U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission REDACTED Office of the Inspector General by CFTC Review of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s Oversight and Regulation of MF Global, Inc. Prepared by the Office of the Inspector General Commodity Futures Trading Commission May 16, 2013 This CFTC OIG Report is subject to the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 USC § 552a, and has been redacted as determined by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. The redactions are not determined by the CFTC OIG. All redactions are made pursuant to exemption (b)(6) of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 USC § 552(b)(6). In lieu of redaction, the Commission has anonymized lower level titles that are traceable to the individual. The following denote the CFTC field offices: HQ (Headquarters, Washington, D.C.); CH (Central Region, Chicago, IL); NY (Eastern Region, New York, NY). U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission REDACTED Office of the Inspector General by CFTC Review of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s Oversight and Regulation of MF Global, Inc. Executive Summary On October 31, 2011, MF Global Holdings Ltd. and MF Global Finance USA Inc. filed for bankruptcy protection in the Southern District of New York under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. On the same day, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York entered an order granting the application of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”) for issuance of a Protective Decree adjudicating that the customers of MFGI were in need of protection afforded by Securities Investor Protection Act, and appointing a Trustee to oversee the liquidation. The Trustee eventually reported that MFGI suffered a shortfall in segregated property available to return to customers (“customer segregated funds”) totaling “approximately $900 million in domestic accounts (both commodities and securities), plus an additional approximately $700 million related to trading by customers on foreign exchanges.”1 On November 30, 2011, Senator Richard C. Shelby, then Ranking Member on the Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, requested “a report on the CFTC’s oversight and regulation of MF Global Inc.” He also requested that our Office examine whether CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler’s decision to recuse himself (or issue a statement of non-participation) is consistent with the agency’s official recusal policy. Specifically, our report was requested to include: 1. A detailed account of the CFTC’s role in overseeing and regulating MFGI, including an assessment of whether its oversight and regulation of MFGI differed in any material way from its oversight and regulation of other futures commission merchants (FCMs); 2. A detailed account of how the CFTC coordinated with the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (“CME”), the designated self-regulatory organization for MFGI, in overseeing MFGI’s customer segregated funds; 3. A summary of relevant examination manuals or other guidance for staff involved in overseeing and regulating MFGI or monitoring the CME’s oversight of MFGI; 4. An analysis of whether and how the CFTC’s oversight of MFGI changed after the CFTC’s enforcement actions against MFGI in December 2007 and December 2009; 1 Report of Trustee’s Investigation and Recommendations (“Trustee’s Report”), page 2, filed June 4, 2012, In re MF Global, Inc., Case No. 11-2790 (MG) SIPA, US Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York. A link to the Trustee’s Report is available here: http://dm.epiq11.com/MFG/Project. All internet addresses cited in this report were last visited on May 15 or May 16, 2013. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission REDACTED Office of the Inspector General by CFTC 5. An analysis of the CFTC’s role in the determination that caused MFGI to increase its net capital in August 2011; 6. An analysis of the CFTC’s activities with respect to MFGI in the week prior to the liquidation; 7. An analysis of whether CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler’s decision to recuse himself from matters relating to the MFGI investigation is consistent with the CFTC’s official recusal policy; and 8. An analysis of whether and how a decision by CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler to recuse himself from previous matters relating to MFGI would have been consistent with the CFTC’s official recusal policy. In order to complete our report, we interviewed or discussed specific matters of interest with more than 30 individuals, including current and former CFTC employees, current and former CFTC Commissioners, Chairman Gensler, and market professionals. Several were interviewed on multiple occasions. In addition, we reviewed thousands of documents furnished by representatives of the Trustee for MFGI, and furnished by the Commission. Documents included email, memoranda, spreadsheets, correspondence, pleadings, drafts, and other items. We also reviewed recordings of closed Commission meetings at the end of October and beginning of November, 2011. Our responses to the first five questions are addressed at pages 10 through 16 of this report, and summarized briefly below. CFTC’s monitoring of MFGI differed from other FCMs in that CFTC enhanced surveillance of MF Global three years before the events leading to the MF Global bankruptcy. These enhancements consisted of daily (rather than monthly) review of MF Global’s limited financial information (known as the “cap, seg, and secured” statement),2 along with a limited review performed after 2009 that did not involve a detailed examination of MFGI’s treatment of customer funds. CFTC also required MF Global to undergo a review by an independent consulting firm in 2009, as part of a settlement following a CFTC Enforcement proceeding. CFTC staff charged with responsibility for monitoring MFGI reviewed those findings and was briefed on MFGI’s compliance with the settlement provisions. 2 In accordance with CME’s Audit Information Bulletin #12-04, dated April 2, 2012, and NFA Financial Requirements Section 8, CME and NFA require FCMs to submit daily segregated, secured 30.7 and sequestered statements, as applicable, through WinJammer™ by 12:00 noon on the following business day. http://www.cmegroup.com/tools- information/lookups/advisories/clearing/Daily_Segregatedx_Secured_30.7_and_Sequestered_Statements.html. NFA has published detailed information on current daily reporting requirements here: http://www.nfa.futures.org/NFA-compliance/NFA-futures-commission-merchants/fcm-reporting.pdf. The Trustee’s Report refers to this statement as the Segregated and Secured Statement. See, e.g., Trustee’s Report at 92 (discussing CFTC and CME’s request for cap, seg, and secured statements for October 26, 2011). We use “cap, seg, and secured” because it was the term used by CFTC staff during our interviews. ii U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission REDACTED Office of the Inspector General by CFTC CFTC staff did not formally coordinate with CME concerning oversight of MFGI. Staff told us that they would communicate with CME occasionally pertaining to MFGI, essentially to address specific issues as deemed necessary, but nothing formal was in place to coordinate regulatory efforts with regard to MFGI (or any other FCM). CFTC staff encountered CME staff at MFGI offices during the final week of MFGI’s existence, but these encounters were not coordinated. Instead, CFTC separately determined to go to MFGI’s offices to obtain information and assurances, and found CME staff arriving on site within a short period. CME and CFTC communicated during the final week of MFGI’s existence on a consistent basis. CFTC had no examination manuals or other guidance for staff involved in overseeing and regulating MFGI or any other FCM, or for monitoring CME’s oversight of MFGI or any other FCM. Instead, prior to MFGI’s collapse, CFTC relied on materials provided by the Joint Audit Committee,3 its own guides for registrants regarding FCM statements, and CFTC published interpretations. CFTC staff had detailed guidance for FCM examinations in its early years; we do not know when the detailed guidance was abandoned. Since the collapse of MFGI, CFTC has created a guide to reviewing the monthly financial statements it receives for all FCMs under its oversight, which CFTC staff state describes what they were already doing with regard to financial statement reviews. The CFTC Division of Enforcement (“Enforcement”) charged MFGI in two Enforcement proceedings in the four years leading to the eventual SIPC filing; however, neither Enforcement proceeding involved misconduct pertaining to treatment of customer segregated funds. CFTC did not alter its oversight of MFGI after the first Enforcement proceeding in 2007, but it did enhance its oversight of MFGI following the second CFTC Enforcement proceeding in 2009. The 2009 Enforcement proceeding arose from a rogue trader event that took place in February 2008; unauthorized trading resulted in overnight losses to MFGI in excess of $141 million, which immediately impacted MFGI’s net capital.4 Daily review of MFGI’s financial information would permit CFTC staff to know quickly if a similar large overnight decrease in firm capital took place in the future, indicating a similar rogue trader situation, and CFTC staff required MFGI to submit their financial information to CFTC on a daily basis. CFTC staff charged with day-to-day oversight responsibilities for MFGI also remained informed on MFGI’s compliance with undertakings that were part of the 2009 settlement agreement, which pertained to branch office training of managers and establishment of supervisory controls pertaining to the monitoring and supervision of traders. 3 The Joint Audit Committee is a representative committee of US futures exchanges and regulatory organizations. Information about the Committee (including documents) is available here: http://www.wjammer.com/jac/. 4 On December 12, 2012, the trader admitted guilt in a federal criminal proceeding, and faced a maximum prison sentence of 10 years and a $1 million fine; the trader was sentenced to five years in prison. Former MF Global Trader Pleads Guilty in $141 mln Trading Loss, Ann Saphir, Thomson Reuters News & Insight, December 11, 2012.