Page 26 | Trilogue Salzburg 2016 Background Paper Identity Politics, Sectarian Conflict, and Regional Political Rivalry in the Middle East Seán Cleary I An Introduction to Sectarian Identities Although conflicts between Sunni and Shia Muslims are not the only sectarian violence in the Middle East, with an increase in violence against members of the Coptic community in Egypt before and after the overthrow of President Mubarak exciting domestic and international concern1, most references to sectarian violence in the Middle East relate to conflicts between Sunnis and Shias. Sunnis are a majority in most Muslim communities in Southeast Asia, China, South Asia, Africa, and most of the Arab World.2 Shias are in the majority of the Muslim population in Iran3, Azerbaijan4; 1 See for example: http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Fact_Sheet-Egypt-Sectarian-Violence.pdf; https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/16/egypt-end-mubarak-era-impunity-sectarian-violence; https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/10/egypt-address-recurring-sectarian-violence [all retrieved July 15, 2016]. 2 http://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population [retrieved May 6, 2016]. 3 Around 95%. 4 Around 90%. Background Paper Trilogue Salzburg 2016 | Page 27 Iraq5, and Bahrain6. Minority communities are also found in Yemen7, Turkey8, Kuwait9, Lebanon10, Saudi Arabia11, Syria12, Pakistan13, Afghanistan14, Nigeria15, and Tajikistan16. The distinction between the two branches lies in deep disagreement about the succession of authority after the death of the Prophet Mohammed. Sunnis believe that Abu Bakr, the father of Muhammad’s wife Aisha, who was selected to succeed him by the Muslim umma on Muhammed’s death, was the Prophet’s rightful successor.17 Sunnis follow the four Rashidun “rightly guided Caliphs,” selected by the umma after the Prophet’s death: Abu Bakr (632–634 CE), Umar ibn al- Khattab (634–644 CE), Uthman ibn Affan (644–656 CE), and Ali Ibn Abi Talib (656–661 CE). Shias believe that Muhammad, acting on the command of Allah, declared his cousin and son-in- law Ali Ibn Abi Talib18 the next Caliph, thus making him and his descendants the Prophet’s successors19. Shias deny the legitimacy of the first three “rightly guided Caliphs” (Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman) and believe that Ali is the Prophet’s successor. Ali and his descendants by Fatimah – the Twelve Imams – are thus, in the Shia “Twelver” tradition, the legitimate Muslim leaders.20 5 About 55–60%. 6 About 65%. 7 Some 40% are Shia, mostly Zaidi. 8 About 15–20% are from the Alevi sect. 9 30–40%. 10 50% of the Muslim population. 11 Some 25%. 12 About 12% are Alawi. 13 20–25%. 14 15–20%. 15 Less than 6% of Nigeria’s Muslims. 16 Around 5%. 17 Sunnis believe that the Quran determines that leaders are to be chosen through the consensus of the umma. 18 Ali was the father of Muhammad’s grandsons Hasan ibn Ali and Hussein ibn Ali, by Fatimah, Muhammad’s daughter by his wife Khadijah bint Khuwaylid. an ,(مخ ر دغ :Shias believe that Muhammad made this appointment clear in the Hadith of Ghadir Khumm (Arabic 19 account of a speech by Muhammad on 18 Dhu al-Hijjah, 10 AH (March 15, 632 CE) at Ghadir Khumm, near al- Juhfah. The hadith is interpreted differently by Shias and Sunnis: The Shias maintain that in this hadith the prophet Muhammad appointed Ali as his heir and successor. The Sunnis recognize Muhammad’s declaration about Ali at Ghadir Khumm, but argue that he was simply urging the audience to hold his cousin and son-in-law in high esteem and affection. (Veccia Vaglieri, Laura, G̲ h̲ adīr K̲ h̲ umm, Encyclopedia of Islam, 2012, Brill Online). The Imamate of the Shias encompasses a prophetic function, unlike the Caliphate of the Sunnis, which was focused on political stability. Unlike the Sunnis, the Shias believe special spiritual qualities were granted to Muhammad and to Ali Ibn Abi Talib and the Imams that succeeded them. Shias believe the Imams are immaculate from sin and human error (ma'sūm) and can understand and interpret the meaning of the teachings of Islam. They are thus trustees (wasi) who bear the light of Muhammad (Nūr Muhammadin). Shia (,یخوةزخه ةمشغ هیش :Ithnā‘ashariyyah; Persian ,ةيرش ار ا :Some 85% of Shias are “Twelvers.” Twelver (Arabic 20 'is the largest branch of Shia Islam. The term Twelver refers to adherents (ةمشم ا :Islam or Imamiyyah (Arabic belief in the Twelve Imams, and their belief that the last Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, lives in occultation and will reappear as the promised Mahdi. Twelvers constitute majorities in Iran, Azerbaijan, Iraq, and Bahrain; a plurality in Lebanon; and significant minorities in Kuwait, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Qatar, UAE and Saudi Arabia. Smaller minorities also exist in Oman, Yemen, Egypt and Uzbekistan. Page 28 | Trilogue Salzburg 2016 Background Paper Vali Nasr21 contextualizes this:22 “The Shia view became crystallized at the siege and battle of Karbala in 680 C.E., when soldiers of the second Umayyad caliph, Yazid I, massacred Ali’s son Husayn along with seventy-two of his companions and family members.[23] Husayn’s refusal to admit the legitimacy of the Umayyad caliphate … [was] shared with many of the people of Kufa, Ali’s capital. Many Kufans were liberated slaves and prisoners of war who had risen in revolt against the distinctly Arab character of Umayyad rule. Since that time, this town near Najaf [Kufa] has had a special emotional resonance for Shias. In 2004, when the firebrand Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr symbolically moved from Baghdad to Kufa to deliver his sermons dressed in a white funeral shroud, he was signalling his resolve to sponsor an armed challenge to the U.S. coalition, and Iraqi government authority.”24 The Sunni and Shia traditions were embedded in political structures: Sunni Islam in the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates in Damascus and Baghdad, respectively, and Twelver Shia Islam, much later, in the Safavid dynasty25 which ruled from 1501 to 1722, and 1729 to 1736, over modern Iran, Azerbaijan, Bahrain and Armenia, most of Georgia, the North Caucasus, Iraq, Kuwait and Afghanistan, and parts of Turkey, Syria, Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.26 After the fall of the Abbasids in Baghdad, the Caliphate was claimed by the Ottomans. In 1453, after Mehmed’s conquest, the Ottoman seat moved to Constantinople. In 1517, Sultan Selim I incorporated the Mamluk Sultanate of Cairo, becoming defender of the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina. Although the Ottomans were viewed as the representatives of the Sunni world, Ottoman Sultans did not use the title “Caliph” in state documents until the Empire declined. Then, and until the formal abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 after Turkey’s defeat in World War I, the Sultans used the title to give them prestige among Sunni Muslims. 21 Nasr, Seyyed Val Rezai, The Shia Revival, How Conflicts within Islam will Shape the Future, WW Norton, 2006. 22 Dr. Nasr also served as senior advisor to the U.S. special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, between 2009 and 2011. 23 This event is commemorated by Shias each year on the 10th day of Muharram in the Islamic lunar calendar, an occasion of collective lamentation and self-flagellation known as Ashoura. Processions of believers follow a tall staff with a black flag, topped by a carved hand symbolizing the five holy person held in highest regard – the Prophet Muhammed, his daughter Fatima al-Zahra, his son-in-law and cousin Ali, and his grandsons Hasan and Husayn. It excites Sunni disquiet and condemnation as Shias use the day to define their identity, often in extreme ways, leading Sunnis to condemn Shia practices. 24 Nasr op. cit. p. 40. .The Safavids arose from the Safaviyya Sufi order in Ardabil in Azerbaijan .يويوهص ٔهو شس :Persian 25 26 When the dynasty fell in 1736, the Safavids had revived Persia as a major economic power with an efficient state, and spread Shia Islam throughout Iran and large parts of the Caucasus, Anatolia, and Mesopotamia. Background Paper Trilogue Salzburg 2016 | Page 29 Nasr describes the interplay between clashing sectarian identities and the political context in the 20th century: “Debates between Sunnis and Shias … have their own internal dynamics, but events … imposed a certain logic on them. The end of [WWI] brought important changes…. The Ottoman Empire collapsed, and within … Asia-Minor arose the modern, secular-nationalist Republic of Turkey under its ... first President, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Kemalism’s anti- Islamic program would … become the model for emerging Muslim states…. Nationalism and secularism replaced Islam as the credo of state leaders[27], and muftis (Sunni religious leaders) and ayatollahs [Shia religious teachers] alike found themselves relegated to the margins…. In 1924, the Turkish Republic abolished the caliphate, ending the last vestige of Muslim unity…. In the turmoil…, Shias and Sunnis found pressing reasons to join forces. Intra-Muslim polemics began to appear trivial in the harsh light [of] … colonialism and secularism. …That Shia religious authorities should come to the caliphate’s defense … was a … rare coming together of the two millennium-old rivals, rising above the legacy of their conflicts … and bloody history, to stand united as Muslims in the face of … a grave threat to Islam.”28 Faced with Westernization and secular modernization over the next 50 years, Sunnis and Shias collaborated in Egypt, the Maghreb, and the Levant. In 1959, the Al Azhar University in Cairo included courses on Shia jurisprudence in its curriculum by way of a fatwa29 declaring Shia law the fifth school of Islamic law (fiqh).30 But two factors later frustrated this collaboration: The birth of Wahabism in the Nejd in what became the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and the Iranian revolution and the birth of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979.