Appendix A: General Figures of Proof (Birmingham Production, 1804–1914) Barrels for small arms, made for the Board of Ordnance, at Birmingham (1804–28, 1855–1914) Year Muskets Rifles Carbines Pistols (×2) Total per year 1804 80,123 62 – – 80,185 1805 110,833 2,938 3,120 1,158 118,049 1806 112,222 15,106 4,418 2,276 134,022 1807 155,839 1,873 6,536 8,942 173,190 1808 229,355 6,334 15,245 21,402 272,336 1809 265,049 1,433 5,571 16,608 288,661 1810 299,382 133 313 6,405 306,233 1811 316,760 1,886 178 3,611 322,435 1812 409,961 2,260 7,694 16,347 436,262 1813 413,918 466 24,878 51,576 490,838 2,622,211 1814 282,215 91 6,566 23,313 312,185 1815 98,689 – 442 4,117 103,248 1816 – 116,686 – 10,745 127,431 1817 87,217 9,456.5 96,673.5 1818 128,935 14,843.5 144,778.5 1819 102,499 18,118 120,617 1820 66,099 66,099 84,568 1821 63,754 10,825 74,579 1822 56,419 9,535 65,954 1823 97,926 10,521 108,447 1,238,481 1824 104,713 8,611.5 113,324.5 1825 159,740 11,555 171,295 1826 126,745 11,425 137,170 1827 73,306 8,649 81,955 1828 68,615 8,362 76,977 580,721.5 224 Appendix A 225 Year Trade Military Government Pistols Total Proof Barrels Proof House per year House (The ‘Tower’, (Banbury Bagot Street) Street) 1855 264,477 131,869 28,776 425,122 1856 275,468 119,910 33,252 428,630 1857 302,670 136,247 35,593 474,510 1858 198,238 127,265 36,504 362,007 1859 250,922 133,823 42,775 427,520 1860 301,021 136,298 35,098 472,417 1861 380,781 142,819 101,241 32,637 657,478 1862 622,372 388,264 45,405 24,288 1,090,329 1863 460,140 210,078 19,263 38,522 728,003 1864 221,726 42,242 26,930 48,181 338,279 5,396,295 1865 576,884 576,884 1866 582,127 582,127 1867 766,893 766,893 1868 961,459 (c.197,000 961,459 1869 693,572 21,000 693,572 1870 852,079 90,000 852,079 1871 891,228 119,000 891,228 1872 815,863 40,000 815,863 1873 756,056 19,000 756,056 1874 626,478 40,000 626,478 7,522,639 1875 695,554 95,000 695,554 1876 466,748 10,000 466,748 1877 458,656 14,000 458,656 1878 559,815 13,000 559,815 1879 552,152 6,000 552,152 1880 638,070 16,000 638,070 1881 730,364 12,000 730,364 1882 771,597 7,000 771,597 1883 681,439 8,000 681,439 1884 694,035 7,000 694,035 6,248,430 1885 501,634 21,000 501,634 1886 459,052 7,000 459,052 1887 440,334 5,000 440,334 226 Appendix A Year Trade Military Government Pistols Total Proof Barrels Proof House per year House (The ‘Tower’, (Banbury Bagot Street) Street) 1888 460,211 7,000 460,211 1889 529,082 12,000 529,082 1890 520,949 10,000) 520,949 1891 561,631 561,631 1892 379,086 379,086 1893 335,271 335,271 1894 299,273 299,273 4,486,523 1895 328,791 328,791 1896 324,898 324,898 1897 402,115 402,115 1898 392,939 392,939 1899 375,513 375,513 1900 390,268 390,268 1901 355,270 355,270 1902 376,788 376,788 1903 427,474 427,474 1904 304,969 304,969 3,679,025 1905 337,457 337,457 1906 370,528 370,528 1907 371,435 371,435 1908 326,697 326,697 1909 340,176 340,176 1910 420,239 420,239 1911 417,988 417,988 1912 514,681 514,681 1913 448,324 448,324 1914 361,011 361,011 3,908,536 Note: The figures in italics are decadal totals, the only exception being the total for the five-year period, 1824–28. Sources: The Ironmonger; Arms and Explosives; ‘Artifex’ and ‘Opifex’, Causes of Decay in a British Industry; and C. Harris, History of the Birmingham Gun-Barrel Proof House, pp. 152–5. Appendix B: Monthly Fluctuations in British Small Arms Exports, c.1860 to c.1880 250,000 1861 1862 200,000 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 150,000 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 Value (£) 1874 100,000 1875 1876 1877 1878 50,000 0 Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May. Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Sources: The Ironmonger; and Artifex and Opifex, Causes of Decay. 227 Notes Preface 1 The Proof House archives held the informative Proceedings of the Guardians (PG), incorporating miscellaneous correspondence and specialist literature (both published and unpublished), plus newspaper clippings (including rare excerpts from the Birmingham Daily Post, 1864–69). 2 Arms and Explosives furnished Proof House returns and key references to arms trafficking in the Gulf region during the 1890s. 3 See, for example, L. Decle, ‘The Murder in Africa’, New Review (December 1895); ‘Papers relating to the Execution of Mr. Stokes in the Congo State’, Parliamentary Papers, Africa No. 8, C 944 (1896); A. Luck, Charles Stokes in Africa (Nairobi, 1972). 4 Significant gaps existed even at the better-documented metropolitan end. Citing just one example from conversations with former Proof Master Roger Hancock, a considerable portion of the commercial records of gunmaking firms located in the Birmingham Proof House Library were destroyed in a mysterious boiler fire during the last century. Against this background, it is hardly surprising that the British Government should finally stop issuing data on the financial value of Britain’s arms exports, citing in 2008 ‘the tech- nical difficulty of continuing to produce reliable statistics’. Introduction 1 For a comprehensive overview, see R. A. Bitzinger (ed.) The Modern Defence Industry: Political, Economic, and Technological Issues (Santa Barbara, 2009). 2 See C. Trebilcock, The Industrialization of the Continental Powers, 1780–1914 (London, 1981); I. T. Berend, The European Periphery and Industrialization 1780–1914 (Paris, 1982); M. E. Chamberlain, ‘Pax Britannica’?: British Foreign Policy, 1789–1914 (London, 1988); and D. Blackbourn, Fontana History of Germany 1780–1918: The Long Nineteenth Century (London, 1997). European historians justify their starting-point in the 1780s by arguing that the French Revolution and the armies it spawned changed forever the geopolitical and military configuration of Europe, even as the industrialization that began in Britain was also starting to work its socio-economic transformation in the rest of the Continent. 3 See V. T. Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire 1763–1793, 2: New Continents and Changing Values (London, 1964), pp. 482–594; and, more recently, C. A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons (Oxford, 2004). The imperial historian’s case for starting from the late eighteenth century rests not only on Britain’s loss of the American colonies and, as an extension of European great power rivalry, the growth of commercial and strategic interests in India and the Far East. As this book argues, indi- 228 Notes 229 genous societies in Asia and Africa were themselves at various stages of crisis and transition, which in turn shaped the course of colonial encounters throughout the century. 4 F. Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, trans. S. Reynolds, 2 vols (London, 1966). Fernand Braudel (1902–85) was a great oceanic historian, though known primarily as a leading light of the French Annales School of historical writing. The longue durée would be the expression denoting their distinctive approach to the study of history: historical events or movements in politics, economics, and society yield particular consequences in the short to medium term, but the seasonal cycles and structural crises of the shorter time-scale are regulated over the long term by underlying structures or forces of geography, climate, and culture. All but permanent or perennial in nature, these larger structures or forces predispose particular communities to char- acteristic patterns of thought and action, thereby shaping their identities and destinies in the long run. 5 K. N. Chaudhuri, Asia before Europe: Economy and Civilization of the Indian Ocean from the Rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 10–41, 147–8; cf. R. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power (New York, 2010). While occasional reference will be made to what some scholars and analysts have defined as the ‘greater’ Indian Ocean, extending further eastward across the South China Sea, this book focuses on the ‘lesser’ Indian Ocean, encom- passing East Africa, the Gulf region, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. 6 See J. R. V. Prescott, Political Frontiers and Political Boundaries (London, 1987). In defining ‘borders’ for the modern world, Prescott makes a clear distinction between ‘frontiers’ and ‘boundaries’, in which the indistinct contours of frontier spaces have given way to distinct boundary lines, while ‘borderland’ refers to the transitional zone within which a border lies. From my study of the Indian Ocean ‘periphery’, this was at best an uneven process of transition, occurring at different times in different places. Such terms are therefore used more or less interchange- ably throughout this book.