Swarthmore College Works History Faculty Works History 2000 Austrian Non-Reception Of A Reluctant Goldhagen Pieter M. Judson , '78 Swarthmore College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-history Part of the History Commons Let us know how access to these works benefits ouy Recommended Citation Pieter M. Judson , '78. (2000). "Austrian Non-Reception Of A Reluctant Goldhagen". The "Goldhagen Effect": History, Memory, Nazism: Facing The German past. 131-149. https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-history/177 This work is brought to you for free and open access by . It has been accepted for inclusion in History Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Works. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Austrian Non-Reception of a Reluctant Goldhagen Pieter Judson German translations of Hitler’s Willing Executioners appeared in Austria in September of 1996 to a strangely distanced reception. The book did not unleash in Austria the kind of public discussion it called forth in neigh­ boring Germany. The book did not even sell particularly well. Most Aus­ trian reviewers treated it with an exaggerated deference, praising the work for what they called its original focus on the participation of ordinary Germans in the Holocaust. Some went so far as to remind their readers that what Goldhagen had written about the Germans could be said of “Austrian citizens of the German Reich” or “citizens of Greater Ger­ many” (Grossdeutschland) as well.' While Austrian reviewers acknowl­ edged that the book’s more controversial conclusions had drawn strong criticism in American and German scholarly circles, they seemed to have missed the more interesting phenomenon altogether, namely, the degree of Goldhagen’s personal popularity in Germany. Instead, reviewers tended to describe the Goldhagen phenomenon purely as an academic contro­ versy over narrow issues of interpretation. The bloodless reception in Hitler’s homeland of a book that charac­ terized ordinary German attitudes toward Jews as eliminationist and doc­ umented the active complicity of ordinary Germans in the Holocaust might seem surprising. After all, public opinion polls of the past decade have consistently registered lingering Austrian bitterness over the Wald­ heim controversy and a defensive anger directed toward “world Jewry.” Did no Austrians reject Goldhagen’s accusations as constituting yet I would like to thank Matt! Bunzl, Heidemarie Uhl, and Douglas McKeown for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this essay. 1. Hans Rauscher, “Ganz gewohnliche Deutsche,” Kurier, 17 August 1996, 3; Arbeit- skreis Goldhagen, Goldhagen und Osterreich: Ganz gewohnliche Osterreicherinnen und ein Holocaust-Buch (Vienna, 1998), 8. 131 132 The “Goldhagen Effect” another smear campaign? More to the point, given the reasons for the book’s popularity in Germany, did not those Austrians seeking to undo the myth of Austrian victim status find it a useful confirmation of their arguments? Or did this nonreaction simply confirm the popular view among American, European, and some Austrian observers that Austrians stubbornly deny their perpetrator past? This latter was, for example, the conclusion reached by the Arbeitskreis Goldhagen, a group of left-wing university students who published the volume Goldhagen und Osterreich in the summer of 1998.^ Whatever else it implied, I do not believe that the bland reception Goldhagen received at the hands of the Austrians simply reflected an ongoing denial of Austrians’ historic participation in the Holocaust. The question of how to treat Austria’s Nazi and antisemitic pasts is in fact cen­ tral to public discourse in today’s Austria. The question underlies several current controversies, both within the academic community and generally in the public sphere. It permeates almost every new attempt by each of the political parties to reposition itself with particular voting groups. In a sense, the question cannot be escaped. We might find fault with the ways in which the question is debated, with its particular manipulations at the hands of historians, politicians, and journalists, but the general consensus that Austria was Hitler’s first victim no longer holds sway. There is, therefore, some point in seeking to understand why Austri­ ans did not react to Hitler’s Willing Executioners. In a society where claims and counterclaims about the Holocaust, about Austrians’ relationship to the Third Reich, and about the nature of Austrian identity are today more bound together than ever before, it may be useful to investigate the rea­ sons why, in this case, the proverbial dog did not bark. In what follows I will argue that two contingencies—(1) the particular demands of Austrian politics in the fall of 1996, and (2) the nature of Goldhagen’s argumenta­ tion itself—ensured that Hitler’s Willing Executioners made few waves in Austria, even as it became a topic of almost obsessional proportion in neighboring Germany. Austrian History, Austrian Identity The new Austrian identity pieced together after the collapse of the Third Reich built on several political elements of the imperial and republican pasts, while strongly rejecting the German ethnic basis for national iden­ tity that had defined its predecessor. The first Austrian Republic had defined itself literally as the republic of German Austrians (the term Aus- 2. Goldhagen und Osterreich, 7. Austrian Non-Reception of a Reluctant Goldhagen 133 tria had theretofore included people of several national and ethnic identifications). Most citizens of the new state viewed potential Anschluss with Germany as their economic and cultural salvation, at least until 1933. After Austria achieved full independence in 1955, however, political lead­ ers of Austria’s two major parties, the Socialist Democrats (SPO) and the Catholic Peoples’ Party (OVP) tended to define Austria’s unique mission, and thus its identity in a Cold War world, according to its geographic sit­ uation between east and west, and its political neutrality. This new identity ignored the paramount issue of Austria’s interwar history, namely, Anschluss with Germany. It therefore fostered a kind of amnesia toward Austria’s recent past, since it required a thorough denial of the powerful German nationalist traditions of the preceding fifty years. Austrian leaders were aided, of course, by the Allied declaration of November 1943 that proclaimed Austria Hitler’s first victim, and by the Allied tendency to equate Prussian German traditions with the cultural origins of Nazism. This official rejection of the recent past for a completely new identity meant that in the public sphere, at least, the recent past would remain largely unexamined. Amnesia about its recent past, however, did not require a denial of all Austrian history. On the contrary, evocations of Austria’s imperial past have recently become a critical ingredient in the global popularization of Vienna as a center for tourism and high culture. It was also a critical ingre­ dient in Austria’s chosen identity as mediator between west and east, or between the developed and third worlds. Until the fall of neighboring communist regimes in 1989, Austrians often drew on a nostalgic vision of their imperial multinational. Catholic internationalist past to differentiate themselves from Germans and to construct a relevant mediating role for themselves in the Cold War era. The visible presence of Slovene, Czech, and Hungarian flags waving at Empress Zita’s funeral in 1989, for ex­ ample, was but a small reminder of Austria’s historic relationship to those “nations,” a relationship the latter now view far more positively than they did before fifty years of Soviet hegemony.^ 3. In 1989 it was decided that a state funeral would be held in Vienna for the recently deceased Empress Zita, wife of the last Habsburg emperor Charles. Imperial tradition dic­ tated the route to be taken by the cortege through the streets of the inner city to the Capuziner Crypt, final resting place of the Habsburgs. More than one commentator noted that the imperial cortege would have to circle the Albertinaplatz, site of Alfred Hrdlicka’s recently erected monument to the victims of fascism. Should the coffin of the Empress (a reminder of a glorious tradition) be confronted with this brutal monument to Austria’s recent past? Some wondered whether the route might not be changed to avoid the monument’s bru­ tal evocation of Jews forced to clean Vienna’s streets during the Anschluss. The funeral, after all, was an attempt to recreate an imperial past that would evoke contemporary Austria’s 134 The "Goldhagen Effect” When Austrians evoke the imperial past, it is, of course, an extremely selective process. Along with historicist architectural reminders of Vienna’s centrality in East Central Europe, the city also houses visible monuments to more unsettling by-products of that very same age. Several monuments, for example, recall the rise of political, cultural, and religious antisemitism in Vienna. Even the most innocent of tourists can’t fail to notice the ongoing popularity of Karl Lueger, Vienna’s greatest mayor (1897-1911) and founder of the populist antisemitic Christian Social movement in Austria. Several monuments, a church, and a segment of the Ringstrasse testify to Lueger’s gargantuan importance in Vienna’s con­ struction of its past and present identity. Today’s OVP situates itself con­ sciously as the postwar legatee of Lueger’s Christian Social party. Historians, both Austrian and American, have themselves given Lueger the necessary alibi to remain a respected and beloved figure in Aus­ trian mythology, for his political use of antisemitism was above all consid­ ered opportunist and not ideological, situational and not racialist. Lueger’s was the cultural antisemitism of the ordinary person, not at all the virulently racist, ideological ravings of an Adolf Hitler or a Georg von Schonerer. This distinction parallels another important element in post- 1945 Austrian public culture that makes it difficult to square today’s Aus­ trian identity with the histories of individual Austrians.