Over the years Robert Alexy has devel- the other dimensions of his system are pre- oped a systemic approach to legal theory, sented here, along with a contribution on Alexy’s Theory of Law an approach whose dimensions include human rights, one of Alexy’s more recent discourse theory, principles theory, and a foci. Alexy’s work is receiving ever greater Proceedings of the Special Workshop “Alexy’s Theory of Law” non-positivist conception of law. Principles attention, both at home, in Germany, and th theoryisfoundattheverycoreofAlexy’s abroad, with translations of his treatises held at the 26 World Congress of the International Association for system. Constitutional rights, he argues, and papers into many languages. The au- Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy in Belo Horizonte, 2013 are best understood as principles, and thors of the contributions aim to promote collisions between constitutional rights enquiry into Alexy’s project. While their – understood now as competing princi- general approach is that of analytical ju- ples – are resolved by balancing their re- risprudence, the individual contributions Edited by Júlio Aguiar de Oliveira / Stanley L. Paulson / spective weights. Critical examinations of reflect great variety in their respective as- Alexandre Travessoni Gomes Trivisonno Alexy’s work on principles theory and on sessments of Alexy’s seminal work. s Theory ofLaw ’ Alexy www.steiner-verlag.de ARSP ARSP Beiheft 144 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie Franz Steiner Verlag Franz Steiner Verlag ISBN 978-3-515-11043-3 de Oliveira / Paulson / Trivisonno 9 7 8 3 5 1 5 1 1 0 4 3 3 Alexy’s Theory of Law Edited by Júlio Aguiar de Oliveira / Stanley L. Paulson / Alexandre Travessoni Gomes Trivisonno archiv für rechts- und sozialphilosophie archives for philosophy of law and social philosophy archives de philosophie du droit et de philosophie sociale archivo de filosofía jurídica y social Herausgegeben von der Internationalen Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (IVR) Redaktion: Dr. Annette Brockmöller, LL.M. Beiheft 144 Alexy’s Theory of Law Proceedings of the Special Workshop “Alexy’s Theory of Law” held at the 26th World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy in Belo Horizonte, 2013 Edited by Júlio Aguiar de Oliveira / Stanley L. Paulson / Alexandre Travessoni Gomes Trivisonno Franz Steiner Verlag Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek: Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über <http://dnb.d-nb.de> abrufbar. Dieses Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist unzulässig und strafbar. © Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2015 Satz: DTP + TEXT Eva Burri Druck: Druckhaus Nomos, Sinzheim Gedruckt auf säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier. Printed in Germany. Franz Steiner Verlag: ISBN 978-3-515-11043-3 (Print) Franz Steiner Verlag: ISBN 978-3-515-11093-8 (E-Book) Nomos Verlag: ISBN 978-3-8487-2332-4 CONTENTS Introduction . .7 PART I–LEGAL DISCOURSE Carsten Bäcker Rationality without Ideality . Outlines of a Relativistic Discourse Theory of Law . .11 Gonzalo Villa Rosas A Matter of Interest . On Robert Alexy’s ustificationJ of Practical Discourse . 23 Alexandre Travessoni Gomes Trivisonno Discretion and the “Problem of Practical Knowledge” in Ideal and Real Discourses . 65 PART II – HUMAN RIGHTS Jean-Christophe Merle Robert Alexy’s Conception of Human Rights . 83 PART III – PRINCIPLES AND PROPORTIONALITY Martin Borowski Robert Alexy’s Reconstruction of Formal Principles . .95 João Andrade Neto Should All Arguments Matter? On the Exclusion of Certain Reasons from the Proportionality Test . 111 Ralf Poscher Theory of a Phantom . The Principles Theory’s Vain Quest for its Object . 129 Jan Sieckmann Alexy’s Theory of Principles: The Ideal/Real Dualism . .149 6 Contents PART IV – LAW AND RIGHTS Júlio Aguiar de Oliveira Extreme Injustice and the Concept of Law . .163 Stanley L. Paulson An Issue in Robert Alexy’s Theory of the Nature of Law . .179 INTRODUCTION If this short introduction bore a title, we might well be tempted to write: “Robert Alexy, the Agreeably Unyielding Legal Philosopher” . Whereas other analytical ju- rists embrace legal positivism, Alexy goes his own way, developing a non-positivist position . Whereas other jurists are fond of using “formalism” as a negative label – a practice with a long tradition, most notoriously in the Weimar period, where parti- cipants in the politico-constitutional confrontations dismissed Hans Kelsen as a “formalist” – Alexy is quite happy to be called a formalist, reading formalism as shorthand for a conceptual approach to jurisprudential issues . eW are thinking, here, of Jeremy Bentham’s and, much later, Georg Henrik von Wright’s contribu- tions to deontic logic, of Georg Jellinek’s development of the Theory of Legal Status (elegantly reconstructed by Alexy in A Theory of Constitutional Rights), of Kelsen’s effort to work out a principle of normativism that underlies, indeed makes possible, legal science, and we are thinking, too, of Alexy’s own weight formula in its ramified form . In short, if legal science is a serious enterprise, then conceptual work – forma- lism – has an important role to play . This, after all, is what Georg Friedrich Puchta and Rudolf von Jhering had in mind with their Verwissenschaftlichung des Rechts, their effort “to render the law scientific” . Martin Borowski, a contributor to the present volume, writes in a review article in Jurisprudence, 2 (2011), 575–595, that three treatises of Alexy’s represent the core of his work – A Theory of Legal Argumentation, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, and The Argument from Injustice – A Reply to Legal Positivism . “They lay the foundation for the three main strands in his œuvre: discourse theory, principles theory, and a non-positivist concept of law .” Happily, the present volume reflects work in all three areas – and in a fourth area, too, Alexy’s work on human rights . Specifically, the first part of the volume, devoted to discourse theory and related topics, contains contributions from Carsten Bäcker, Gonzalo Villa Rosas, and Alexandre Travessoni Gomes Trivisonno . The second part of the volume, on Alexy’s conception of human rights, consists of a contribution from Jean-Christophe Merle . The third part, devoted to principles theory, contains contributions from Martin Borowski, João Andrade Neto, Ralf Poscher, and Jan Sieck- mann . The last part of the volume, which takes up issues related to the concept of law, contains contributions from Júlio Aguiar de Oliveira and Stanley L . Paulson . The authors of the essays published here were participants in the workshop “Alexy’s Theory of Law” at the 26th World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (IVR), held in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, on 21–26 July 2013 . While the authors represented here recognize the uncommon significance of Alexy’s work, they have not settled for a mere restatement of his views . Rather, they engage in criticism and the exploration of new approaches . The editors of the present volume wish to express their gratitude to these authors . Kiel and Belo Horizonte, November 2014 Júlio Aguiar de Oliveira Stanley L . Paulson Alexandre Travessoni Gomes Trivisonno PART I–LEGAL DISCOURSE CARSTEN BÄCKER RATIONALITY WITHOUT IDEALITY OUTLINES OF A RELATIVISTIC DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW* INTRODUCTION By contrast to the most significant discourse theory in philosophy, that of Jürgen Habermas, Robert Alexy’s discourse theory1 can lay claim to be of the greatest sig- nificance in legal philosophy .2 A central reason for this significance might well be that Alexy’s theory has been conceptualized from the beginning as the basis of a special discourse theory of law, whereas Habermas commenced his work in this field with the development of a general theory of communicative action . To be sure, Alexy developed his discourse theory under the influence of Habermas,3 whose theory served as a point of departure for Alexy’s own .4 With an eye to this genesis, the relativization of general discourse theory to be presented here begins with Alexy’s conceptualization, for the aim is to reconstruct the discourse theory of law . PART ONE:THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL MODEL OF DISCOURSE IN ALEXY’S THEORY According to the familiar discourse-theoretic point of view, as reflected in Alexy’s theory, the distinction between two kinds of discourse is significant: ideal discourse on one hand and real discourse on the other .5 Ideal discourse is understood as a perfect discourse, whereas real discourse is limited . Ideal discourse serves as some- thing approximating a standard for real discourse . In this way, a two-dimensional * First published in German in Junge Rechtsphilosophie, C . Bäcker and S . Ziemann (eds .), ARSP- Beiheft 135, Stuttgart 2012, 9–22 . Unless otherwise declared, translations in the text and notes stem from the author . 1 Alexy’s variant of discourse theory is independent from Habermas’s theory, see Peter Gril, Die Möglichkeit praktischer Erkenntnis aus Sicht der Diskurstheorie. Eine Untersuchung zu Jürgen Haber- mas und Robert Alexy, Berlin 1998, 14, a “self-contained variant of discourse-theory” . However, Alexy’s theory has been profoundly influenced by Habermas’s work; see below, n . 3. 2 This is emphasized in Bernd Rüthers,