CSIS Lecture Series on Regional Dynamics INDONESIA, ASEAN, AND THE INDO-PACIFIC: STRATEGIC NECESSITY OR NORM-SETTING EXERCISE? Rizal SUKMA Indonesia’s Ambassador to the UK, Ireland and the IMO Jakarta, 28 August 2019 During the 34 th ASEAN Summit in late June 2019 in Bangkok, ASEAN leaders officially endorsed and adopted the “ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific”. They agreed, in light of the ongoing strategic changes in the region, that ASEAN needs its own vision about the future of region order, a vision that represents a distinct ASEAN’s view and voice. ASEAN leaders hope that the vision would reconcile the competing visions of regional order advocated by major powers. By adopting the Outlook, ASEAN evidently wants to remind itself, and sends a simple message to extra-regional powers, that ASEAN centrality should never be forgotten. Indeed, one of ASEAN’s remarkable qualities since its inception in 1967 has been its ability to survive the power play among great powers. Yet, as we enter the third decade of the 21 st century, the strategic challenges facing ASEAN now are different from the past. Different challenges require different responses. During the Cold War era, ASEAN (still five members at the time) believed that it could preserve regional peace and stability by trying to keep great power rivalries out of the region. ZOPFAN is a clear example of this approach. When the Cold War ended, new strategic context compelled ASEAN to open up and embrace extra-regional powers as a strategy in maintaining peace and stability in the region. This is demonstrated by the proliferation of ASEAN-centred multilateral processes and platforms such as the ARF, the APT, the ADMM Plus, and the EAS. The short-lived unipolar moment allowed ASEAN to focus more on deeper institutionalization and the regional community-building project. ASEAN managed to have the ASEAN Charter, and agreed on a blueprint to transform itself into an ASEAN Community. Today, ASEAN finds itself in a completely new terrain. The world is undergoing profound changes. Scholars and policy makers start to talk about the world in disarray, disorder, and even anarchy. We live in a turbulent world, where the old is being dismantled and the new is yet to emerge. Power relations and balance of power are shifting. 1 New rivalry is emerging and old ones are returning. Allies are changing side; friends become foes, and foes become friend. Indeed, we live in a world characterized by great uncertainty, and we have no idea what to expect. Faced with such strategic uncertainty, every nation is scrambling and struggling to find the most suitable place for itself in the emerging strategic environment, individually or collectively. Within that context, some of us in Indonesia began to worry about peace and stability in Southeast Asia, about the future of ASEAN, about the future of the entire East Asia, and more importantly about Indonesia’s place in the emerging regional order. We know, the geo-economic and geo-political centre of gravity of the world is shifting from West to East. We already know, China is fast becoming a great power, if not already is. We also know, the United States is trying to sustain its primacy in the world while dismantling the international order it helped build since 1945. Yet, the process of that strategic change is still unraveling, and the final outcome of that change remains to be seen. Three developments, however, have emerged from that process of change: First, a great power game is returning to Southeast Asia… Second, the future of Southeast Asia is increasingly defined by how extra-regional powers interact with each other… And third, key extra-regional powers begin to formulate and promote their own vision of regional order. The key questions before us in region, therefore, are twofold: 1) Are we about to see the end of the ASEAN-centered regional order? 2) What are we going to do about it? In principle, the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP) is an attempt to provide answers to these questions. The AOIP recognizes, “it is in the interest of ASEAN to lead the shaping of their economic and security architecture” in order to address challenges stemming from changes in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. In doing so, the Outlook promises that ASEAN will “continue to maintain its central role in the evolving regional architecture in Southeast Asia and its surrounding regions” and “continue being an honest broker within the strategic environment of competing interests”. 2 This is the key rationale behind the Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific proposal to ASEAN since early 2018, starting here in this building when Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi gave a major policy speech on 16 May 2018 on the issue. The AOIP, in this sense, constitutes a response to the growing challenges stemming from external pressures that could threaten ASEAN’s unity, undermine ASEAN’s relevance and corrode ASEAN’s centrality. And, responding to external changes at critical times is something ASEAN has always been good at. Seen in this light, the AOIP is a strategic necessity. ASEAN can no longer just sit and watch extra-regional powers actively shape the future of its own region. ASEAN must ensure that its two core interests –ASEAN centrality and strategic autonomy of the region— will be preserved, enhanced and reinforced. ASEAN hopes that the AOIP would provide the necessary platform to do that. It is necessary to point out that the AOIP would not have been possible without Indonesia’s initiative and determination. Under the leadership and direct involvement of Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, Indonesia managed to convince its regional partners that it is a strategic necessity for ASEAN to articulate its own vision on the future of regional order and architecture. Indonesia hopes and expects AOIP to address strategic challenges in the region, and give impetus for greater regional cooperation. In strategic terms, it hopes the AOIP could serve as a platform through which rivalries among great powers can be mitigated and conflict prevented. It also expects the AOIP to serve as an inclusive meeting place for the competing visions of regional order offered by great and regional players. And most importantly, it expects to maintain ASEAN’s relevance, uphold ASEAN’s centrality, preserve ASEAN’s unity, and sustain Southeast Asia’s strategic autonomy. Now, let us move from hope and expectation to policy and strategy. This is where the challenge becomes more profound. Why? Because the burden and responsibility of moving from hope to policy, from expectation to strategy, rests first and foremost with Indonesia. And, our ability to fulfill that task would require an understanding of the domestic origins of the Indonesian Indo-Pacific outlook. And, that understanding would not be complete unless we also understand the return of maritime awareness into Indonesia’s strategic thinking. *** 3 Five years ago, on 20 October 2014, in his inaugural speech, President Jokowi declared, “We have to work hard to rebuild Indonesia as a maritime nation. We have far too long turned our back on the seas, the oceans, the straits, and the bays. It is time to turn everything around so that in the sea we will triumph”. Jalasveva Jayamahe ! It is a simple proclamation. Yet, it carries a powerful message. It reminds all Indonesians that we were once a maritime power. It declares that it is now our duty to reclaim that identity. The speech marks the beginning of a new path for a new Indonesia, an Indonesia as a maritime power. President Jokowi’s inaugural speech is a continuation of the ideas that had formed the core argument of his opening remarks during a presidential debate on foreign policy earlier that year. If elected, he pledged to transform Indonesia into a global maritime fulcrum (GMF), a power between two strategic oceans. This idea was then articulated in greater details at the 9 th East Asia Summit (EAS) in Myanmar in November 2014. In his speech, President Jokowi clearly explains how Indonesia would transform itself into a GMF, by focusing on the five pillars of the GMF: maritime culture, maritime resources, maritime infrastructure and connectivity, maritime diplomacy, and maritime safety and security. [It has been expanded into 7 pillars: HRD and maritime space] Transforming Indonesia into a GMF cannot be achieved in a vacuum. We must take into account the strategic changes taking place in our external environment. Given the nature of international changes I mention earlier, it is imperative for Indonesia to undertake a strategic re-positioning. The GMF provides a conceptual framework for Indonesia to do just that. First, the GMF reflects a very simple understanding: the way you define the map, and where you are on that map, will define how you behave internationally. Here, when you look at the map, Indonesia IS clearly located between two strategic oceans – the Indian and Pacific oceans. Second, as a doctrine, the GMF emphasizes geographical, geopolitical and geo-economic reality of Indonesia whose future depends on, and will affect, the dynamics in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Therefore, for Indonesia to only pay attention to the Pacific Ocean would no longer make any strategic sense. Given these two features of the GMF, then it would make a lot of sense for Indonesia to expand its space of engagement. Therefore, Indonesia needs to re-conceptualize and re-construct the geo-political and geo-economic space for itself. Treating the Indo-Pacific regions as a single geo-political and geo-economic theatre is the answer for that need. 4 In other words, for Indonesia, articulating its vision for the Indo-Pacific constitutes a logical outcome of the need to operationalize the GMF as a foreign policy doctrine.