Summer 2020 The Relationship between the Reality of the World and the Reality of Consciousness Nicolas Laos Abstract Introduction he concept of being is the central concept ne of the most important problems in every T of philosophical inquiry. By the term “be- O philosophical endeavour is the analysis of ing,” we mean a reality that encapsulates every the relationship between consciousness and ex- kind of reality and is present in every field of ternal reality. The arguments that have been ar- philosophical inquiry. In the present essay, I ticulated with regard to this problem can be re- shall investigate the different aspects of being duced to two general philosophical “schools,” and the relationship between consciousness and namely: realism and idealism. the world. There are two general models The central premise of philosophical realism is whereby philosophers interpret the world: the the following: since experience provides human one gives primacy to the reality of the world, beings with images (irrespective of whether and it is known as philosophical realism, they are related or unrelated to each other) of a whereas the other gives primacy to the reality of reality that seems to be external to one’s con- consciousness, and it is known as philosophical sciousness, it naturally follows that this reality idealism. The monistic varieties of philosophi- (namely, the reality of the world) is the cause cal realism ignore important elements whose that generates the set of the given partial im- identification and analysis undermine the valid- ages, which exist in human consciousness. ity of the monistic varieties of philosophical re- Therefore, on the basis of the principle of cau- alism. The dualistic varieties of philosophical sality, there necessarily exists a mind-independ- realism lead to contradictions and logical gaps. ent reality. Idealism seems to be an arbitrary intellectual construction, which can be refuted on both sub- Realistic philosophical theories can be divided stantial and logical grounds. However, idealism into two categories: monism and dualism. Ac- has the advantage of allowing various philo- cording to monism, only one basic substance or sophical differentiations, which highlight the principle exists as the ground of reality. If this plasticity of idealism. In the present essay, I _____________________________________ shall argue that the aforementioned two general models (realism and idealism) are not incom- About the Author patible with each other, but they complete each Dr. Nicolas Laos is a philosopher, religious vision- other, and their common function contains ele- ary, mathematician, and noopolitics expert and con- ments that underpin the mutual adaptation be- sultant, and he has taught courses in political philos- tween realism and idealism. My synthesis be- ophy and international relations theory at the Univer- tween realism and idealism is based on the use sity of Indianapolis (Dept. of International Rela- of the notion of “structure” (which refers to the tions). He is also a Freemason (regularly installed link between “substance” and “form”), and, Grand Hierophant–97ο of the Ancient and Primitive specifically, on the structural continuity be- Rite of Memphis–Misraim), and the Founder and Grand Master of the Scholarly and Political Order of tween the energies of cosmic/divine reality and the Ur-Illuminati (SPOUI). He is the author of sev- the energies of human consciousness. My con- eral scholarly books, including The Meaning of Be- ceptions of “intelligent activity” and of the “di- ing Illuminati (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, alectic of intelligence” elucidate a unique way 2019), in which he elucidates his research program of conceiving the synthesis between realism and of “Ur-Illuminism.” He can be reached at: Nicolas idealism, and they highlight the creativity of Laos, P.O. Box 9316, Athens 10032, Greece and also consciousness. at: [email protected]. Copyright © The Esoteric Quarterly 59 The Esoteric Quarterly principle is material, then we talk about monism are the original, eternal, and transcendent arche- of the materialistic type (or materialistic mon- types of things, existing prior to things and apart ism), and, if this principle is spiritual, then we from them and, thus, uninfluenced by the be- talk about monism of the spiritual type (or spir- coming of the manifest world. On the other itual monism). On the other hand, according to hand, as Plato maintains in his earliest books dualism, two fundamental substances or princi- (including his famous Republic), the particular ples exist, which often oppose each other. objects that we perceive are imperfect copies or The second general cosmological model to reflections of the eternal patterns (ideas). At this point, Platonism follows the philosophical leg- which one can reduce the relationships between 3 consciousness and external reality is idealism, acy of Parmenides. and it developed mainly in the context of Mo- According to Parmenides, there are no interme- dernity. As opposed to realism, idealism does diate ontological degrees of being between be- not distinguish between external reality and ing4 and nonbeing: if being has become, it must consciousness. The basic argument of the ideal- either have come from being or from nonbeing; ists is the following: if the substance of external if it has come from nonbeing, then it has come reality were distinct from the substance of con- from nothing, which is absurd; if it has come sciousness, then we would not be able to know from being, then it has come from itself, which external reality. Idealism presents the world not is equivalent to saying that it is identical with as something reflected in consciousness, but as itself and, hence, has always been. Therefore, an extension and a projection of consciousness Parmenides argues that, from being, only being outside itself and as consciousness itself. can come, that nothing can become something else, and that whatever is always has been and Ancient Realistic Philosophy always will be, which means that there can be he earliest Greek philosophy (which ex- only one eternal, self-existent, unchangeable T tends from about 585 BCE to the middle of being and that the world of the senses, which is the fifth century BCE)1 is realistic, in the sense susceptible to change, is an illusion. that it orients the mind toward the external na- During the last period of his life, Plato (espe- ture; it is mostly hylozoistic, specifically, it con- cially in his books Timaeus, Critias, Philebus, ceives nature as animated; it is ontological, in and Laws) was arguably influenced by the cri- the sense that it inquires into the essence of tique of his philosophy by Aristotle. As a result, things; and it is mainly monistic of the materi- Plato qualified his previous thesis about the ir- alistic type, namely, it seeks to explain its phe- reducibility of ideas (namely, beings) and phe- nomena by means of a single material principle, nomena (namely, nonbeings), and he argued such as a single natural element or a concrete that reality is composed of beings and nonbe- combination of different natural elements. Mo- ings as well as of nearly beings and nearly non- nistic theories of the spiritual type were devel- beings. As Brann, Kalkavage, and Salem ex- oped much later in the history of philosophy as plain, in Plato’s Sophist, nonbeing is not any- extreme varieties of dualistic theories. more “unthinkable and unutterable, as Father Two characteristic examples of dualistic real- Parmenides asserted,” but it is interpreted as the ism are Platonism and Aristotelianism. Plato- “Other,” and, thus, it “ceases to be mere noth- nism2 is a paradigmatic type of realistic philos- ingness and becomes instead the source of artic- ulated diversity in things and in thought. Par- ophy: according to Plato, the “idea” compre- 5 hends or holds together the essential qualities menides has been superseded.” Indeed, in common to various particulars. Plato argues that Plato’s Sophist, “the Other is Nonbeing posi- ideas are not mere thoughts (abstractions) in the tively understood,” and it “is in fact a necessary minds of human beings or even in the mind of ingredient in thought and speech,” since “it is God; in Platonism, even the divine mind is ori- still negative enough to help account not only ented toward the ideas, which exist eternally, for the diversity of kinds but also for differences and they may be considered as the energy (or in their dignity. An image or an imitation, be- the mode of being) of the deity. Platonic ideas cause it has a share in Nonbeing, is not merely 60 Copyright © The Esoteric Quarterly, 2020. Summer 2020 other than its original but also less. It is less in external to the agent of desire. “One” is para- genuineness and may even fall further into fal- digmatically what Intellect is, and Intellect is sity.”6 paradigmatically what Soul is. Thus, there are Finally, Plato asserts the existence of a series of two phases of the Soul’s existence: in the first, different ontological levels, which inspired Ne- it is turned toward Intellect, and, therefore, it oplatonism. Neoplatonism, mainly through the acts as its archetype and contemplates ideas; in works of Plotinus (ca. 204/5–70 AD), Proclus the second, it is turned toward the sensuous (412–85 AD), and Dionysius the Areopagite world, and, therefore, it is impelled to bring or- (one of the earliest Church Fathers), formulated der into matter. In his Enneads, Plotinus main- a religious and philosophical argument accord- tains that matter is to be identified with evil and ing to which there exists a series of fundamental privation of all form or intelligibility. However, substances such that: they are related to each according to Plotinus, matter is evil not in itself, other, either through emanation or through re- but matter is evil only when it impedes human- turn, and they compose an ontological hierarchy ity’s return to the One.