POLITICAL DYNASTIES AND PROVINCE CREATION: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DECENTRALIZATION IN THE PHILIPPINES By CHENG, Ranel Ram THESIS Submitted to KDI School of Public Policy and Management In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of MASTER OF PUBLIC POLICY 2018 POLITICAL DYNASTIES AND PROVINCE CREATION: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DECENTRALIZATION IN THE PHILIPPINES By CHENG, Ranel Ram THESIS Submitted to KDI School of Public Policy and Management In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of MASTER OF PUBLIC POLICY 2018 Professor Hun Joo PARK POLITICAL DYNASTIES AND PROVINCE CREATION: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DECENTRALIZATION IN THE PHILIPPINES By CHENG, Ranel Ram THESIS Submitted to KDI School of Public Policy and Management In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of MASTER OF PUBLIC POLICY Committee in charge: Professor Hun Joo PARK, Supervisor Professor Dong-Young KIM Professor Seulki CHOI Approval as of December, 2018 ABSTRACT POLITICAL DYNASTIES AND PROVINCE CREATION: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DECENTRALIZATION IN THE PHILIPPINES By Ranel Ram C. Cheng This study explores the role of “political dynasties” in the creation of new provinces as a feature of decentralization reforms in the Philippines. This research looks into whether political dynasties are able to create new provinces through gerrymandering in order to achieve political ends, thus indicating local elite capture of decentralization reforms. Co- option of local elite families into representative institutions is a colonial legacy that manifests through the persistence of political dynasties in present-day institutions. By using historical institutionalism as analytical lens, key historical junctures in center-local relations were identified, parallel to the formation of the Philippine state, while situating local elite families within each juncture. In this way, this study distinguished between “Executive-led gerrymandering” and “Legislative-led gerrymandering” across different time periods. While the former fits the prevailing view of gerrymandering as a “strategic choice” of the central authority to accommodate rent-seeking by local elites, the latter shows how the Philippine Congress as an institution evolved as an amalgamation of local elites from across the country with the power to create the rules for decentralization, including that of province creation, to suit their own political interests in the first place. Key words: decentralization, local elite capture, political dynasties, gerrymandering Copyright by RANEL RAM C. CHENG 2018 Dedicated to my family, Papa, Mama, Inday, and to my grandparents vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This thesis is the culmination of my journey through graduate school. I wish to thank everyone who was part of it. To my professors at the KDI School, thank you for sharing your expertise and insights, especially my thesis supervisor Professor Hun Joo Park who encouraged me to see problems through different perspectives, and to Professor Dong-Young Kim who reminded me to always keep my reader in mind. It is an honor to have you as mentors. To the KDIS community, especially the school staff I had the privilege to interact with, thank you for your patience and for your kind understanding. I am also grateful to the Korean Government Scholarship Program for this opportunity to study abroad. This was a life-changing experience that has allowed me to meet new friends from all around the world. I will forever cherish the bonds we made and the memories we forged from Busan to Sejong to Seoul, and beyond. Special thanks go to the “Dream Team” and the friends I made in DSU, my “NIIED friends” at KDIS, and my Korean brothers and sisters who made me feel like one of their own. Additionally, this experience was a chance to immerse with fellow Filipino scholars and the migrant community in Korea, whose warmth and hospitality I will forever cherish. To my KGSP batchmates and to the Pinoys of KDI School, tuloy ang laban para sa ekonomiya! Likewise, I thank my friends, my professors, and former colleagues back home in the Philippines whose words of encouragement made life overseas less lonely. I especially thank Jori and Patty who kept me sane through every step of this journey, Ian who first introduced me to Korean culture, and my hometown friends who keep me grounded. Finally, I thank my family, Papa, Mama, and Inday, and our relatives for your love and support. You are my inspiration in striving to be a better person and in paying it forward in whatever way I can. Most of all, I thank God for making all these possible. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES………………………………………………………………………….... x 1. INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………... 1 2. LITERATURE REVIEW……………………………………………………………….... 5 2.1. ELITE FAMILIES AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES……………. 5 2.2. LOCAL GOVERNANCE UNDER DECENTRALIZATION………………….. 7 2.3. CREATION OF NEW UNITS UNDER DECENTRALIZATION……………... 9 2.4. PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY…………………………. 13 3. STUDY FRAMEWORK………………………………………………………………... 15 3.1. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF DECENTRALIZATION………………… 15 3.2. WHY STUDY ACTORS?................................................................................... 17 3.3. METHODOLOGY, SCOPE, AND LIMITATIONS…………………………... 19 4. CRITICAL JUNCTURES IN CENTER-LOCAL RELATIONS………………………. 22 4.1. ESTABLISHING A CENTRAL AUTHORITY OVER THE ISLANDS UNDER SPANISH RULE………………………………………………………………... 22 4.2. THE CREATION OF REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS UNDER AMERICAN RULE AND COLLUSION WITH PROVINCIAL ELITES…….. 25 4.3. THE FIRST DECENTRALIZATION LAWS POST-INDEPENDENCE…….. 31 4.4. REGIONALIZATION AND CRONYISM UNDER THE MARCOS DICTATORSHIP……………………………………………………………….. 33 4.5. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE AND POLITICAL DYNASTIES IN THE POST-EDSA DEMOCRACY…………………………………………….. 38 5. FINDING LOCAL ELITE CAPTURE IN DECENTRALIZATION REFORMS……... 44 viii 5.1. ELITE FAMILIES IN EVOLVING CENTER-LOCAL RELATIONS………. 44 5.2. THE CREATION OF PROVINCES IN THE PHILIPPINES………………… 46 5.3. EXECUTIVE-LED GERRYMANDERING………………………………….. 52 5.4. LEGISLATIVE-LED GERRYMANDERING………………………………... 53 6. CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………. 64 6.1. LEGISLATIVE-LED GERRYMANDERING AS EVIDENCE OF LOCAL ELITE CAPTURE……………………………………………………………... 64 6.2. IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY…………………………………………... 66 6.3. RECOMMENDATIONS……………………………………………………… 67 BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………………... 69 ix LIST OF TABLES 1. Average Local Government Unit (LGU) Dependency Ratio (2011-2015)……..………... 9 2. Government Structures in Selected Countries…………………………………………... 10 3. Members of the House of Representatives Belonging to Political Families……………. 40 4. Share of LGUs in the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA)..……………………………... 42 5. Formula to Determine IRA Share of each LGU………………………………………… 42 6. Philippine Provinces by Historical Juncture..................................................................... 48 7. Provinces Created from 1959 to 1969 (under Local Autonomy Act)…………………... 59 8. Provinces Created from 1992 to 2016 (under Local Government Code)……………….. 61 9. Political Dynasties in the New Provinces Created under 1991 LGC………………….... 62 x 1. INTRODUCTION Context and motivations for undertaking decentralization reforms is an important dimension in analyzing the political economy of decentralization.1 In the Philippines, such reforms have been introduced over the past decades supposedly to bridge the gap between the national or central government and various local communities. However, there is evidence that so-called “political dynasties”, wherein members of a family or clan are elected to different positions at the same time or in succession with each other,2 are able to thrive under decentralization. These political dynasties constitute local elite families who are able to exercise influence in policymaking and the allocation of government resources, not only through local government positions in practically every single province in the Philippines but also their relatives who make up the national Congress. In this regard, this thesis seeks to answer the main research question: Was there local elite capture of decentralization reforms in the Philippines? In the formative years of the Philippine nation, members of elite families represented their respective provinces in the early national representative institutions (i.e. Congress) and their local counterparts (i.e. municipal councils). Their descendants continue to hold on to electoral power to this day. The persistence of political dynasties weakens democratic governance as it encourages corruption through personality-based patronage across the country3 and gives these dynasties undue electoral advantage which limits opportunities for 1 Kent Eaton, Kai Kaiser, and Paul Smoke, The Political Economy of Decentralization Reforms: Implications for Aid Effectiveness, (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2010). 2 Ronald Mendoza, Edsel Beja, Jr., Victor Vendia, and David Yap II, Political dynasties and poverty: Resolving the “chicken or the egg” question, 2013. Retrieved from Munich Personal RePEc Archive website https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48380/ 3 Sheila S. Coronel, Yvonne T. Chua, Luz Rimban, and Booma B. Cruz, The Rulemakers: How the Wealthy and Well-Born Dominate Congress, (Quezon City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2004). reform-oriented, non-dynastic candidates to effectively compete during elections4. This has wide implications for institutional reforms such as decentralization in the Philippines that seeks empowered governance at the local