Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers Volume 9 Issue 4 Article 6 10-1-1992 Divine Simplicity: A New Defense William F. Vallicella Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy Recommended Citation Vallicella, William F. (1992) "Divine Simplicity: A New Defense," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 9 : Iss. 4 , Article 6. DOI: 10.5840/faithphil19929441 Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol9/iss4/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. DIVINE SIMPLICITY: A NEW DEFENSE William F. Vallicella The doctrine of divine simplicity, according to which God is devoid of phys­ ical or metaphysical complexity, is widely believed to be incoherent. I argue that although two prominent recent attempts to defend it fail, it can be de­ fended against the charge of obvious incoherence. The defense rests on the isolation and rejection of a crucial assumption, namely, that no property is an individual. I argue that there is nothing in our ordinary concepts of prop­ erty and individual to warrant the assumption, and that once the assumption is rejected, the way is clear to viewing the divine attributes as self-exempli­ fying properties whose self-exemplification entails their identity with an in­ dividual. Among the entailments of the classical theistic doctrine of divine simplicity as found in Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas are such baffling claims as that God is identical with each of his essential properties; that these properties are identical with each other; and that there is no distinction in God between essence and existence. If true, the simplicity doctrine promises the theist considerable advantages: a possible way around the Euthyphro Paradox,' an explanation of why God is a necessary being,2 and a premise for a short non-modal ontological argument.3 But not only does the doctrine promise these advantages, it also seems to be an inescapable logical consequence of the central theistic idea that, necessarily, God is the creator and sustainer of everything distinct from himself. This has been rigorously and persuasively argued by Brian Leftow. 4 The argument in outline is that since God cannot create his own nature, and since everything distinct from God is existentially dependent on God, God is identical with his nature. Unfortunately, however, the simplicity doctrine will strike many philoso­ phers as it does Quentin Smith, who writes that "this doctrine is plainly self-contradictory, and its hold on some people's minds testifies to the pre­ dominance of faith over intellectual coherence in some Christian circles."5 And indeed it does seem self-contradictory to say that God, an individual, is identical with his essential properties, since this seems to imply that God is a property and hence not an individual.6 And so the simplicity doctrine seems to issue in the absurdity that God both is and is not an individual. It also seems to entail that God both has and does not have a plurality of properties.7 FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY 508 Vol. 9 No. 4 October 1992 All rights reserved. DIVINE SIMPLICITY 509 For if God by definition is omniscient, omnipotent, etc., then he has a plu­ rality of properties; but if these properties are identical with one another, then he does not have a plurality of properties, but exactly one property. One might even argue that if this one property is simplicity, then God cannot possess the property of existence. Hence if God is simple, he does not exist, and if he exists, he is not simple!8 Although Leftow has shown that what he calls the Identity Thesis (the core of the simplicity doctrine) can be derived from the claim that, necessarily, God creates everything distinct from himself, he leaves largely undiscussed the question of the logical coherence of the Identity Thesis itself.9 If this thesis is inconsistent, no argument in its support can be sound. What is needed, then, is a direct assault on the consistency question. My aim here is accordingly modest: not to argue for the truth of the doc­ trine, but to argue for its consistency. Even more modestly, perhaps, my aim is to show, contra Smith, Plantinga, and a host of others, that it is not obvi­ ously inconsistent or otherwise repugnant to the intellect. But before advanc­ ing to the positive task, we do well to examine a couple of extant approaches both of which in my judgment fail. 1. The Approach of Stump and Kretzmann According to Stump and Kretzmann, the names of the divine attributes ... are all identical in reference but different in sense, referring in various ways to the one actual entity which is God himself or designating various mani­ festations of it. [Which is it? Different ways of referring to one thing, or reference to different things?] 'Perfect power' and 'perfect knowledge' are precise analogues for 'the morning star' and 'the evening star': non-synony­ mous expressions designating quite distinct manifestations of one and the same thing ... .'Perfect power is identical with perfect knowledge' does not entail that power is identical with knowledge any more than the fact that the summit of a mountain's east slope is identical with the summit of its west slope entails the identity of the slopes. 10 This passage is confusing, employing as it does two distinct analogies that are dubious in themselves and not obviously compatible with each other. The Fregean analogy compares identity of properties with identity of individuals: the implication is that just as there is no problem in understanding how the morning star can be identical with the evening star once we distinguish the sense and reference of the relevant expressions, so also there is no problem in understanding how perfect power can be identical with perfect knowledge: you just distinguish the senses of these terms from each other and from their common referent. The senses are distinct, but the referent, God, is one and the same. Presumably, the senses of "perfect power" and "perfect knowledge" are the properties perfect power and perfect knowledge, respectively, which, we are told, are different manifestations of God. In Fregean jargon, they are 510 Faith and Philosophy different Darstellungsweisen, modes of presentation, of one and the same thing. But this implies that the two divine attributes in question are not identical, but as distinct as the senses of "morning star" and "evening star." The point is that the Fregean gambit requires the distinctness of senses in order to account for the informativeness of the identity claim; and so if the attributes in question are senses, they must be really distinct. If, on the other hand, the attributes are not senses but identical with each other and with God, then we need to be told what the distinct senses of "perfect power" and "perfect knowledge" are. If no answer is forthcoming, the Fregean analogy collapses. It wiIl not help to say that omniscience and omnipotence differ as concepts ("in the mind") but are identical as properties ("outside the mind"), for even if this is true, it has not been explained how the properties can be identical with one another and with God. The problem is one of metaphysics, not of philosophy of language. The problem is to explain how God can be identical with his properties, not to explain how informative identity statements like "God is omniscience" and "Omniscience is omnipotence" are possible. Frege's Sinn/Bedeutung distinction may help us with the latter problem; but it seems unavailing when applied to the former. Whereas the Fregean analogy suggests that perfect power and perfect knowledge are distinct as distinct modes of presentation of one and the same thing = God, the slope/summit analogy suggests something quite different, namely, that the attributes are identical. This is of course more in line with what is needed. What the analogy is intended to suggest is that even if F-ness and G-ness are distinct, perfect F-ness and perfect G-ness can be identical, just as the slopes are distinct shy of the summit, but identical at the summit. But this analogy, although a neat representation of the identity of perfect power and perfect knowledge assuming the coherence of this identity, does nothing to show the coherence or refute the charge of incoherence. One might as well try to prove the consistency of the doctrine of the Trinity by producing a can of "Three-in-One" oil. II The intellect has exigencies of which the picture-loving imagination knows nothing. 2. Mann s Approach It is one thing to say that God is identical with each of his properties; quite another to say that he is identical with each of his property-instances. Mann's way, derived from Aquinas, is the latter.12 Accordingly, God is identical, not with omniscience, but with his (instantiation of) omniscience. And similarly with the other attributes. If we take this tack, we avoid the consequence that God is a property with al\ its supposedly absurd implications. Mann has recently conceded to T. V. Morrisl3 that the property instance view faces a damaging objection: if God is (identically) an instance of a DIVINE SIMPLICITY 511 property P, then God is dependent on P to be what he is, namely, an instance of P. The divine aseity is thus compromised. As Mann puts it, It looks as though a simplicist is confronted with a dilemma.