EDUCATING THE ARMY’S JEDI The School of Advanced Military Studies and the Introduction of Operational Art into U.S. Army Doctrine 1983-1994 BY Kevin C.M. Benson Submitted to the graduate degree program in the Department of History and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. ________________________________ Dr. Ted Wilson Chairperson ________________________________ Dr. Roger Spiller ________________________________ Dr. Robert Baumann ________________________________ Dr. Jonathon Earle ________________________________ Dr. Brent Steele Date defended 25 March 2010 The Dissertation Committee for Kevin C.M. Benson certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: Educating the Army’s JEDI The School of Advanced Military Studies and the Introduction of Operational Art into U.S. Army Doctrine 1983-1994 Professor Theodore Wilson Chairperson Date approved:_9/27/10__ ii ABSTRACT EDUCATING THE ARMY’S JEDI: The School of Advanced Military Studies and the Introduction of Operational Art into Army Doctrine 1983-1994 By Kevin C.M. Benson, Ph. D. Department of History, University of Kansas Professor Theodore A. Wilson, Advisor This dissertation examines the decisions taken during the development of the concept for the School of Advanced Military Studies and its subsequent refinement in the first ten years of its history. The other line of inquiry in the dissertation is the development, introduction and refinement of the concept of operational art and the operational level of war into U.S. Army doctrine, primarily in the 1982, 1986 and 1993 versions of Field Manual 100-5, Operations. iii Acknowledgements There are far too many people to acknowledge in this short space. To all of the men and women who allowed me to interview them, bombard them with questions and requests for support all I can say is thank you. I wish to thank my wife, Kate, and my daughter, Sharon, for standing by me these long years while I worked on this effort, retired from the Army, bought a home and made the transition from public to private life. I promise that I will fix the back yard fence. Professor Ted Wilson encouraged me to pursue this goal and assisted me along the way. Professor Roger Spiller reminded me that I was pursuing a Doctor of Philosophy in History and to broaden my interests and my mind. I am also grateful to Professors Harvey Sapolsky, Barry Posen, Steve Van Evera, Dick Samuels, Ted Postol, Dr. Owen Cote, and Dr. Cindy Williams for inspiring me to pursue the course of study that led to this work and my degree. These people, along with the other men and women of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Security Studies Program, showed me a blend of academia and government and how both can profit from each other. These great people also prepared me for the greatest challenge of my life, the preparation of the war plans for Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2002-2003. I learned the value of critical thought from these wonderful people and applied these lessons in the service of our Republic. I am equally grateful to the great faculty and staff of the School of Advanced Military Studies. Profs. Bob Berlin, Jake Kipp, Bob Epstein, Jim Schneider educated me as a student, and then along with Profs. Bill Reeder, Bill Gregor, Pete Schifferle, Alice Butler-Smith, Dave Burbach, Michael Mosser, and Rob McClary worked for me while I was privileged to be the Director of our great school. Candi Hamm, Angela Edwards, Jim Webber, Lauren Greer, and Jenny Schneider kept our school running as they handled the administrative requirements of the school. LTC Ray Jensen and MAJ Clay Novak served as my executive officer during my tenure as Director. I could not have accomplished what I did without them. These dedicated men and women serve our Republic by really teaching our finest officers the art of how to think critically and creatively. I am indebted to them and our Republic is indebted to them for their service. Ed Burgess, the director of the Combined Arms Research Library opened up the resources of the library for me, as well as allowing me to use one of his special, and sought after, study rooms. Cathy Buker and Rusty Rafferty, along with the other research librarians of the Combined Arms Library, aided me along the way from finding rare interview transcripts and out of date field manuals to eagerly assisting on every wild request I had. I could not have completed this task without their help. Finally, I want to remember my friend Colonel Thomas Felts, U.S. Army. Tom Felts was the first graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies to die in combat. Tom was killed by Iranians on 14 November 2006. He embodied the goals set forth by BG Huba Wass de Czege, the founder of the school. Tom was killed on patrol in Iraq, leading his men into action, and leading by force of personal example. iv Table of Contents Page Abstract iii Acknowledgements iv Table of Contents v Chapter One: An Elite of Obligation and Contribution 1 Chapter Two: The Context of the Times 30 Chapter Three: The Operational Level of War and U.S Army Doctrine 53 Chapter Four: The Tension of Expectations 86 Chapter Five: The First Test; Panama and Operation Just Cause 124 Chapter Six: The Arrival of The Jedi 155 Chapter Seven: The Wars of the Peace Dividend 198 Chapter Eight: A Return of Tensions 246 Chapter Nine: Epilogue 288 Appendix One 309 Appendix Two 310 Bibliography 311 v Chapter One An Elite of Obligation and Contribution “Not satisfied that we were thinking creatively enough, I sent a message in early September to the Army requesting a fresh team of planners. A four-man team of graduates from the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), the elite year-long program at Command and General Staff College that concentrated on campaign planning, arrived in the middle of the month. We briefed them on our thinking to date and then I instructed: “Assume a ground attack will follow an air campaign. I want you to study the enemy dispositions and the terrain and tell me the best way to drive Iraq out of Kuwait given the forces we have available.” I gave them two weeks to come up with an answer .” 1 In the fall of 1990 General Schwarzkopf called for a team of Army officers educated at the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) to energize the thinking in his headquarters. Schwarzkopf and staff planners in his headquarters, U.S. Central Command, faced the challenge of how to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. Why did he ask for SAMS educated officers? The school established at Fort Leavenworth to enhance education in large unit, division and corps, operations had been in existence for only seven years and, while a few of its graduates had participated in the planning and execution of Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989 , the larger U.S. Army and defense establishment did not know much about the school or its alumnae. Now a group SAMS graduates faced the challenge of planning a huge campaign. This dissertation tells the story of SAMS, and of the remarkable reputation so quickly acquired by its graduates, educated in a pre-World War II horse cavalry stable at Fort Leavenworth. It is also the story of the doctrinal revolution in which SAMS played an important role, a doctrinal shift that energized how the U.S. Army thought about and fought its wars. It may be claimed that the combination of a new, offensively oriented doctrine and educated practitioners significantly raised the level of tactical and 1 H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, It Doesn’t Take A Hero , New York: Bantam Books, 1992, p. 354. Emphasis added. 1 operational understanding in the U.S. Army from 1983 to 1994. This study explores the interrelationship between the School of Advanced Military Studies, the introduction of operational art into the doctrine of the U.S. Army, and how the graduates of the school sought to translate education and doctrine into action. Chapter One will highlight the decisions leading to the founding of the School of Advanced Military Studies. Chapter two will review the conditions at the end of the Vietnam War and the challenges the Army faced at that time. Chapter three focuses on the development of operational level of war as the bridge between linking tactical actions on the battlefield with strategic objectives derived from security policy. Chapter four looks at the School of Advanced Military Studies immediately before Operations Just Cause and Desert Shield/Storm, and how the school was changing with the times. Chapters five and six focus on the first two wars faced by graduates of the school and how the graduates used operational level doctrine to frame the fights conducted during these combat operations. Chapter seven focuses on three events in the turbulent period that followed the end of Operation Desert Storm, events that took place during the expected time of peace that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and during which graduates of the school applied doctrine to new challenges. Chapter eight focuses on the School of Advanced Military Studies and how the school was under internal and external pressure to change in response to combat operations and operations other than war. Chapter nine, the conclusion, juxtaposes the guidance of the first director with the guidance of the sixth director to highlight the changes in the school and how the school changed. A central hypothesis of the dissertation is that the fundamental purpose of the school remained relatively unchanged during the first ten years of its existence.