UNDERSTANDING MORAL PRINCIPLES: JONATHAN DANCY, IRIS MURDOCH, AND PARTICULARISM by Hibi Pendleton B.A. in Philosophy, Columbia University, 1987 M.A. in Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, 1991 J.D. in Law, New York University School of Law, 1994 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2017 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH THE DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by Hibi Pendleton It was defended on October 20, 2017 and approved by John Lyne, Professor, Professor of Communication John McDowell, Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy Jennifer Whiting, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy Dissertation Director: Stephen Engstrom, Professor of Philosophy ii Copyright © by Hibi Pendleton 2017 iii UNDERSTANDING MORAL PRINCIPLES: JONATHAN DANCY, IRIS MURDOCH, AND PARTICULARISM Hibi Pendleton, Ph.D. University of Pittsburgh, 2017 There is a paradox about moral principles like ‘You ought to keep your promises.’ They seem to express universal truths that tell us what to do, but exceptional situations arise in which it seems we should not do what they tell us. Generalists like R. M. Hare resolve this paradox by arguing that accurately specified moral principles do not have exceptions, and we can use them to syllogistically derive correct judgments about actions. Particularists like Jonathan Dancy resolve the paradox by arguing that, because there can be exceptions to any moral principle, moral principles actually are false. At best they are “reminders” or “dispensable crutches.” I argue that although Dancy’s particularism undermines generalism, it fails to capture the true normative status of moral principles. Consequently, there is a lacuna in particularism: it does not provide an adequate understanding of how moral values are related or how moral principles are action-guiding. I trace the failures of particularism, as well as generalism, to an assumption both share about generality—an assumption that tethers them to an unduly narrow conception of moral principles. After rejecting this assumption, I draw on Iris Murdoch’s notion of vision and its perfection to develop an ideal-based account of generality. According to this account, moral thought includes reflection on substantive ideals, the content of which is partly expressed in iv ordinary moral principles. I argue there are two forms of generality moral principles can exhibit, which generalists and particularists alike should embrace. The first is characteristic of fundamental principles like those in Murdoch’s and Aristotle’s views. The second is exhibited in principles that help give content to moral ideals. My account (unlike particularism) allows that principles have a normative, action-guiding role, but (unlike generalism) it does not construe principles as bases for syllogistic derivations about what to do. I discuss examples of both moral exemplars and rehabilitated criminal offenders to demonstrate that principled reflection is crucial to perfecting agency. In doing this, I show how the paradox about moral principles can give way to an understanding of moral principles that captures the role they play in ordinary moral reflection. v TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................... 1 1.0 GENERALISM AND DANCY’S CRITIQUE .......................................................... 9 1.1 SUBSUMPTIVE GENERALISM ................................................................... 11 1.2 PRESUMPTIVE GENERALISM .................................................................... 14 1.3 DANCY’S ACCOUNT OF GENERALISM ................................................... 17 1.4 DANCY’S CRITIQUE OF GENERALISM ................................................... 20 1.4.1 Dancy’s argument against subsumptivism ............................................... 20 1.4.2 Dancy’s argument against presumptivism ............................................... 24 1.4.3 Insights in particularism and generalism ................................................. 28 1.5 A COMMON ASSUMPTION .......................................................................... 29 2.0 DANCY’S PARTICULARISM AND A CRITIQUE .............................................. 31 2.1 DANCY’S REMINDERS AND SHAPE .......................................................... 32 2.2 A CRITIQUE OF REMINDERS ..................................................................... 34 2.3 AN ANALYSIS OF THE RATIONALITY OF REGRET ............................ 45 2.4 GENERALITY IN MORAL REASONING ................................................... 62 3.0 MURDOCH, DANCY, AND VISION ...................................................................... 64 3.1 VISION: AN EXAMPLE ................................................................................. 65 3.2 VISION: AN ANALYSIS ................................................................................. 68 vi 3.2.1 Vision and perception ................................................................................. 68 3.2.2 Attention and reflection .............................................................................. 70 3.2.3 Change in perception without change in total vision ............................... 76 3.2.4 Change in perception with three types of change in total vision ............ 77 3.2.4.1 Temporary change in total vision ...................................................... 77 3.2.4.2 Improperly motivated change in total vision .................................... 78 3.2.4.3 Properly motivated change in total vision ........................................ 79 3.3 DANCY AND MURDOCH: A CONTRAST ................................................. 80 3.4 DANCY’S PARTICULARISM: A LACUNA ................................................ 91 3.5 BEYOND MURDOCH: IDEALS IN VISION ............................................. 101 4.0 THE IDEAL-BASED ACCOUNT OF GENERALITY ....................................... 104 4.1 MORAL REFLECTION AND EXAMPLES ................................................ 106 4.2 AN EXAMPLE ................................................................................................. 107 4.3 MORAL REFLECTION AND IDEALS ....................................................... 107 4.4 PRINCIPLES AND IDEAL-BASED REASONING .................................... 116 4.4.1 Ideals, principles, and subsumptivism .................................................... 120 4.4.2 Ideals, principles, and presumptivism .................................................... 125 4.4.3 Defectiveness and imperfection ............................................................... 128 4.4.4 Inadequacies in subsumptivism and presumptivism ............................. 129 4.5 TWO DISTINCTIONS ................................................................................... 129 4.5.1 Absolute subsumptivism and contextual subsumptivism ...................... 130 4.5.2 Invariable propositions and unvarying propositions............................. 132 4.6 QUESTIONS FOR THE IDEAL-BASED ACCOUNT................................ 137 vii 4.6.1 Is there a highest or ultimate principle or ideal? ................................... 138 4.6.2 Where do ideals come from? .................................................................... 138 4.6.3 How are ideals related to each other? ..................................................... 139 4.6.4 How are ideals related to principles? ...................................................... 140 4.6.5 Are principles hypothetical imperatives? ............................................... 141 4.6.6 Is it possible to violate a principle or an ideal? ...................................... 142 4.6.7 Is the ideal-based account unrealistic? ................................................... 149 4.7 THE CHARGE OF IGNORATIO ELENCHI ............................................... 158 4.7.1 The common assumption elaborated ...................................................... 159 4.7.2 A response to the charge of ignoratio elenchi ......................................... 164 4.7.3 Insights in particularism, generalism, and the ideal-based account .... 165 4.8 THE CHARGE THAT PRINCIPLES CANNOT GUIDE ACTION ......... 169 4.8.1 Conditioning the system and the mechanism of choice ......................... 169 4.8.2 A response to the charge that principles cannot guide action .............. 173 4.8.2.1 The action-guiding role of principles in H’s reflection .................. 174 4.8.2.2 Three action-guiding roles for principles in reflection .................. 176 4.9 FILLING THE LACUNA: FROM PRINCIPLES TO CHARACTER..... 183 4.10 ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF GENERALITY ............................. 190 4.10.1 Aristotelian generality .............................................................................. 196 4.10.2 Ideal-based generality ............................................................................... 201 4.11 CONCLUSION: RECONCILING PARTICULARISM, GENERALISM, AND THE IDEAL-BASED ACCOUNT OF GENERALITY ...................................... 208 BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 211 viii PREFACE There are so many people whose help and encouragement have sustained me in my life and in the writing of this dissertation. I am immensely grateful to my committee