No.23 April 2011 Community and intergovernmental method: an irrelevant debate? Paolo Ponzano, obtained a political science degree in 1967. From 1969 to 1970, he worked as both a uni- versity assistant in International Law and as member of the International Affairs Institute. Then, from 1971 to 2009, Ponzano served as a civil servant for the European Commission. Most of his career took place in the Secretariat-General of the Commission, where he was Director of Relations with the Council of Ministers. From 1995 to 2001, he also represented the Commission in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). After this, Ponzano served as the Director for Institutional Affairs and “Better Regulation”. In 2002 and 2003, Ponzano served as an alternate member of the European Convention. Currently, Ponzano is the Special Adviser of the Vice-President of the European Commission, Maros Sefcovic, and a Senior Fellow for the European University Institute in Florence. He has taught European Union Institutional Law and European Paolo Ponzano Union Governance in many universities and he has written several articles on European Union institutional questions and on the European Union decision process. The two methods The recent positions taken by the German Finance lor added: “Perhaps we could agree on the follow- Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, in favour of applying ing description of this approach: a coordinated the intergovernmental method to economic gover- action in a spirit of solidarity, each one of us [Ed: nance as well as the federal government’s propos- EU institutions and member states] in the sphere als on the formation of an economic government in which comes under their responsibility but while the eurozone, have relaunched the debate on the focussing on the same aim. For me, that is the new use of the intergovernmental method rather than ‘EU method’ which we so need [...]” the community method in the application of the Treaty of Lisbon and, more generally, in pursuing At first sight, the Chancellor’s remarks - just like the European integration process. those by President Van Rompuy - seem full of good sense. Who could be against a coordinated action That follows what was called the “Speech on the by the EU that would allow it to set out a common method of EU decision-making”, i.e. the speech position on the most controversial issues in discus- given by Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel in sion with the EU institutions and member states? Bruges on 2 November 2010, in which she sug- But, when you dig deeper, you realize that the new gested moving beyond the old argument between EU method advocated by the Chancellor is a lot like the community method and the intergovernmen- - her speechwriter would not mind my saying so - tal method in favour of a new method, namely the the famous Hegelian night in which all the cows are “Union method”, which she defines as follows black. The Treaty of Lisbon envisages the applica- by first referring to a declaration by the European tion of the ordinary legislative procedure (namely Council President Herman Van Rompuy: “In most the aforementioned community method) for all 2011/no.23 cases, the choice is not between the community areas coming under EU competence whilst the inter- method and the intergovernmental method but governmental method is essentially reserved for the between a coordinated European position and no foreign, security and defence policy (although the position at all.” “In other words,” she goes on, “a initiative of member states goes hand in hand with coordinated European position is not necessar- that of the High Representative for the Common ily the result of the application of the community Foreign Security Policy). One might wonder there- method. This common position is sometimes an fore which areas the new EU method advocated by outcome of the intergovernmental method. The the Chancellor should apply to if not to the areas to main thing is to have a common position on impor- be found outside the EU’s competences (for exam- tant issues.” Pursuing her reasoning, the chancel- ple retirement). If, however, it was to apply to all www.notre-europe.eu / [email protected] 19 rue de Milan -75009 Paris - France Tél. : 33 (0) 1 44 58 97 97 / Fax : 33 (0) 1 44 58 97 99 resources. The European general interest would tations from heads of state and government would therefore demand not just a resulting increase in be very useful in encouraging the Commission to the EU’s budget but also the establishment of a new propose legislative measures and, if possible, draft own resource that would make it possible to give agreements with the third countries concerned. new flexibility to the EU’s budget at a time when national budgets will not be able to take on new However, it is important not to underestimate the expenditure because of the budgetary discipline danger that the political orientations of heads of that they will have to respect. state correspond to a minimum common denomi- nator between the different interests of the energy c) An EU energy policy resource producer and consumer countries. For example, the EU might need to put in place a real The Treaty of Lisbon stipulates in its Article 194 agency for energy supply tasked with executing (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) agreements reached in the meantime by the EU that the EU’s energy policy aims, inter alia, in a with producer countries, which would allow some spirit of solidarity between member states, to EU countries to gradually free themselves of their ensure security of energy supply in the EU. This energy dependence on these countries (in accor- objective should be achieved via measures adopted dance with the spirit of solidarity between member according to the community method (proposal from states set down in the Treaty). But will this objective the Commission, decision by the Council by quali- be achievable via the intergovernmental method? fied majority and codecision with the European Would it not be preferable to use the community Parliament, except for fiscal measures). But the method, which has, for example, allowed a common European Council is now talking about an energy fisheries policy (in spite of the difference in inter- strategy concerning both completing the energy ests between countries with fish stocks and the Single Market, security of supply and the EU’s action others) and the realization of the aforementioned towards its main partners. Of course, political orien- Galileo project? 2011/no.24 Conclusions The conclusions of the European Council of ing into conflict with the competences already December 2010 on economic governance envis- attributed by the Treaties to the EU’s institutions age amending Article 136 of the Treaty of Lisbon and leading to decisions based on the minimum by entrusting eurozone member states with the common denominator and even on the predomi- power to set up a stability mechanism that will be nant interests of some member states (see above). activated if it is essential to preserve the stability of However, what precedes confirms, it seems to us, the eurozone as a whole. Irrespective of the doubts the more balanced and more satisfactory nature of already expressed by several economists as to the community method for the EU and, within that, whether this instrument would be sufficient to safe- of the role played by the Commission in identifying guard the Single Currency, this provision innovates the general interest of the EU. by introducing an intergovernmental competence in a framework governed mainly by the community As Jean Monnet said in his memoirs, «Putting gov- method. We know full well that this solution aims to ernments together and making national adminis- avoid a fresh transfer of powers to the EU’s institu- trations cooperate starts with good intentions but tions, which could not be the subject of a simplified fails as soon as there are differences in interests Treaty revision procedure and would probably mean if there is no independent political body capable having a referendum in some countries. However, of taking the common view and coming to a com- the European Union might not be kept in the strait- mon decision.» This statement, drawn from a lot of jacket of its current competences if the necessity to experience of intergovernmental cooperation, still expand them were to appear in the clear light of day. seems relevant to us in the current phase of the process of European integration In addition, using the intergovernmental method in the aforementioned subjects runs the risk of com- With the support of the European Commission © Notre Europe, April 2011 design : Notre Europe ISSN 2103-8635 areas, whether they are in the EU’s competence or tries in the definition of a European energy market). not, we would be talking about a Hegelian night... Of course, the Commission does not have a monop- oly on truth. It can get things wrong. In these cases, Let us know look at the difference between the it is up to the Council deciding by unanimity and community method and the intergovernmental the European Parliament deciding by a majority to method. It is explained well in the contribution that amend the Commission’s proposal. the representatives of the European Commission (Commissioners Barnier and Vitorino) submitted The intergovernmental method is quite different. to the European Convention in April 2002. The The proposals for a solution to a given problem ‘pure’ community method corresponds to a system come from the member states individually or from in which the Commission - the institution repre- an administrative body which, as it is familiar with senting the general European interest - holds the the national positions, seeks to identify the low- monopoly of legislative initiative (namely the abil- est common denominator that will allow member ity to propose laws) while the Council - an institu- states to reach unanimity more easily.