This is a repository copy of Kidnapping an Ugly Child: Is William James a Pragmaticist?. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/115189/ Version: Accepted Version Article: Williams, N.W. (2017) Kidnapping an Ugly Child: Is William James a Pragmaticist? British Journal for the History of Philosophy. ISSN 0960-8788 https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2017.1358140 Reuse Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record for the item. Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing [email protected] including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. [email protected] https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ KIDNAPPING AN UGLY CHILD: IS WILLIAM JAMES A PRAGMATICIST? §1. INTRODUCTION Since the creation of pragmatism, a great deal of ink has been spilt attempting to determine who is or is not a real pragmatist, and what exactly that might mean. In recent scholarship, the division most commonly drawn is between the respective pragmatisms of Charles S. Peirce and William James. Peirce is seen as providing an account of pragmatism which is logically grounded, scientific in approach, and which offers an objective account of truth. As such, his pragmatism coheres with prevalent attitudes and projects in Anglo-“merican philosophy Jamess pragmatism on the other hand, is presented as the kind which was rightly rejected by the founding analytic philosophers. It is woolly, nominalistic, and deeply subjectivistic. Whether intentionally or not, the argument goes, this version of pragmatism opens a door which leads to relativism and vulgar Rortyism.1 It is not only contemporary scholars who make this division, however. The first person to separate Jamesian and Peircean pragmatisms was in fact Peirce himself. In his 1905 1 Haack (1997). For examples of the division between these two types of pragmatism in recent scholarship, see in particular Misak (2013), and also Talisse (2010; 2013); Talisse and Aikin (2005); Haack (1977; 1997) and Mounce (1997) for a book length account of the split. Rorty makes the same split in the opposite direction, endorsing Jamesian pragmatism and arguing that Peirce did little more than give pragmatism its name (1982: 161). Klein (2013) and Levine (2013) are two contemporary figures arguing against this asserted divide from a Jamesian position. IS WILLIAM JAMES A PRAGMATICIST? Monist article, entitled What Pragmatism Is, Peirce distinguishes between pragmatism, a broad church which includes himself, James, Dewey, Schiller, as well as many historical figures, and pragmaticism, which was a more narrow and defined version of pragmatism to which he subscribed. Though surprisingly coy in the published article about who precisely he was trying to distance himself from (he was, after all, still to some extent reliant on James's fame and good will), elsewhere it is clear that his target was James and those who followed him. Peirce held that James applied the doctrine of pragmatism too liberally, and that his remodelling of pragmatism had prominent parts which Peirce held to be opposed to sound logic. (1908, CP6.482; cf. 1903, CP5.358n.1).2 It was this which drove him to kiss goodbye to his child pragmatism, and give birth to pragmaticism, a name which he held to be ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers (1905, CP5.414). Despite this ugliness, it is precisely the aim of this paper to kidnap this term pragmaticism, and ague that it should be applied to James as well as to Peirce. The next section will move through the various criteria by which Peirce separates his own pragmaticism from pragmatism more broadly, focusing on his two Monist articles, both published in 1905, What Pragmatism Is and Issues of Pragmaticism (§2). The subsequent sections will show that James meets these various criteria, looking in particular at James's position on metaphysical inquiry (§3), his stance on critical common-sensism (§4), and his realism about generals (§5). Though James himself was unconcerned to discern differences between various versions of pragmatism, preferring to focus on commonalities, by calling him a pragmaticist I hope to bridge the apparent divide between the two thinkers, and bring them into a more productive dialogue. §2. PRAGMATISM AND PRAGMATICISM At the beginning of the first Monist article, Peirce gives us the terminological rule by which he separates pragmatism from pragmaticism: the name of a doctrine would naturally end in -ism, while -icism might mark a more strictly defined acception of that doctrine (1905, CP5.413). 2 For abbreviations see bibliography. 2 IS WILLIAM JAMES A PRAGMATICIST? Pragmaticism, then, is meant to be a more defined version of pragmatism. In a letter to the Italian pragmatist Mario Calderoni, Peirce presents the position he adopted in this article in the following way: I proposed that the word pragmatism should hereafter be used somewhat loosely to signify affiliation with Schiller, James, Dewey, Royce, and the rest of us, while the particular doctrine which I invented the word to denote, which is your first kind of pragmatism, should be called pragmaticism. The extra syllable will indicate the narrower meaning (1905, CP8.205). Peirce considers his original conception of what he now calls pragmaticism to have a number of advantages over the pragmatisms which followed it, and sees it as immune to a number of the problems which less precise pragmatisms entail (1905, CP5.415).3 Pragmaticism, then, is the original, best, and most strictly defined version of pragmatism. Seeing as pragmaticism is a more refined example of pragmatism, we need to be clear on what Peirce means by pragmatism. Pragmatism, according to Peirce, emerges out of the application of a certain kind of scientific methodology to philosophy. When someone with an experimentalist perspective is asked to assess the meaning of any assertion, they tend to do so in terms of the kinds of experiences we should expect if certain actions are performed (1905, CP5.411). It was this experimentalist perspective which lead Peirce to express the pragmatic maxim, which in 1905 he defines in the following way: if one can define accurately all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply, one will have therein a complete definition of the concept, and there is absolutely nothing more in it (1905, CP5.412).4 A pragmatist in Peirce's terms is simply someone who holds some version of the pragmatic maxim. He is happy to attribute this definition to himself, James, Dewey, Schiller, Royce, and others (1905, CP5.414; 1905, CP8.205). 3 Peirce thinks that the capital merit of his pragmaticism over other pragmatisms is that it more readily connects itself with a critical proof of its truth (1905, CP5.415). See Hookway (2012: 197-234) for an examination of Peirce's attempts to prove pragmaticism. 4 Peirce's original expression of the pragmatic maxim was in How to Make Our Ideas Clear (1878, W3:266). Other, distinct expressions of the pragmatic maxim can be found throughout Peirce's work (cf. 1903, CP5.18; 1905, CP5.9; 1905, CP5.438). See Hookway (2012: 165-181) for an exploration of these different formulations. 3 IS WILLIAM JAMES A PRAGMATICIST? Before giving an account of pragmaticism and its differences from pragmatism, Peirce is keen to assert that there are several preliminary propositions which we must adopt if our pragmaticism is going to be anything more than a nullity. He thinks that some of the other pragmatists (he mentions Schiller) include some of these propositions within their pragmatism, but Peirce aims here to present them precisely (1905, CP5.416). These propositions include a commitment to anti-foundationalism, anti-scepticism, and a theory of beliefs as habits of action. Let's take these in turn. Peirce consistently and explicitly rejects any philosophical methodologies which attempt to find some certain foundation for philosophical reflections, either through the first impressions of sense, or by doubting everything until we find something indubitable. The first strategy forgets that all our perceptions are the results of cognitive elaboration. The second misunderstands what doubt really is (1905, CP5.416). True doubt, Peirce tells us elsewhere, is an unpleasant state of mind which is characterised by a feeling of unease and by an inability to continue with some actual conduct. It is defined by the interruption of some actual belief, and initiates an inquiry to regain a stable belief (cf. 1877, W4:247-8; 1905, CP5.510). Peirce often contrasts true doubt with what he calls paper-doubt (e.g. 1906, CP6.498). These are doubts merely entertained in philosophical reflection, as if doubtingwereaseasyaslying. But doubting is not easy. We cannot really doubt anything which we actually live by, and that which we do not actually doubt, we must regard as infallible, absolute truth (1905, CP5.416). Combined with his anti-foundationalism, then, Peirce presents a kind of anti-scepticism. Rather than looking for some indubitable foundation from which to start our philosophical inquiry, Peirce holds that: there is but one state of mind from which you can setoutnamelythevery stateofmindinwhichyouactuallyfindyourselfatthetimeyoudosetout a state in which you are laden with an immense mass of cognition already formed, of which you cannot divest yourself if you would (1905, CP5.416). Asserting that beliefs which we do not actually doubt are held to be absolutely true does not commit Peirce to anti-fallibilismPeircesassertionisthatwemusthold them to be absolutely true until we find an experience which actually leads us to really doubt them.