Aelius Aristides: A view on rhetoric Albert Joosse MA dissertation Ancient Society and Culture Student # 0127418 Utrecht University Aelius Aristides: A View On Rhetoric Page 2 Introduction Reflection on rhetoric was so well-developed in antiquity that Aristotle’s Rhetoric and other ancient works still have more than antiquarian value today. Late antiquity acknowledged as one of its champions of rhetoric, if not its foremost, Aelius Aristides of Mysia, the preservation of whose writings is due to his equal popularity with Byzantine scribes; in modern times, however, this ancient champion is considered at most an interesting malade imaginaire. Modern scholarship on Aristides has been almost unanimously disparaging. As the title of Baumgart’s Aelius Aristides als Repräsentant der sophistischen Rhetorik des zweiten Jahrhunderts der Kaiserzeit indicates, the only perspective in which Aristides was thought worth studying was as an uncommonly rich source for the cultural life of the second century AD. This approach also dominates Boulanger’s Aelius Aristide, which remains the main source of Aristides studies.1 In this view Aristides’s thought is judged barren,2 his style tortuous for abuse of mechanical procedures of composition and product of incoherent enthousiasm.3 In more recent years, however, the theoretical views and approaches of Aristides have received more positive attention, in the work of scholars as Pernot, Michel, Cassin.4 My attempt in the following is in line with this reappraisal of Aristides. I propose to elucidate and interpret the argument Aristides develops in §§135-177 of Oration II, In defence of rhetoric, in refutation of Plato’s claim that rhetoric is not an art because it uses conjecture. In order to understand Aristides’s position we must discuss the views on rhetoric of Plato and Isocrates. These great figures of classical culture each stand at the head of an intellectual tradition in antiquity, influential not least in their different views on rhetoric. It is with reference to them that later theoretical positions were occupied and must be explained. Knowledge of these views will help us understand Aristides’s view per se as well as his position in relation to the main theoretical positions of his age and of earlier ages. For this reason part II of this paper analyses these views of Isocrates and Plato. Further context is provided in part I, which pays attention to the Second Sophistic, to the position of Aristides’s ‘opponent’, Plato, in this cultural climate, and to Aristides’s place in the Second Sophistic. Part I also discusses form, method and content of Oration II as a whole. Part III will analyse in detail the argument Aristides unfolds in §§135-77. A commentary on the text distils the main statements in this section. Then four terms will be subject of close analysis. The final section of this third part attempts to provide a synthesis of the reflections on rhetoric in this passage, while relating these reflections to the views of Plato and Isocrates. My aim in this paper is to uncover the view on rhetoric that motivates the arguments of §§135-77. In speaking of a ‘view on rhetoric’ I do not mean undisputed elements of rhetorical theory (the parts of an oration, for instance), but my interest in this paper concerns those points of method, status and conditions of rhetorical activity which Aristides advances against Plato. In my view, comprehension of Aristides’s views and of their significance must include an account of their relation to Platonic and Isocratean theory; I therefore explicitly include this relation in section III.iii as part of the Aristidean conception of rhetoric. Questions about originality need not be answered before one can affirm the relevance of this conception of rhetoric. As one of the central figures of Hellenic culture both to his own day and to centuries to come, what Aristides has to say about the art of rhetoric is worth 1 Except for the religious aspect of Aristides (and his dreams), for which the main text is Behr 1968a. 2 Baumgart: 14; Reardon: 150. 3 Boulanger: 458; Reardon: 151. 4 Pernot 1993a; Pernot 1993b; Michel; Cassin. See also the works cited in Pernot 1993b: 329n.59, which works I have been unable to access. Aelius Aristides: A View On Rhetoric Page 3 investigating. The highly skilful way in which Aristides, as will emerge, undertakes a defence which seeks to honour the aggressor, and adapts central theoretical notions in Isocrates and Plato to his own cultural and rhetorical needs, is an additional reward for such investigation. There is no need to say I disagree that ‘le désordre de l’exposition interdit toute analyse suivie’;5 the Defence is neither concise nor always lucidly structured, but well worth analysis. It is not my intention, however, to defend Aristides at all points; in fact, I am not much concerned with whether his arguments are good ones or not, or whether he does justice to Plato. I am interested in the view of rhetoric Aristides uses and develops in one section of his oration, §§135- 77, and in how that view relates to the views of Plato and Isocrates.6 I leave a number of terms in Greek (transliterated).7 These terms play an important role in the argument; some of them have different shades of meaning that are exploited in the argument. Translation of these terms would therefore obscure the argument. If an important change in meaning occurs in the course of the argument I will signal this and assess the consequences of this change for the argument. One such term is stokhazesthai, which means ‘to take aim’ in contexts such as archery, to ‘aim for’ in more figurative contexts, but also ‘to guess at’ something. These are not disjunct meanings, however; Aristides’s argument assumes that there is a continuity of meaning across more literal and more figurative contexts and that the process referred to by stokhazesthai is the same in the activities he describes. Another term I leave untranslated is logos. This term can mean as divergent things as ‘word’, ‘argument’, ‘proportion’, ‘reason’, ‘story’, ‘account’, ‘calculation’, ‘measure’. I also keep eikazein, as it, too, has nuances of meaning, including ‘forming a picture’ to ‘conjecture’. Kairos is another key term that I will generally transliterate. For these four terms I refer to the discussions in III.ii. Other terms that are occasionally left untranslated are prosagein, eikos, anapherein, tekhnê, tukhein. 5 Boulanger: 212. 6 Nor is my aim, ultimately, to specify whether the view on rhetoric that motivates §§135-77 – it is in these terms that I formulate my aim – is Aristides’s view; for my purpose it does not matter, strictly speaking, whether Aristides believes what he says in this section. This question of sincerity is problematic about all dead authors; perhaps even more so for Aristides. Still, for all practical purposes, we may assume that the view on rhetoric that motivates §§135- 77 is a view Aristides would subscribe to. 7 All translations are mine, unless indicated otherwise. Aelius Aristides: A View On Rhetoric Page 4 Part I In this first part I will sketch the movement of the Second Sophistic as a general context of Aristides’s writing (I.i), place Oration II into its immediate context (I.ii), discuss the form and method of Oration II (I.iii) and finally summarise the contents of Oration II, in order to correctly situate the part on stokhazesthai with which we will be concerned here (I.iv). I.i Second Sophistic as background to Aristides Aristides was part of a cultural movement known as the Second Sophistic. This section briefly explains the significance of this movement as the background to Oration II. General discussion of the Second Sophistic (I.i.A) is followed by discussion of Aristides’s life and place in the Second Sophistic (I.i.B). Thirdly, I briefly discuss the standing of Plato’s works in the Second Sophistic (I.i.C). I.i.A SECOND SOPHISTIC The name ‘Second Sophistic’ is taken from Philostratus’s Lives of the Sophists. This work surveys the lives of a number of significant cultural figures, most of them active in the second century AD. This origin of the name is clear; meaning, relevance and accuracy of the name are less obvious. A second sophistic implies the existence of a first sophistic and suggests its decline. Philostratus refers to the classical age of Athens as this first sophistic; recent scholarship has, however, questioned whether Philostratus was right to view the cultural activity in his day and the activity of fifth-century sophists as of one kind. Nor is it evident that the sophistic spirit went underground from the end of the fifth century BC to, say, the beginning of the second century AD, although Philostratus clearly presents matters as such in his biographies.8 A vexed but central question is the meaning of ‘sophist’.9 The relation between this word and ‘rhetor’ or ‘philosopher’ is not clear, nor is clear whether the Second Sophistic should be understood as concerning sophists only. ‘Second Sophistic’ can still, however, be used to indicate a particular movement and period. In the second century a cultural climate became dominant in the Greek-speaking part of the Roman Empire that had been developing earlier and that would continue into late antiquity (well after Philostratus’s book). This climate can be characterised as archaising, intellectual, and rhetoric-focused. Insofar one can speak of a movement, this movement had its geographic centre in the cities of Asia Minor and the Greek mainland, while the major players of the movement were typically of the high nobility and in close contact with governmental circles, including the imperial court.