Journal of Ancient Philosophy J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.7, n.1. p. 1-18, 2013. ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v7i1p1-18 www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga Voice as Difference in Aristotelian Zoology Marcello Zanatta The Aristotelian treatment of animal voice reveals a significant wealth of philosophical issues and methodological approaches. The capability to emit voice, in fact, concerns different aspects of animal life, which Aristotle studies both from the point of view of the different aspects of the soul’s activity involved in phonation, and from the point of view of the bodily parts in control of voice emission and articulation. This paper attempts to provide a general survey of these issues. The poet Alcman claimed he was able to recognize and distinguish the wide range of bird singing and attributed the origin of his art to this knowledge: «aye, and Alcman did put together the tongued utterance of the caccabis, to make his twine of words and music» (fr. 39P, tr. Edmonds) Centuries later, Aristotle listened to partridges with a different intent but with the same attention to differences in their singing1. The Aristotelian treatment of animal voice reveals a significant wealth of philosophical issues and methodological approaches. The capability to emit voice, in fact, concerns different aspects of animal life, which Aristotle studies both from the point of view of the different aspects of the soul’s activity involved in phonation, and from the point of view of the bodily parts in control of voice emission and articulation. 1 See HA 536b 8 ff. 1 Journal of Ancient Philosophy J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.7, n.1. p. 1-18, 2013. ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v7i1p1-18 www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga : 1. The activity of the soul Aristotle argues that voice [fwnh@] is peculiar to animals only and therefore he distinguishes it from what is more generally called ‘sound’ [yo@fov]. In DA 420b 5 he says that «voice is a particular sound made by something with a soul [fwnh# yo@fov tiv eòstin eèmyu@cou]; for nothing which does not have a soul has a voice, although such things may be said, by way of likeness, to have a voice, e.g. the pipe, lyre and any other things which lack a soul but have variation in pitch, melody and articulation [dia@lektov]; there is a likeness here because voice too has these properties» (tr. Hamlyn). First it must be said that the definition of voice in this passage is evidently incomplete, because the plants are in the number of animate natural beings as well, but they don’t have the capability to emit voice. In the following passage indeed Aristotle’s account is more precise: «so, the striking of the inbreathed air upon what is called the windpipe due to the soul in these parts constitutes voice. For, as we have said, not every sound made by an animal is voice (for it is possible to make a sound also with the tongue or as in coughing); but that which does the striking must have a soul and there must be a certain imagination [meta# fantasi@av tino@v]; for voice is a particular sound which has meaning [shmantiko@v].» (tr. Hamlyn) From these issues it is possible to sum up a very elaborated definition of voice. This definition is firstly enunciated in a synthetic form - «voice is a particular sound made by something with a soul» - and then developed both from the point of view of the emission process and of the bodily parts controlling this function, and from the point of view of the soul’s activity that is necessarily related to the voice. What distinguishes voice emmission from the production of a different kind of sound by the same animal, is that voice is always linked to an image and has the capability to signify something. The theoretical basis of this issue can be found in the first chapter of De interpretatione, where Aristotle says: «now spoken sound are symbols [su@mbola] of affections in the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of – affections of the soul – are the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses [oémoiw@mata] of – actual things – are also the same» (tr. Ackrill)2. The semantic character of voice is brought about by the symbolic connection which links it to the affections of the soul. In these terms, voice is the symbol [su@mbolon] of the soul’s 2 De int. 16a 3 ff. See R. Polansky - M. Kuczewski, 'Speech and Thought, Symbol and Likeness: Aristotle’s De Interpretatione 16a 3-9', Apeiron 23 (1990), pp. 51-63, DOI: 10.1515/APEIRON.1990.23.1.51. 2 Journal of Ancient Philosophy J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.7, n.1. p. 1-18, 2013. ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v7i1p1-18 www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga 1. The activity of the soul Aristotle argues that voice [fwnh@] is peculiar to animals only and therefore he distinguishes it from what is more generally called ‘sound’ [yo@fov]. In DA 420b 5 he says that «voice is a particular sound made by something with a soul [fwnh# yo@fov tiv eòstin eèmyu@cou]; for nothing which does not have a soul has a voice, although such things may be said, by way of likeness, to have a voice, e.g. the pipe, lyre and any other things which lack a soul but have variation in pitch, melody and articulation [dia@lektov]; there is a likeness here because voice too has these properties» (tr. Hamlyn). First it must be said that the definition of voice in this passage is evidently incomplete, because the plants are in the number of animate natural beings as well, but they don’t have the capability to emit voice. In the following passage indeed Aristotle’s account is more precise: «so, the striking of the inbreathed air upon what is called the windpipe due to the soul in these parts constitutes voice. For, as we have said, not every sound made by an animal is voice (for it is possible to make a sound also with the tongue or as in coughing); but that which does the striking must have a soul and there must be a certain imagination [meta# fantasi@av tino@v]; for voice is a particular sound which has meaning [shmantiko@v].» (tr. Hamlyn) From these issues it is possible to sum up a very elaborated definition of voice. This definition is firstly enunciated in a synthetic form - «voice is a particular sound made by something with a soul» - and then developed both from the point of view of the emission process and of the bodily parts controlling this function, and from the point of view of the soul’s activity that is necessarily related to the voice. What distinguishes voice emmission from the production of a different kind of sound by the same animal, is that voice is always linked to an image and has the capability to signify something. The theoretical basis of this issue can be found in the first chapter of De interpretatione, where Aristotle says: «now spoken sound are symbols [su@mbola] of affections in the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of – affections of the soul – are the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses [oémoiw@mata] of – actual things – are also the same» (tr. Ackrill)2. The semantic character of voice is brought about by the symbolic connection which links it to the affections of the soul. In these terms, voice is the symbol [su@mbolon] of the soul’s 2 De int. 16a 3 ff. See R. Polansky - M. Kuczewski, 'Speech and Thought, Symbol and Likeness: Aristotle’s De Interpretatione 16a 3-9', Apeiron 23 (1990), pp. 51-63, DOI: 10.1515/APEIRON.1990.23.1.51. 3 Journal of Ancient Philosophy J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.7, n.1. p. 1-18, 2013. ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v7i1p1-18 www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga [sunetwte@ran eòcei yuch@n]. Man’s imagination is strictly connected with thought [qewrei^n]6, and it is a necessary condition for it. On the other hand, all animals devoid of intellect [nou^v], yet endowed with imagination, act in accordance with images7. The relation between voice and imagination should be clear on the basis of these issues. Sounds are symbols of the soul’s affections and bear resemblance to objects, so that they are oJmoiwvmata of objects. However this resemblance is peculiar to image: in DA 428b 14 ff. indeed, Aristotle holds that the ‘movement’ of imagination must be resemblant [oémoi@an] to the sensation of the object. This resemblance regards exclusively the soul’s affection and the sensation of the relative object, not the word that designates the object, because this word is due to convention8. The voice and the imagination of animals are distinguished by relevant differences, so that the questions at issue are firstly the nature of the connection between these differences and secondly the relation between the excellence of phonation and the soul qualities of animals.