Appendix: Glossary This glossary defines such relevant concepts that are drawn from law (whether or not they were treated in the chapters of this book), or from computing (especially artificial intelligence), or argumentation, provided that they were mentioned in some relevant chapter. Tools are defined, if they had been mentioned or discussed in the book. So are abstract concepts, but not names of persons. Importantly, with a few exceptions (in biometrics and concerning facial com- posites), this glossary does not cover forensic science or engineering, or forensic psychology or medicine. Much nomenclature had been introduced in the chapters about data mining or the forensic disciplines. Here and there, some passage in the glossary has appeared in sections in Nissan (2008a). This is the case of entries con- cerning: character evidence, logic and law, the doctrine of chances, mens rea, and hearsay. There was little point to try and replicate, here, definitions for concepts from forensic science that can be found in Brenner’s Forensic Science Glossary (2000). Even in such areas that were covered, there is no claim of completeness in this glossary. Sometimes a concept was developed more, simply because the present author was so inclined. It is hoped at any rate that this glossary will prove helpful, supplementing or presenting in a different manner such material that was expounded in the chapters of this book. There being a detailed Subject Index is intended to much facilitate access. Abductive inference A mode of inference, theorised by Charles Peirce. It departs from deductive inference. See Section 2.2.1.6 above. “Abduction,orinference to the best explanation, is a form of inference that goes from data describing some- thing to a hypothesis that best explains or accounts for the data. Thus abduction is a kind of theory-forming or interpretive inference” (Josephson & Josephson, 1994,p.5). ABDUL/ILANA A tool developed by computational linguists. It was an AI program that used to simulate the generation of adversary arguments on an international conflict (Flowers et al., 1982). Actus reus The actual performance of a forbidden action, or that action itself, as opposed to the intention (mens rea). E. Nissan, Computer Applications for Handling Legal Evidence, Police Investigation 1021 and Case Argumentation, Law, Governance and Technology Series 5, DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-8990-8, C Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012 1022 Appendix: Glossary Ad hominem argument Such an argument that attacks the person who is claim- ing the truth of a proposition, in order to attack that proposition. Ad hominem arguments are the subject of Walton (1998b). Adjudicative fact-finding Judicial decision-making (returning a verdict, as distinct from the later stage, of sentencing). Sometimes different kinds of courts can be alternative venues for adjudication for the same case, apart from the option of turning to arbitration rather than a court of justice. Moreover, sometimes alter- native venues are known to have a tendency to adjudicate differently. A U.S. taxpayer disagreeing with the Inland Revenue Service (IRS) has four venues of appeal. Two of these require that before turning to them, the taxpayer pay up front what the IRS demands, whereas the other two venues can be approached with- out paying in advance the disputed tax bill, but these other venues are known to be more biased against the taxpayer. Without paying in advance, a taxpayer can request a conference with an IRS appeals officer, but such officers are Treasury employees, and clearly favour the IRS. Also without paying in advance, a tax- payer can appeal to the U.S. Tax Court, but in 1989 it issued split decisions 55% of the time (i.e., the finding was a compromise), and that kind of court only decided 4% of cases in favour of taxpayers. But if taxpayers pay up front what the IRS requests and then sue in order to recover, then two venues are open: the U.S. Claims Court (which in 1989 favoured taxpayers in 8% of cases), and the U.S. District Court: in 1989 it found for the taxpayers in 18% of cases, and so appears to be the venue least unfavourable to taxpayers (Topolnicki & MacDonald, 1991, p. 84). In a different domain, contracts are sometimes drawn by specifying which geographic jurisdiction is to adjudicate in case of litigation, and not infrequently (especially when the parties are from different countries), the parties expect that adjudication at one’s own place may prove to be more favourable. Thus, sometimes the parties reason as though as the ideal of perfect objectivity of adjudicators was an ideal at variance with actual practice. Admissionary rules Typically in the U.S. law of evidence: rules about which kinds of evidence can be admitted and heard in court. As opposed to exclusionary rules. ADR See alternative dispute resolution. Adversarial A type of criminal procedure, which is typical of Anglo-American jurisdictions. As opposed to the inquisitorial system. During the 1990s, some countries on the European Continent with an inquisitorial system have to some degree shifted towards an adversarial system. In Britain, public inquiries are in theory inquisitorial, rather than adversarial. See inquisitorial. Adversary argument One of two classes of arguments (the other class being per- suasion arguments), “depending on the goals and expectations of the participants. [...]In[...] adversary arguments, neither participant expects to persuade or be persuaded: The participants intend to remain adversaries, and present their arguments for the judgment of an audience (which may or may not actually be present). In these arguments, an arguer’s aim is to make his side look good while making the opponent’s look bad” (Flowers et al., 1982, p. 275). The ABDUL/ILANA program models such arguers (ibid.). Appendix: Glossary 1023 ADVOKATE A computer system for the evaluation of the credibility of eyewitness evidence (Bromby & Hall, 2002). It is described in Section 4.4 in this book. Age-progression software A kind of computer graphic software, useful to the police for the purposes of locating missing people, in that it predicts how a given person (based on an old photograph) would have aged meanwhile. See Section 8.2.3. Agent beliefs Models from AI for treating them were applied to modelling the rea- soning about legal evidence, in Ballim et al. (2001) and Barnden (2001). This area is called attribution in psychology. See Section 3.4 AI See Artificial intelligence. AI & Law Artificial intelligence as applied to law, this being an established discipline both within legal computing and within artificial intelligence. ALIAS A particular multi-agent architecture, with abductive logic-based agents. It was applied to the modelling of reasoning on the evidence in a criminal case, in Ciampolini and Torroni (2004), using LAILA, a language for abductive logic agents. See Section 2.2.1.5. Alibi In the proper, legal sense of the term, an alibi states an alternative location. Loosely speaking, one sometimes uses the term more generally, to refer to an alternative, exonerating account provided by a criminal suspect, or by a defen- dant being tried. It disconfirms a claim which is essential for the accusers for them to prove the charge. “The defence of alibi presupposes that the accused was somewhare else when the offence happened. If he does not remember where he was, then he can give no particulars. If he was alone at the time, he must still give such particulars as he can of where he was and when” (Osborne, 1997, p. 135). See Section 2.2.2.8. ALIBI A computer system developed by Nissan and his students in various pro- totypes as early as Kuflik et al. (1989). In an AI perspective, it is a planner which produces alternative explanations, and with respect to an input accusation, it seeks exoneration or a lesser liability. See Section 2.2.2. Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) In civil cases, case disposition (q.v.) includes, among the other options: the court finding for one of the parties, or settlement out of court, or alternative dispute resolution. The latter may be either arbitration,orbinding or nonbinding mediation. Ambiguity aversion “Ambiguity aversion is a person’s rational attitude towards probability’s indeterminacy. When a person is averse towards such ambigu- ities, he increases the probability of the unfavorable outcome to reflect that fear. This observation is particularly true about a criminal defendant who faces a jury trial” (from an extended abstract of Segal & Stein, 2006). “Because most defendants are ambiguity-averse, while the prosecution is not, the crim- inal process systematically involves and is thoroughly affected by asymmetric ambiguity-aversion” (ibid.). Indeed: “The prosecution, as a repeat player, is pre- dominantly interested in the conviction rate that it achieves over a long series of cases. It therefore can depend on [...] general probability as an adequate predictor of this rather. The defendant only cares about his individual case and cannot depend on this general probability”. Because of the ambiguity, from the 1024 Appendix: Glossary defendant’s perspective, of his individual probability of conviction, “[t]he defen- dant consequently increases this probability to reflect his fear of that ambiguity” (ibid.). “Asymmetric ambiguity-aversion foils criminal justice. The prosecution can exploit it by forcing defendants into plea bargains that are both inefficient and unfair. Because plea bargain is a predominant method of case-disposition across the United States, this exploitation opportunity is particularly pernicious” (ibid.). Amicus curiae In some countries, an expert witness above the parts, appointed by the court. Anchored narratives (or AN for short) The theory of anchored narratives was proposed by Wagenaar et al. (1993). The central idea of this approach is that juridical proof is organized around plausible narratives where “plausibility” is determined by the relationship between the story offered at trial and the back- ground knowledge/common sense of the decision maker.