individuals is explicitly misogynistic, homophobic, an- ti-democratic, anti-American and anti-Semitic. Glorifications of violence, celebrations of jihad, endorsements of suicide-terrorism, and the rejection of secular authorities and institutions are frequent tropes of Balkan militant Islamists. • The growth of militant Islamism in southeastern Europe over the past two decades is not an accidental byproduct of the wars of the 1990s; it is the result of a long-term, planned effort of indigenous, clandestine Islamist circles operating in the Balkans since the 1930s. • Militant Islamist groups in the Balkans tend to be extra-systemic, created and operating in op- position to existing Islamic religious institutions, which throughout the region tend to be more conservative and moderate. • The militant Islamist movement in southeastern Europe is neither unified nor monolithic. Several different factions exist, some more radical, others less so, some closer to the Iranians, some closer to the Saudis. Considerable infighting and feuding exists between different factions and leaders. • Strongholds of Balkan Islamist militants provide the international jihadi movement with places to hide, recruit and train new adherents, and plan operations against local and international targets. Islamic “charities” and “NGO’s” provide jihadis with cover identities allowing them to circulate between the Middle-East, Europe, and North America, and the ability to launder and funnel monies to support terrorist actions and jihad around the globe. • Considerable variation can be observed in the attitudes and relationships of elites in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Kosovo towards militant Islamism. In Albania and Kosovo, the predominantly Muslim-elites in power on the whole do not have an explicitly religious/Muslim political or social agenda. In Bosnia & Herzegovina, militant Islamism is supported by small, conspiratorial groups of militant Islamists that came to power in the 1990s, with hard-core el- ements of this group continuing to provide material support to the militant Islamist movement. Secularly-oriented Muslims in Bosnia & Herzegovina disapprove of the movement. • Competition between Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey for ideological/spiritual influence and control over the Balkan Muslim populations has increased since the 1990s. iv SEERECON From the Balkans to ISIS • A number of developments over the past two decades threaten to change the historically more moderate nature of Islam in the Balkans. These include the infiltration of thousands of jihadis from Afghanistan and the Middle-East into the region, the billions of dollars states such as Iran and Saudi Arabia have been spending in southeastern Europe to spread their influence, and the new generation of Balkan Islamic clerics educated in the Middle-East and indoctrinated in more puritanical and extreme versions of Islam. • Two distinct types of individuals compose the militant Islamist movement in southeastern Eu- rope: 1) leaders tend to be clerics educated in the Middle-East; 2) lower-level adherents and followers tend to be alienated, disoriented young people, often estranged from their families and with a criminal background. • Analysts throughout the region report a consistent and successful effort by militant Islamists to infiltrate local political, social, educational and security institutions. Security sector reform in the region should thus focus on improving vertical coordination of existing security and intelligence services with international bodies such as NATO and Interpol to compartmentalize and limit the potential for security breaches. Horizontal integration of existing agencies and services would only serve to expand the access militant Islamists and their sympathizers and allies have to intelligence about their networks and activities. • International policy towards the spread of militant Islamism has been inconsistent, ranging from denial of the problem outright to occasionally hysterical over-reactions. Efforts to deal with the threat have been sacrificed for the sake of placating the movement’s Middle-Eastern patrons. More resources need to be devoted to intelligence-gathering on Balkan militant Isla- mist groups to enhance their identification, isolation, and removal, and more coordination is needed between regional and international authorities in combating the problem. • The danger confronting southeastern Europe and international policy in the region is not the es- tablishment of radical Muslim states; it is that relatively small, clandestine groups of Islamist mil- itants can use the area to provide material and logistical support for the global jihad movement. • There is an inverse relationship between the strength of militant Islamist movements in south- eastern Europe and international efforts to create stable multiethnic democracies in the region: the stronger militant Islamism becomes, the lesser the chances international and local actors have to stabilize inter-religious and inter-ethnic relations in the Balkans, or to create stable, tolerant, democratic states and societies. • The Balkan Blowback (i.e., the impact of Balkan volunteers to the Iraqi and Syrian jihads returning to southeastern Europe) is already being felt and portends an upsurge in militant Isla- mist activity in the region over the coming 1-2 years. v From the Balkans to ISIS SEERECON I. Introduction Since the fall