CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULLETIN News, Background and Comment on Chemical and Biological Warfare Issues ISSUE NO. 35 MARCH 1997 Quarterly Journal of the Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation ENTRY INTO FORCE: THE TEST OF OUR PREPARATIONS Ian R Kenyon Executive Secretary, OPCW Preparatory Commission A new world will dawn on 29 April, the date on which The situation with procedures to implement the inspec- the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Pro- tion provisions of the Convention is similar to that of decla- duction, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on rations. Transforming the inspection provisions of the their Destruction enters into force. Since its opening for Convention into practical procedures is incomplete, for ex- signature in 1993, we at the Preparatory Commission have ample, in areas such as old chemical weapons (in particular been preparing for this first internationally verifiable treaty the problems associated with usability), conversion of aimed at eliminating an entire category of weapons of mass chemical weapons production facilities and model facility destruction. Now finally, we stand poised between the fa- agreements. Training of future OPCW inspectors started in miliar world of preparations and the uncharted world of ac- January of this year, and is expected to be completed, for tual implementation. 29 April will represent a brave step this first group, shortly after entry into force. Initial quanti- forward into a brave new world, the realisation of long-held ties of most types of the equipment to be used for on-site inspections have already been procured for training and dreams and the reward of determined persistence. evaluation purposes and can be provided to the first inspec- How prepared is the Preparatory Commission to present tion teams. Therefore, although many of the finer details of a working organization, staffed, trained and equipped, to inspection procedures remain unresolved, the OPCW will the international community? What has been achieved have the basic tools it requires to start inspections. since 1993? In retrospect, the years have proved to be more These key tasks of inspections and declarations will difficult than most of us had expected. Nevertheless, it is need an extensive infrastructure, much of which is already my view that despite all the trials and tribulations, the Pre- in place. Construction is well advanced on the OPCW paratory Commission has more or less accomplished the building, which is due to be completed in January 1998. mandate set down in the Paris Resolution in 1993 in that the The OPCW Laboratory and Equipment Store, located in basic structures are in place to allow the Organisation for Rijkswijk just outside The Hague, is now operating. Draft the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to meet the OPCW Financial Regulations have been developed, as challenges it will surely face. have Draft OPCW Financial Rules. The Preparatory Com- Ultimately, the success of this Convention will depend mission has agreed on a Draft OPCW Health and Safety on the workability of its verification system, built on the Policy and supplementary regulations. The Draft OPCW twin pillars of declarations by states parties and on-site in- Confidentiality Policy and Draft OPCW Media and Public spections by the OPCW. In these fundamental areas, the Affairs Policy, which together will guide the OPCW activi- Preparatory Commission was tasked with developing de- ties in the areas of protection of confidential information tailed procedures for implementation and, although not all the mandated tasks have been discharged, enough have Guest Article by Ian R Kenyon 1–3 been accomplished to allow implementation to start on 29 April. In addition, a Declaration Handbook, which will in- Forthcoming Events 2 corporate a series of forms to be used by states parties in CWC Non-Signatory States 3 compiling and forwarding their declarations to the OPCW, although incomplete in some respects and still without for- Progress in The Hague: 17th Quarterly Review 4–12 mal approval of the Preparatory Commission, is in fact CWC Signatures that still await full ratification 12 being used by many member states in their preparations. Riot Control Agent Guidelines 13–18 An Information Management System has been installed at the Secretariat and will ensure the confidentiality of elec- News Chronology: November 1996–February 1997 19–43 tronic information received and automate the processing of Recent Publications 43–44 most kinds of data. Staff are already in place, preparing for CWC Ratifications 44 the receipt of the first declarations in May. and release of information for the public, have also been ap- Second, the treaty is not unworkable. It can and it will proved by the Preparatory Commission. work. In Geneva, after more than 20 years of negotiations, Thus, taking an overall view, the Preparatory Commis- common ground on some issues still could not be found. In sion has succeeded to a large degree in its mandate of pre- seizing the optimism of the time, many of those issues were paring for the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons put aside to be worked out by the Preparatory Commission. Convention and its work will allow the OPCW to take its The tasks were not inherently impossible although they first faltering steps into this new world. However, it would have proved difficult and arduous. To be perfectly frank, be less than honest to pretend that we will leave all the old the difficulties have been more of a political than technical uncertainties and ambiguities behind. Despite the fact that nature. This is not just my personal observation but is a the Commission or its subordinate bodies have been in con- point which member-states’ representatives themselves fre- tinuous session since 1993, a number of significant tasks re- quently underline in Commission meetings. Nonetheless, main unresolved. The gaps in the draft Final Report we should recognise that the decision to defer these intrica- currently being prepared by the Commission are testament cies allowed the treaty, complete with its uncertainties and to this reality. These problems will not simply disappear at ambiguities, to go forward. Should we have waited for the entry into force but will be inherited by the OPCW. perfect compromise at that time? And today, on the eve of There were hopes that the Preparatory Commission entry into force of the Convention, should we wait for the would have completed all of its mandated tasks, particularly perfect compromise on all unresolved issues of im- given that the preparatory period extended twice as long as plementation before proceeding to implement the Conven- anticipated. Why did these expectations not bear fruit? tion? Having worked for this treaty for more than twenty Was the optimism at that time misplaced? Were the tasks years, my answer is an emphatic “no”. These difficulties, which pre-existed the advent of the assigned to the Preparatory Commission unworkable? Fair Preparatory Commission, were compounded by uncertain- questions perhaps. First, it is true that the text of the treaty ties about the date of entry into force of the Convention was adopted by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva which understandably did not lend a sense of urgency to the in a time of hope and optimism. The Cold War had just process of resolving outstanding issues. Even when entry ended and barriers, both real and perceived, were falling, into force was triggered with the deposit of the 65th instru- paving the way for precisely this type of treaty — a symbol ment of ratification, the Commission still faced a serious of the new world. But it would be a gross oversimplifica- uncertainty: ratification by the two declared chemical tion to dismiss the Convention as a mere product of its time weapons possessor states, the Russian Federation and the and thus bound for failure in the aftermath of post-Cold War United States of America. Given the Convention’s disar- euphoria, where cautious pragmatism has replaced enthusi- mament goals, it has always been understood that these two astic idealism. No-one intimately involved in the process countries would be party to the Convention — an under- ever believed that the road to entry into force would be easy. standing formally reflected in working assumptions Indeed, the comment was made on these very pages, shortly adopted by the Preparatory Commission early on in its work after the opening for signature of the treaty, that “the Prep- and reinforced by repeated statements by the two govern- Com will also have the awkward, not to say perilous, task of ments. repressing attempts to renegotiate the treaty while at the It is a fair and important question to ask how we arrived same time agreeing whatever interpretations are necessary in a situation where the two most important players have for the formulation of practicable working rules.” (CWCB still not ratified the treaty just one month prior to entry into 19, March 1993, p 1) force. Both states are essential not only because of their Forthcoming events The CWC will enter into force on 29 April. Controlling Arms will take place in Nor- A NATO Advanced Study Institute, New folk, Virginia during 2–5 June. The first session of the Conference of the Scientific and Technological Aspects of Verification of the Biological and Toxin States Parties to the CWC will open in The The seventh workshop of the Pugwash Hague on 6 May. Study Group on Implementation of the Weapons Convention (BWC), will take place in Budapest on 6–16 July 1997. For In the Czech Republic, the Purkyne Mili- CBW Conventions, The CWC at Entry into details, see box on page 18. tary Medical Academy at Hradec Kralove Force, will take place during 6–8 June in will host a symposium on chemical and bi- Noordwijk.