9-603-070 REV: DECEMBER 5, 2003 y AMY C. EDMONDSON Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (B) The teleconference was scheduled for 8:45 p.m. EST. Among those assembled around the table at Morton Thiokol were Jerry Mason, Senior Vice President; Joe Kilminster, Vice President for Space Boosters; Bob Lund, Vice President of Engineering; Roger Boisjoly, Booster Seal Expert; and Arnie Thompson, Solid Rocket Motor Cases Expert. Also in attendance, at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Alabama, were George Hardy, MSFC Deputy Director of Science and Engineering; and, at Kennedy Space Center, Stanley Reinartz, MSFC Shuttle Projects Manager,Cop and Larry Mulloy, MSFC Solid Rocket Booster Manager. Going into the meeting, Boisjoly thought again about the conversation he'd had in the Morton Thiokol cafeteria the previous July (see Exhibit 1). The following is an abbreviated transcript of a fictionalized teleconference:1 Scene 1: The Teleconference Begins Cecil Houston (NASA): I think everybody’s hooked up. Joe Kilminster: This is Joe Kilminster. Earlier today we were informed about the extremely low temperatures predicted for tomorrow morning’s launch. The main question we’re looking at is how the O-rings in the solid rocket boosters would be affected. We’ve put together some charts with information from previous flights. We’ll go over those and then make our recommendations. Larry Mulloy (NASA): Give us a minute, will you. The charts are coming through the fax now. Joe Kilminster: Arnie Thompson andNot Roger Boisjoly have been doing the research. They’ll make the presentation. 1 Source: Challenger, dir. Glenn Jordan, video, ABC, 1990. This transcript is a reconstruction of the teleconference based on testimony from the Hearings of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. The proceedings of the hearing can be found in the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Vols. 4 and 5 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986). Available at http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/genindex.htm, accessed October 10, 2002. The casewriters acknowledge Action Design Associates and the Monitor Company for calling our attention to this reconstruction and Hearst Entertainment for the transcript. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Professor Amy C. Edmondson and Research Associate Laura R. Feldman prepared this case. This case was developed from published sources. HBS cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management. Copyright © 2002 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685, write HarvardDo Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to http://www.hbsp.harvard.edu. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the permission of Harvard Business School. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email protected] or 617-783-7860. 603-070 Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (B) Arnie Thompson: We have no data on O-rings operating at temperatures this low but we’ve put together a rationale based on the information we have. The charts are mostly not typed, so if there’s a problem reading them let us know. y Roger Boisjoly: I’ll begin by citing Flight 15 which was launched a year ago. The temperature at that launch was 53 degrees, which is the coldest reading experienced to date. We’re faxing a chart showing erosion on that flight. Unidentified speaker at NASA: Go ahead, we’ve got the charts coming through. Roger Boisjoly: The Air Force estimates 29 degrees at launch tomorrow morning. That is far below any temperature we’ve launched with before. So determining if this extreme cold will affect the O-rings, and if it does, how much, is critical. The charts you’re getting relate to that. The indication is that the cold hardened O-rings will be slower in sealing. There could be hot leakage beyond the primary seal. Because of that there is increased danger of the backup O-ring being eroded. Bob Lund: So our recommendation is—you should see it on the sheet coming through now—not launching until the temperature is at least 53 degrees. Larry Mulloy (NASA): Whoa! Wait a minute! Am I looking at the right charts? The charts I’ve got don’t support that conclusion. Cop Roger Boisjoly: They do, I think they do. Larry Mulloy (NASA): I’ve listened to everything you’ve said and I just don’t see how you got that recommendation. It’s not logical. Roger Boisjoly: It’s perfectly logical. Larry Mulloy (NASA): Well, you began by saying what you’re presenting can’t be proved and I agree, it can’t. But now you’re drawing serious conclusions from it and you’re making very serious recommendations. Roger Boisjoly: Serious recommendations are called for. Larry Mulloy (NASA): Well, of course. That’s why we’re here. But what you’re saying sounds like Morton Thiokol is establishing new launch commit criteria the night before a launch. Now these solid rocket boosters have been operating under very definite specifications. You suddenly want to change them! You now want to base everything on this 53-degree benchmark. At that rate it could be spring before the shuttle would fly. My God, NotThiokol, when do you want me to launch? Next April? Bob Lund: Now, I don’t think we want to change launch commit criteria. We’re trying to see if it’s safe to launch with the O-rings experiencing these severe temperatures. Roger Boisjoly: The benchmark of 53 degrees is based on my personal observation of Flight 15, where we had O-ring erosion and blow-by in both boosters. By blow-by I mean the gases went right past the ring, didn’t erode it, didn’t even take the shine off it. That tells us lower temperature is a factor. Larry Mulloy (NASA): All right, I’m looking at your chart on Flight 15. There was erosion but the worst erosion we’ve ever had was on Flight 2, and the temperature outside was 70 degrees. Now where in what you’re presenting is the correlation between low temperature and erosion? Your charts even seem to support the opposite. Roger BoisjolyDo: I’m not talking about only erosion. Blow-by is the important thing here. 2 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email protected] or 617-783-7860. Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision (B) 603-070 Larry Mulloy: But where is the connection to low temperature? If the worst erosion occurred at 70 degrees, where is your data to support your idea of a connection between low temperature and erosion? y Roger Boisjoly: I don’t have any other data than what I sent you but I saw with my own eyes there was a much larger arc of soot between the two O-rings. The soot was much blacker and penetrated all the way to the second ring, which was also scorched. When I say the grease was black, I mean it was black, like coal, jet black. Larry Mulloy (NASA): What does the color mean, do you know? What engineering data supports your idea that the color of soot means something? Maybe it does, but what? It would be very dangerous to start guessing at it. Roger Boisjoly: I have no other data than what I am presenting to you. I have tried to get data as a member of the O-ring Task Force since last October but haven’t been successful. Larry Mulloy (NASA): I’m looking at the chart on Flight 22. There was also blow-by past the primary O-ring, right? The temperature that day was 75 degrees. I’m not clear what you’re saying. If low temperature has a dangerous effect on O-rings, why did we have both blow-by and erosion at 75 degrees? Cop Roger Boisjoly: I’m not talking about only erosion and damage to O-rings. I’m talking about blow-by as revealed in post-flight analysis of Flight 15 when the temperature was 53 degrees. Larry Mulloy (NASA): How much erosion was there on Flight 15? Roger Boisjoly: It was minor compared to other erosions but it was black and sooty. Larry Mulloy (NASA): If you have no data on what darker or lighter means, let’s just leave color out of the equation. Boisjoly spreads out color photos of O-rings. Larry Mulloy (NASA): Now you’ve just said the erosion was more extensive. If it was, why didn’t it burn the O-ring more? Roger Boisjoly: I don’t know the answer to that. All I know is that it looked worse. Larry Mulloy (NASA): You’re saying it looked worse, the dark color made it seem worse. But the figures on your chart, which I’m lookingNot at, say it wasn’t worse. The direct relationship between O- ring performance and temperature is not supported by your data! Roger Boisjoly: You’re putting what I said into a different context! Larry Mulloy (NASA): I’m putting it into the context I learned in engineering school—that you have to have reliable data to come to an engineering conclusion. Roger Boisjoly: I don’t have that data. All I’m saying is that launching it below freezing is an act away from goodness. All I’m saying is we should go by our experience base, as limited as that is, and our experience base says that at 53 degrees or less we can expect increased erosion and blow-by.