UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI _____________ , 20 _____ I,______________________________________________, hereby submit this as part of the requirements for the degree of: ________________________________________________ in: ________________________________________________ It is entitled: ________________________________________________ ________________________________________________ ________________________________________________ ________________________________________________ Approved by: ________________________ ________________________ ________________________ ________________________ ________________________ CRITICAL VALUES: FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE COMPUTING SCIENCES A dissertation submitted to the Division of Research and Advanced Studies of the University of Cincinnati in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of DOCTORATE OF PHILOSOPHY (Ph.D.) in the Department of Philosophy of the College of Arts and Sciences 2003 by Catherine Elizabeth Sherron B. Phil., Miami University, 1992 M.A., University of Tennessee, 1994 Committee Chair: Chris J. Cuomo, Ph.D. University of Cincinnati Abstract Critical Values: Feminist Philosophy of Science and the Computing Sciences by Catherine Elizabeth Sherron Committee Chair: Professor Chris J. Cuomo Department of Philosophy My dissertation is an examination of the intersections between epistemology, philosophy of science, and feminist theory. Feminist philosophy of science creates new and valuable ways of looking at the sciences by using gender as a category of analysis, or a lens through which to critically assess and constructively build projects in science, as well as in the philosophy of science. I employ feminist philosophy of science and a gendered lens in particular to examine the computing sciences. Starting specifically from the underrepresentation of women in computing, the project creates a platform for exploring the dimensions and contributions of feminist philosophy of science. This is not merely a critique of philosophy of science or a feminist review of computing, but a positive project in its own right, examining the epistemological structure of scientific inquiry, including the nature of objectivity, epistemic agency and the composition of an epistemic community, the importance of those epistemic communities, and the role of values in science. A central tenet of the work is that objectivity in science does not require leaving personal and political commitments at the lab door, but that social, ethical, cultural, and other values play a foundational epistemological role in science. Using gender as a lens uncovers some of those values for critical evaluation. This is not to deny the importance of the natural, empirical world in science. I argue that a philosophical position must at minimum account for our actual relationships—emotional, embodied, social, etc.—in the world and their impact on our theorizing and that dismissing the embodied experience of scientists results in a diminished understanding of the world in addition to diminished epistemological theories. Acknowledgements I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor, Chris Cuomo, who could see the merit and completion of this dissertation long before I could. My project and I have flourished in no small part thanks to her. My other committee members, Bob Richardson and John McEvoy, have been generous, supportive, and tremendously helpful in reviewing drafts of this dissertation, which is much improved for their insightful comments. Errors and confusions that remain are solely my own. I am also deeply indebted to Thomas More College, its talented faculty and staff, all of whom have been overwhelmingly supportive emotionally, editorially, and financially. I am grateful to be able to continue to working with these energetic people who have taught me so much about the academic life. I wish to thank my students and my colleagues, in particular Siobhan Barone, Bob Berger, Joe Cronin, Dale Myers, Jim Nelson, Julie Perry, Sherry Cook Stanforth, Jim Schuttemeyer, and Father Gerald Twaddell. Many old friends have counseled me through what was at times a rather arduous process. Thank you Julie, Zac, Colene, Wags, and Jana. Many new friends found at the Women, Work and Computerization 2000 Conference and at the Grace Hopper Celebration of Women in Computing 2002 encouraged and inspired me. While I did not know the late Anita Borg personally, her passion for developing the presence and talents of women in computing was contagious. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the loving support of my family: John and Crystal Sherron, John and Cathy Sherron, Mike and Christel Sherron, Everett Sherron, Christine Young, and especially my new husband, Randy Lee Bailey, for keeping me healthy. I dedicate my dissertation to all of them. Table of Contents Introduction 2 Chapter One Stepping Stones: From Feminist Science Scholarship 13 to Artificial Intelligence Chapter Two Critical Values and the Character of Feminist 34 Philosophy of Science Chapter Three Computing and Feminist Philosophy of Science 63 Chapter Four Social Epistemology 89 Chapter Five Competition in Science 121 Chapter Six Embodiment and Embeddedness in AI: 161 Drafting a Model of Intelligence Chapter Seven Computing Women 197 Conclusion Future Paths 221 References 229 1 CRITICAL VALUES: FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE COMPUTING SCIENCES This project originated with reading Helen Longino’s Science as Social Knowledge in a philosophy of science course. My undergraduate training had left me somewhat jaded with regard to feminist projects, yet to my surprise, I could not resist Longino’s explicitly feminist analysis in philosophy of science and of science itself. How could there be so much disagreement in science, I wondered? I was convinced by Longino’s argument but perplexed by the conclusion. What was at stake seemed to be the very thing that gave science its power: objectivity. A course in feminist epistemologies and more research uncovered more jewels: Sandra Harding’s strong objectivity stemming in part from her work with science and technology studies, postcolonial studies, and feminist theories; Lynn Hankinson Nelson’s discussions about epistemic agents; and Nancy Tuana’s work on embodiment in epistemology. The beginning of my interest in computing is less well-defined. My interest in physics and chemistry was not strong enough to pursue extended study of them, which I thought would be necessary for a grounding of further study in philosophy of science. Biology was interesting to me, but after assisting with a computer ethics course, I decided to pursue a series of courses in programming, data structures, and artificial intelligence (AI). Eventually I discovered that although there had been some exploration of issues surrounding gender in the computing sciences and technology, the approaches were more sociological rather than philosophical, or specifically, epistemological. Thus, there seemed to be a gap in the philosophical literature addressing broader concerns of feminist philosophy of science in the computing sciences, Introduction including AI. Alison Adam’s book, Artificial Knowing: Gender and the Thinking Machine, helped me to start to connect issues in feminist philosophy of science to computing, particularly issues of social, cultural, and ethical values of scientists and their impact on objectivity. It was Adam’s book that introduced me to the AI project called Cyc. Attending professional computer and technology conferences such as the Grace Hopper Celebration of Women in Computing, and the Women, Work and Computerization Conference provided further exposure to computing professionals, mostly women, who were working on problems which I found quite compelling. One set of questions concerned the small numbers of women in computing, why more women were not pursuing degrees and careers in computing, and what, if anything computing professionals, societies, both in and outside of the academy, should or could do about this “shrinking pipeline” as the concern has become labeled. It was these questions which opened up the broader philosophical issues addressed in this dissertation. What are those issues? In a nutshell, they begin with concerns about the low level of participation by women in computing, and focus on gendered aspects of computing which might explain those low levels, but also serve as the basis of broader and more general critiques of computing. Using gender as a lens for investigation has led me to concerns about how computing is taught, what kinds of projects are appropriately pursued in computing, why one might want to pay attention to the composition of the computing profession, and which epistemological commitments are encoded in those projects and teachings. Christina Björkman’s (2002) work in gender studies and computing has been invaluable for assisting my thoughts on, especially, the nature of computing and some of its epistemological commitments. A discipline’s guiding metaphor has many values embedded within it and those values guide the teaching, development, and practice of the discipline. For example, Lynn Stein (1999) argues 3 Introduction that computing interpreted through the metaphor of a sequentially ordered series of steps to a specific goal—computation—abstracts too much away from the real processes of computing. She suggests as a replacement the metaphor of a community of interacting entities. It is the great power and ubiquity of computing that magnifies the importance of what might otherwise