Professionals Australia’s response on behalf of members in relation to the proposed restructure PA met with engineers who work in the Engineering Division on two occasions at WNSW Parramatta offices with members dialling-in from regional NSW. PA encouraged members to put forward their professional views on the proposed restructure on whether it addressed existing problems. PA has received some very detailed responses from our members. It is clear there is a high level of concern that the restructure will have undesired impacts on both employees and the functions of Engineering. Many members have taken the opportunity to respond directly to the WNSW email address set up for feedback. This submission does not repeat those comments. This submission is concerned with the first order issue – Does the restructure enhance the undertaking of engineering functions by WaterNSW or not? The next level of concerns which appear to be the main focus of the input provided via the WNSW email are the detail of position descriptions and the arrangements for filling the structure. We understand such matters have also attracted a large number of comments and concerns from members. However, those issues arise only when the first order issue is satisfied. The focus of this submission is whether the restructure has accurately identified the deficiencies and whether the proposal will address those deficiencies. What can a restructure address? A restructure can address issues such as resourcing levels, specific function focus and functional alignment. It cannot address issues caused by dysfunctional organisational behaviour, lack of effective processes, etc. Does the restructure enhance engineering functions at WNSW? The view of WNSW engineers is that overall the restructure will not result in the enhanced performance of the engineering functions required by WNSW. The following is a selection of comments put forward by engineers with PA comments on those set out in brackets: • The apparent reduction in the number of mechanical and electrical engineering positions in the business. [PA does not see a demonstrable business case for this reduction] • The mandatory experience requirements for the Project Engineering positions do not appear to require technical experience. Currently the design team provides significant assistance on highly technical aspects to the projects team, it is unclear in the new structure where this will come from? Who will be invited to design review meetings? The design team does not believe it was resourced to achieve what it was established to achieve. [PA notes that in other organisations (e.g. Ausgrid), a key reform is to put design functions in the Projects area. This enables the commercial implications of variations to be appreciated by the design team, amongst other things.] • The new projects structure appears to have each Project Manager and Project Engineer across a large quantity of projects. The concern is this will lead to project engineers doing project manager work and not the engineering. Has industry benchmarking been undertaken regarding the practicality of such an arrangement. [PA notes a similar arrangement was set up in Delivery Management at Sydney Water. However, this was an employee driven change which permitted flexibility for those opting one or the other without a set number established. It was purposely developed to enable a business supported skill uplift]. • The inclusion of the maintenance auditing team within the SOAM business unit. Maintenance audits provide significant input to asset planning driving the requirement for new projects. Having the same team charted with the maintenance budget doing the audit is a conflict of interest. Previous experience has shown having maintenance providers perform assets audits to be problematic. [PA agrees that there is an implicit conflict of interest in the roles as proposed.] • The apparent reduction in the number of personnel conducting the maintenance audits is likely to lead to a reduction in the quantity and quality of the audits. Specifically, only one mechanical and no electrical auditors being transferred. [PA does not see how this aspect of the proposal enhances the performance of the engineering function at all] • The structure appears to be reinforcing silo creation as opposed to breaking them down, with perceived barriers and potential conflict between the managers and engineers. • It is not clear how the proposed structure will reduce duplication of work or clarity of which team does what work. Note in some circumstances the appearance of duplication of work is inaccurate because the people involved bring different skillsets. Having different skill sets that complement each other in different roles assists breaking down silos. It is also required to come to the solution or true identification of the problem and promote knowledge transfer. [PA notes that ‘matrix’ organisations require engaged employees – engagement issues at WNSW are discussed further below.] Abolition of reliability engineering The decision to remove a dedicated reliability engineering group raises serious questions with some of a public interest nature. This view is shared across the PA membership including those outside of the Engineering Division. Firstly, the work undertaken by this group is not limited to audit work as the following indicates: 1. Reliability Engineering Non-Audit Tasks – major work only • Warragamba Pipeline inspection and rectification of defects. Mamre Rd works, report writing, design, development procedures, engineering solutions, data entry, etc. • Parcelling of painting work at proposed sites – • Prospect pump rebuild – Specification, Inspection • Tallowa Dam access road and crane. • Tallowa Dam Flood damage • Standardised crane maintenance • Glennies Creek Land Slide • Fish River pipeline lead issue • OPT procedure • ACAC and PM Backlog– Substitute for maintenance planners • Pipeline sink hole at AB66 • Kangaroo Pipeline support failure • Cataract FCDV • Pindari FCDV • Burrawang pumping Station. Urgent specification for mechanical works (~1.5 Mill.) • Warragamba Dam Rock bolting • Warragamba Prospect Pipeline valves • Warragamba Dam Radial gate investigations • Warragamba Dam Drum gate refurbishment works • Warragamba Dam Drum Gate stop log Design and specification input for Geotech. • Warragamba Dam turbidity issue • Warragamba Dam radial gate brakes • Woronora Bridge • Cascade Dam electrical upgrade • Hume Dam – Penstock Internal protective coating • Euston Lock Gates (Redesign, Identification & Rectification of Issues • Assisting ASI with CIMS • Burrendong Dam expansion joint • Upper Avon Road support • Tallowa Dam fish lift support • Organised and conducted hydraulic training • Burrendong Dam CWPC– weeks of onsite support • Nepean Dam VSD and refurbishment works spec. • Warragamba Corridor Bridges - review of load ratings • Pipeline third party bridge proposal Archbold road • GSR known issues list and risk evaluation • Northern Rd upgrade • Greaves Creek handrail augmentation on crest • Warragamba Dam radial gate exercising and maintenance program to CIMs • Establish pilot program for LV single line diagrams • State wide WHS infrastructure register • Menangle Weir bank restoration and fishway Piping • Mollee Fishway post project defect rectification Secondly, the proposal to abolish reliability engineering when it has identified significant serious issues that have exceeded the capacity of the Projects Team to meet is a strange business response. WH&S risks identified by reliability engineering (those which could cause serious injury to WNSW staff or the public) Woronora Spillway Bridge • Corroded bearing fasteners and loose public handrails providing unsafe public access. Consultant reports will validate. Glenbawn Dam • Unterminated compressor cables lying on floor providing potential electrocution. • Overhead crane hitting high bay lights. Risk falling objects/electrocution. Cascades Dam • Fire hydrants non operational Avon Dam • Risk to public due to spalling concrete • Handrail over Spillway Bridge corroded to point of failure. Risk injury/death. Nepean Dam • Access ladder to thermistor chain for the dam does not prevent falling from height.(>30m) • Upper Valve House plated flooring is not safe due to inadequate load bearing. Risk injury/death, fall from height (>10m) Prospect Reservoir • Pooling water in electrical cubical risk of panel explosion due to major short. Chaffey Dam • High voltage transmission line in flood zone. Major Public safety risk. Oberon Dam • Insufficient earthing to switchboard, floating earth. Risk of electrocution. Broughtons Pass • Accessible Live power found in building. Extreme risk of electrocution. Various Locations • Non-compliant stop board lifting frames – i.e. Risk injury/death. Warragamba DWPS • Gas detectors not functioning whilst personnel working in station. • SCADA Alarm disabled for Sydney water chlorine leak. Risk chlorine inundation of station and risk of death to occupants. • Crane rail loose risk of crane derailing causing injury/death. Pheasants Nest • Stoney Gate access ladder/platform corroded beyond repair. Counter weight for gate suspended above walkway/platform. Risk fall injury/crush injury/death. Kangaroo Control Structure • Eye-wash stations not compliant. Risk serious injury/electrocution. • Gate at first level of Surge Tank not self-closing or lockable. Risk fall from height (>3m) injury/death • Kangaroo Shaft inspection lift for personnel not certified. Risk injury/death. Bendeela Control