MILITARY INNOVATION AND THE HELICOPTER: A COMPARISON OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND MARINE CORPS, 1945-1965 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University By Carl John Horn III, B.S., M.A. ***** The Ohio State University 2003 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Dr. Allan R. Millett, Adviser Dr. John F. Guilmartin Dr. David S. Stebenne ______________________________ Adviser Department of History ABSTRACT Since 1989, the American military has sought to adapt to the changing missions and threats in order to secure American strategic objectives. The Army and the Marine Corps have sought to provide a force sufficient for current missions/contingencies while creating a force to defeat future threats. To meet this objective, leaders gaze into history looking for a shred of enlightenment as to how to proceed, or, just as importantly, what to avoid repeating. In this paper understanding the process of change is more important than the final product. The development of American vertical envelopment and airmobility doctrines are significant for two reasons. First, they are examples of the complex inter-relationship between strategic threats, bureaucratic politics, technology, operational adaptation, and doctrinal development in modern warfare. The major difference between the Marine Corps and the Army in this area was that the Marine Corps came to the brink of irrelevance after World War II. While successfully seeking Congressional assistance, this adversity also helped to keep the Marine Corps focused on developing a new doctrine for the nuclear era. The Army also suffered from a reduced role in the nation’s defense, but at no time did the Army ever doubt its importance, nor did anyone seriously believe that there was no need for a good Army. Without much external “push” the Army’s development of airmobility occurred gradually and incrementally. The Army’s i conceptual visions of airmobility provided the impetus for change, and technology provided the means to achieve it. While the rapid pace of technological change directly influences the United States Army’s current transformation, this was definitely not the case in the twenty years following World War II. The second comparative theme is the Army’s attempt to reinvent itself in the 1945-1965 period is much like the Army’s efforts today. The airmobility concept was considered revolutionary during its time much like the Army’s current efforts to obtain information dominance and use the precision weapons are considered the key components of today’s “revolution in military affairs.” The insights extracted from the Army’s experiment with airmobility and the Marines’ successful transition to vertical envelopment may serve as a guide for the Army’s current dilemma of meeting the demands of modernization, personnel recruitment and training, and mission within the constraints of limited funding. ii Dedicated to my wife Kimberly and my son Kyle. Kimberly, without your patience, understanding, love, and editing skills this project could never have been possible. Kyle, may this inspire you to in your quest to seek enlightenment, knowledge, and understanding throughout your life. iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to thank my adviser, Dr. Allan R. Millett, for the intellectual direction and critical commentary that I needed to make this study relatively cogent and useful. I also wish to thank Dr. John F. Guilmartin and Dr. David S. Stebenne who allowed me the opportunity to express my ideas in their seminars and whose teaching provided me with the perspective that gave this study breadth and depth. I also wish to acknowledge the efforts of my fellow graduate students, especially Chris Ives, who forthright commentary on various drafts contributed to a solid final product. Most importantly, I owe my wife and son the greatest of thanks since they had to put up with my bouts of crankiness and frustration caused by too many late nights. This research was supported in part by funding from the Department of the Army and the United States Military Academy and by generous grants from the United States Marine Corps and the United States Army’s Military History Institute in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Both grants allowed me to fully explore their archives without any limitations on the content and ideas contained in this dissertation while the Department of History at USMA provided me with the institutional support and time needed to complete the writing. iv VITA May 7, 1969.............................................Born - Rochester, New York 1991.........................................................B.S., The United States Military Academy 1991-Present...........................................Armor Officer, United States Army 2000……………………………………M.A., The Ohio State University 2000-2003……………………………...Assistant Professor and Course Director, The United States Military Academy FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: History v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract............................................................................................................................... i Dedication..........................................................................................................................iii Acknowledgments..............................................................................................................iv Vita.....................................................................................................................................v Introduction.........................................................................................................................1 Chapters: 1. A Baby Eagle: The Helicopter and Light Aviation Through 1945..............................16 2. Opening Pandora’s Box: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. Military Policy.........................45 3. The First Wave: The Marines’ and Vertical Assault, 1945-1950................................61 4. Grounded: The Army and the Helicopter, 1945-1950..................................................77 5. The Marine Experience in Korea: A Doctrine Verified……………………...............98 6. The Army in Korea: Little Ventured, Little Gained……………….………………..116 7. A New Look At Vertical Assault: The Birth Of Vertical Envelopment…………….136 8. Hovering in Place: The Army in the Eisenhower Years...…………………………..169 9. The Howze And Whys Of Army Airmobility Development, 1960-1965.………..…252 10. International Developments and Their Influence on the Army, 1945-1965……….279 11. Epilogue And Final Thoughts……………………………………………………...335 Bibliography....................................................................................................................342 vi INTRODUCTION Since the end of the Cold War, the American military has sought to adapt to the changing missions and threats in order to secure American strategic objectives. Foremost among the services to “transform” have been the Army and the Marine Corps. They have sought to provide a force sufficient for current missions/contingencies while creating/building a force to defeat future threats. As they try to meet this objective, leaders look back into history in the hope that it can provide a shred of enlightenment as to how to proceed, or, just as importantly, what to avoid repeating. In this paper understanding the process of change is more important than the final product. The development of vertical envelopment and airmobility doctrines in the United States armed forces are significant for two reasons. First, they are examples of the complex inter-relationship between strategic threats, bureaucratic politics, technology, operational adaptation, and doctrinal development in modern warfare. Both services were affected by the strategic context in which they operated from 1945 to 1965. Except for a period of three years during the Korean War, the two decades were ones of tight defense budgets, which contributed to interservice rivalries. The major difference between the Marine Corps and the Army in this area was that the Marine Corps came to the brink of irrelevance after World War II. This crisis forced the Marines to seek Congressional assistance and to emphasize their unique skills. While this adversity also 1 helped to keep the Marine Corps focused on developing a new doctrine for the nuclear era, the Marines were already working on the concept of vertical assault prior to the roles and missions debate began to get vicious. The Army also suffered from a reduced role in the nation’s defense, but at no time did the Army ever doubt its importance, nor did anyone seriously believe that there was no need for a good Army. Without much external “push” the Army’s development of airmobility occurred gradually and incrementally. Technology did not serve as the driving factor in tactical and doctrinal innovation. Instead, the conceptual visions of airmobility provided the impetus for change, and technology provided the means to achieve it. Helicopters and ancillary equipment were designed to meet military requirements and not the other way around. While the rapid pace of technological change directly influences the United States Army’s current transformation, this was definitely not the case in the twenty years following World War II. The second comparative theme is the Army’s attempt to reinvent itself in the 1945-1965 period is much like the Army’s efforts today. The airmobility concept was considered revolutionary during its time, much like the current efforts