ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS: KNOWLEDGE AND MORALITY A Thesis submitted to the faculty of San Francisco State University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for ^ the Degree BG 0 \~\ Master of Arts P\\\L In » Philosophy by Takuma Nishiike San Francisco, California May 2017 Copyright by Takuma Nishiike 2017 CERTIFICATION OF APPROVAL I certify that I have read Aristotle’s Ethics: Knowledge and Morality by Takuma Nishiike, and that in my opinion this work meets the criteria for approving a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree Master of Arts in Philosophy at San Francisco State University. Ml Mohammad Azadpur, Ph.D. Professor Mary V. Rorty, Ph.D. Professor ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS: KNOWLEDGE AND MORALITY Takuma Nishiike San Francisco, California 2017 There is much controversy over the interpretation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. One of the debates is over Aristotle’s view concerning the source of ethical knowledge. For a long time, it was the general consensus that he was an ethical intellectualist. Richard Sorabji is an exemplary case of a scholar who ascribes to this view and firmly defends the intellectualist understanding. However, in recent years, scholars like Jessica Moss, have argued that he has a non-rational cognitive view, according to which, ethical knowledge is grounded on empirical investigation. Roger Crisp points out numerous tensions in Aristotle’s text, which may be a result of a discrepancy that arises when implementing two conflicting ideas, virtue as intellectual and virtue as purely a practice. McDowell offers a view that resolves the dispute between the intellectualists and the empiricists. I certify that the Abstract is a correct representation of the content of this thesis. Date TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction.................................................................................................................... 1 Sorabji Overview of “Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue”................ 3 Practical Syllogism...............................................................................6 Moss Overview of “Virtue Makes the Goal Right”.......................................13 Distinction between her reading and the Humean view.....................17 Crisp Overview of “Aristotle on Greatness of Soul”.................................... 21 McDowell Overview of “Virtue and Reason”........................................................29 Posterior Analytics and Induction...................................................... 34 Conclusion......................................................................................................................40 References...................................................................................................................... 42 v 1 Introduction: Aristotle’s Ethics: Knowledge and Morality___________________________ There is much controversy over the interpretation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. One of the debates is over Aristotle’s belief concerning the source of ethical knowledge. For a long time, it was the general consensus that he was an ethical intellectualist, like Plato. Even though it may appear that Aristotle’s emphasis on habituation sets him apart from Plato, those advocating the intellectualist interpretation maintain that at the end of habituation we reach a level of rationality from which we can grasp principles that allow us to deduce the correct action in any situation. They hold that Aristotle’s use of the ‘practical syllogism’ is evidence for this interpretation. Richard Sorabji is an exemplary case of a scholar who ascribes to this view and firmly defends the intellectualist understanding (Sorabji, 1973-1974, p. 201). In recent years there have been opposing interpretations of Aristotle’s view. The opposition comes from two groups. The first are scholars like Julius Walter who argue that Aristotle has a Humean non-rational non-cognitive view (Dahl, 1984, p. 5). The second are scholars like Jessica Moss who argue that he has a non-rational cognitive view, according to which ethical knowledge is grounded on empirical investigation (Moss, 2011, p. 1). The twentieth century meta-ethical framework provides useful insight into this debate. I believe the Humean interpretation can be eliminated as a possibility due to Aristotle’s use of practical syllogisms and his moral realism. However, there is solid textual evidence to support both the intellectualist view and the non-rational cognitive view. 2 Moss argues that Aristotle believes our ethical motivations involve “non-rational cognitions” (Moss, 2011, p. 1). She criticizes the intellectualist interpretations for their emphasis on rationality. Both the non-rational cognitivist and the intellectualist interpreters agree that Aristotle stresses the importance of habituation. The difference between the views is that, according to the intellectualist interpretation, at the end of habituation, a person reaches a level of rationality in which they can grasp knowledge of universal ethical principles. On the other hand, the non-rational cognitivist interpretation holds that through our experience and process of habituation we cognize the right course of action. At no point do we gain some universal knowledge that is over and beyond our experiences. Moss also wants to clarify that she is not endorsing Hume’s ethical theory. Hume’s ethical theories led the way for the meta-ethical theory of emotivism. Emotivism holds that an ethical claim is merely an expression of sentiments thus non-cognitive. Moss’s interpretation of Aristotle’s ethical theory differs from this because it is cognitive, while being non-rational. In the article “the Greatness of Souls,” Roger Crisp points out numerous tensions in Aristotle’s text. These tensions may be a result of a discrepancy that arises when implementing the two conflicting ideas, virtue as intellectual and virtue as purely a practice. It is clear that Aristotle values both aspects of virtue. The question is how Aristotle can settle the discrepancy in a philosophical capacity. 3 Having thought through the problems, I try to draw on some contemporary discussions that bridge the gulf between intellectualism and empiricism. McDowell has a view that is suitable for a number of reasons. McDowell provides a solution that is both intellectualist and empiricist. He says that we are initiated into a logical space by our language, which is a storehouse of traditional knowledge. The concepts making up the logical space are drawn from our empirical encounter with the world and they are also actualized in our thoughts and beliefs. Experience has a richness of grain that exceeds our discursive codification and is the tribunal for our actions and beliefs. The textual evidence and Aristotle’s concept of “particularized universals” corroborate McDowell’s view. McDowell’s reading of Aristotle incorporates both intellect and experience as playing a pivotal role in the acquisition of knowledge. He offers a view that resolves the contention between the intellectualists and the empiricists. Sorabii: Overview of “Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue”____________________ Against the recent wave of scholars who have argued that Aristotle is a non- intellectualist in his ethical theory, there have been scholars who firmly defend the old theory that the intellect plays a vital role in his ethics. Sorabji is one of these intellectualist defenders who are set on preserving the traditional view and believe that the recent efforts should be discredited. In the article “Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in 4 Virtue,” Sorabji attacks the non-intellectualist view using three key concepts from Aristotle’s ethics: prohairesis (7ipoaip£oi<;), phronesis ((ppovr|oi<;), and habituation. “How large a role does Aristotle give to the intellect in his account of virtue? Commentators have minimalized its role in three interrelated ways. They have de­ rationalized the prohairesis (choice) involved in virtue, they have reduced the part played by phronesis (practical wisdom), and they have treated habituation as a mindless process sufficient for making men good” (Sorabji, 1973-1974, p. 201). There are two levels of choosing when it comes to executing an ethical act. There is your ethical character that chooses to initiate the process of doing a good deed; choosing the ‘ends.’ On the other hand, once you have decided to do something good, there is a strictly practical aspect of the process. This is the portion of the procedure that chooses which specific method you will utilize to complete the deed, choosing the ‘means.’ This entails figuring out the most effective and efficient way to get the job done. This second part is a matter of using your straightforward reason, and does not necessarily denote good character. Prohairesis refers to the first type of choosing, having to have to do with character. “What is prohairesis? The chapter of the Nicomachean ethics devoted to it (3.2.3) makes it out to be a very intellectual thing... But many modern commentators talk in terms of choosing the means to one’s goal” (Sorabji, 1973- 1974, p. 201). The debate between the intellectualists and the non-rational theorists, is not over the second type of choosing. It is over the first type of choosing, whether the choosing done by your character is intellectual or not. Sorabji claims that the non-rational theorists 5 are confused about the meaning of prohairesis. He says that though prohairesis is intended to refer strictly to the first type of choice, the