UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) They did it! The content, effects, and mechanisms of blame attribution in populist communication Hameleers, M. Publication date 2017 Document Version Final published version License Other Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Hameleers, M. (2017). They did it! The content, effects, and mechanisms of blame attribution in populist communication. General rights It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulations If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (https://dare.uva.nl) Download date:05 Oct 2021 They did it! The Content, Effects, and Mechanisms of Blame Attribution in Populist Communication Michael Hameleers They did it! The Content, Effects, and Mechanisms of Blame Attribution in Populist Communication Michael Hameleers colofon ISBN: 978-90-826784-3-7 © Michael Hameleers, 2017 bookdesign and print: proefschrift-aio.nl They did it! The Content, Effects, and Mechanisms of Blame Attribution in Populist Communication ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam op gezag van de Rector Magnificus prof. dr. ir. K.I.J. Maex ten overstaan van een door het College voor Promoties ingestelde commissie, in het openbaar te verdedigen in de Agnietenkapel op woensdag 21 juni 2017, te 12.00 uur door Michael Hameleers geboren te Medemblik Promotiecommissie Promotor: Prof. dr. C.H. de Vreese Universiteit van Amsterdam Copromotor: Dr. L. Bos Universiteit van Amsterdam Overige leden: Dr. B.N. Bakker Universiteit van Amsterdam Prof. dr. F. Esser Universität Zürich Prof. dr. J. Kleinnijenhuis Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam Prof. dr. S.L. de Lange Universiteit van Amsterdam Prof. dr. R. Vliegenthart Universiteit van Amsterdam Faculteit: Faculteit der Maatschappij- en Gedragswetenschappen Voor Jasne TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Figures 8 List of Tables 10 Introduction 13 Chapter 1 Shoot the Messenger? The Media’s Role in Framing Populist 37 Attributions of Blame Chapter 2 To Whom are “the People” Opposed? Conceptualizing and 61 Measuring Citizens’ Populist Attitudes as a Multidimensional Construct Chapter 3 The Appeal of Media Populism: The Media Preferences of 83 Citizens With Populist Attitudes Chapter 4 “They Did it”: The Effects of Emotionalized Blame Attribution 107 in Populist Communication Chapter 5 Framing Blame: Toward a Better Understanding of the Effects of 139 Populist Communication on Populist Party Preferences Chapter 6 Selective Exposure to Media Populism: How Attitudinal 163 Congruence Drives the Effects of Populist Attributions of Blame Conclusion 191 Summary 208 Nederlandse Samenvatting 212 Author Contributions 216 Acknowledgements 220 Appendices 224 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 0.1 Conceptual model of the dissertation 21 Figure 0.2 Structuring of chapters in the dissertation 26 Figure 1.1 Number of blame attributions to elites and societal out-groups 47 communicated by political and non-political speakers Figure 1.2 Marginal effects plots demonstrating the probability of blame 52 attribution for different journalistic styles in tabloid and broadsheet newspapers Figure 2.1 Scree plot of decreasing stress values resulting from the 71 MDS-analysis Figure 2.2 Graphical depiction of the two-dimensional structure 73 underlying populist attitudes Figure 4.1 Direct effects of populist blame attributions on dependent 121 variables Figure 4.2 Effects of emotionalized style on blame perceptions and 129 populist attitudes for different levels of identity attachment Figure 5.1 Interaction effect of blame attribution and political distrust/ 151 cynicism on propensity to vote for the governmental party VVD Figure 5.2 Interaction effect of blame attribution and Dutch identity 153 attachment on propensity to vote for the populist party PVV Figure 5.3 Interaction effect of blame attribution and European identity 154 attachment on propensity to vote for the populist party PVV Figure 5.4 Three-way interaction effect of blame attribution and 154 exclusionist identity attachment on propensity to vote for the populist party PVV Figure 5.5 Mediation model demonstrating the mediating role of blame 155 perceptions on the effects of blame attributions on populist party preferences Figure 6.1 Marginal effect plots for interaction attitudinal congruence 181 and populist blame attribution in forced and selective exposure conditions Figure 7.1 Theoretical framework for populist communication on the 200 intersections of the supply-side and demand-side LIST OF TABLES Table 1.1 Means, standard deviations and probabilities of membership 49 frame variables for the three identified classes Table 1.2 Attributing blame to the elites by media outlet and 51 interpretative journalism Table 1.3 Attributing blame to the elites by media outlet and conflict 53 cluster Table 2.1 Comparing mean scores on both dimensions of populist 75 attitudes for different vote choices Table 2.2 Describing populist citizens 75 Table 3.1 Regression model for the anti-establishment dimension of 96 populist attitudes Table 3.2 Regression model for the exclusionist dimension of populist 97 attitudes Table 4.1 3 X 2 between-subjects factorial design with control group 116 Table 4.2 Scores on dependent variables for different blame 121 attribution conditions Table 4.3a Effects of emotionalized blame attributions on blame 124 perceptions for different levels of identity attachment Table 4.3b Effects of emotionalized blame attributions on populist 125 attitudes for different levels of identity attachment Table 4.4 Regression model predicting the effects of emotionalized 127 style at different levels of identity attachment Table 5.1 Mean scores of voting intentions for no blame attribution 149 versus blame attribution Table 5.2 Regression model predicting the effects of blame attribution 150 and political distrust/cynicism on propensity to vote for a populist political party Table 5.3 Regression model predicting the effects of blame attribution 150 and political distrust/cynicism on propensity to vote for the governmental party VVD Table 5.4 Regression model predicting the effects of blame attribution 153 and identity attachment on propensity to vote for a populist political party (PVV) Table 6.1 Binary logistic regression model predicting drivers of 173 selective exposure to anti-elites populist and non-populist content Table 6.2 Effects of populist blame attribution to elites on anti- 175 establishment populist attitudes within forced exposure conditions Table 6.3 Effects of populist blame attribution to elites on anti- 175 establishment populist attitudes within selective exposure conditions Table 6.4 The effects of populist and non-populist stimuli on anti- 179 establishment populist attitudes at different levels of attitudinal congruence Table 6.5 Effects of populist blame attribution to migrants on 180 exclusionist populist attitudes within forced exposure conditions Table 6.6 Effects of populist blame attribution to migrants on 180 exclusionist populist attitudes within selective exposure conditions 12 Introduction 13 “The search for a scapegoat is the easiest of all hunting expeditions.” ― Dwight D. Eisenhower A growing number of nations around the world have witnessed the rise of influential populist movements. In recent years, it seems that populist ideas are spreading like an oil slick across the most widely dispersed countries around the globe. The essence of populism – emphasizing the causal and moral opposition between the ordinary people and culpable others – can be articulated by different actors, such as politicians, citizens, or journalists. Examples of the expression of such populist ideas abound. In Europe, especially in the midst of the Brexit, financial, and refugee crises, populist sentiments that oppose the ordinary people and their will to failing politicians have prevailed in many countries. In the United States, the ideas communicated by Donald Trump that construct the divide between the ‘good’ American citizens and ‘evil’ others have sparked a heated societal debate, receiving both support and resistance throughout the globe. But what is the core idea expressed in populist communication that may incite populist sentiments among citizens? And what are the potential effects of exposure to such populist ideas? In defining the ideational core of populism, I integrate two strongly related, yet unconnected, areas of research: causal attributions of responsibility (e.g., Hobolt & Tilley, 2014; Iyengar, 1991) and populist communication (e.g., Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Synthesizing these areas of research, I define the essence of populist communication as the attribution of blame for the ordinary people’s problems to different opposed out-groups: either defined vertically as the elites or horizontally as societal