Understanding Brexit: Cultural Resentment versus Economic Grievances Faculty Research Working Paper Series Pippa Norris Harvard Kennedy School July 2018 RWP18-021 Visit the HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series at: https://www.hks.harvard.edu/research-insights/publications?f%5B0%5D=publication_types%3A121 The views expressed in the HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the John F. Kennedy School of Government or of Harvard University. Faculty Research Working Papers have not undergone formal review and approval. Such papers are included in this series to elicit feedback and to encourage debate on important public policy challenges. Copyright belongs to the author(s). Papers may be downloaded for personal use only. www.hks.harvard.edu APSA 2018 - Understanding Brexit- Norris and Inglehart 7/30/18 2:40 PM Understanding Brexit Cultural Resentment versus Economic Grievances Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart Pippa Norris Ronald F. Inglehart McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics Institute for Social Research John F. Kennedy School of Government University of Michigan Harvard University Ann Arbor, Cambridge, MA 02138 Michigan, 48106-1248 [email protected] @PippaN15 [email protected] www.pippanorris.com www.worldvaluessurvey.org Abstract: This study considers the evidence for ‘demand-side’ theories seeking to explain the outcome of the Brexit referendum and subsequent divisions in UK politics. Economic theories suggest that the Leave decision was driven mainly by the ‘left-behinds’ in jobs or wages, such as those living in struggling communities in the North of England, the Midlands, and Wales. By contrast cultural accounts emphasize political attitudes and values, including long-term British suspicion about the European Union project, public disgust with the political class at Westminster, anxiety about the effects of the refugee crisis and migration from other EU countries, and opposition to the government’s austerity cuts. These theories can also be regarded as complimentary rather than rivals, for example if economic deprivation catalyzed resentment about immigrants and the rejection of open borders. To examine these issues, Part I sets out the electoral context and historical background in the run up to Brexit – and its implications for party competition in the UK. Drawing upon a larger book-length study, Part II sets out the arguments based on economic and cultural theories about the British electorate. Part III describes the evidence from the British Election Study panel surveys, which allows us to examine the factors dividing supporters in the Leave and Remain camps in the 2016 Brexit referendum, as well as those predicting support for UKIP from 2015-17. Part IV examines the impact of demographic control factors like age and sex, indicators of economic grievances, and the cultural profile of voters in their authoritarian and populist values, as well as their attitudes towards the Europe Union, immigration, and left-right ideology. The conclusion in Part V considers developments since Brexit and their implications for the future of populism in the UK. The main advocate of Brexit, UKIP, succeeded in attaining this goal, but then failed to achieve a decisive break through as a parliamentary party. Yet authoritarian-populism remains alive and well in post-Brexit Britain, absorbed into the bloodstream of the body politic, disrupting and dividing both major parties. Paper for presentation at the Panel on ‘Populism in Advanced Capitalist Democracies’, Thursday 30 August 4.00- 5.30pm at the American Political Science Association’s annual convention, Boston. 1 APSA 2018 - Understanding Brexit- Norris and Inglehart 7/30/18 2:40 PM The outcome of the Brexit referenda on 23 June 2016 generated international concern about the effects of populist forces, and stunned disbelief that Britain had voted to withdraw from the European Union after more than four decades of membership. 1 Brexit has been widely seen as a watershed signaling an end to the era of faith in the benefits of globalization, open labor markets, and European integration. The development was welcomed by Le Pen and Trump (‘so smart in getting out’), foreshadowing the outcome of the 2016 US elections in the fall. The results of the non-binding referendum were extremely tight: 48.1% (16.1m) voted Remain while 51.9% (17.4m) voted Leave, with 72% of registered electors casting a ballot.2 Given the immense repercussions, the government could have treated the outcome as indicative but open to negotiation and further public consultations in another contest, as happened earlier following similar referenda in Denmark and Ireland.3 Other countries often require a ‘qualified’ or super-majority to pass major constitutional referenda.4 The majority of MPs backed Remain (‘Britain Stronger in Europe’) – as did the leaders of the major parties (David Cameron, Nick Clegg, Jeremy Corbyn, and Nichola Sturgeon), distinguished experts as diverse as the Governor of the Bank of England, the General Secretary of the Trade Union Congress, the head of the IMF, the Russell Group of top universities, the head of NATO, economists, scientists, scholars and businesspersons, and a panoply of world leaders such as Barack Obama, Angela Merkel, Nicholas Sarkozy, Justin Trudeau, and Shinzo Abe.5 A petition to parliament with over 4 million signatories asked for a do-over. Instead, a few weeks later, on 13 July, after Theresa May succeeded David Cameron as Prime Minister and first entered Downing Street, she treated the outcome as definitive. Brexit means Brexit. The people had spoken. “The campaign was fought, the vote was held, turnout was high, and the public gave their verdict. There must be no attempts to remain inside the EU, no attempts to rejoin it through the back door, and no second referendum. The country voted to leave the European Union, and it is the duty of the Government and of Parliament to make sure we do just that.”6 She sounded a populist tone by declaring on the doorstep of No. 10 that she intended to make Britain a country ‘that works for everyone’, in the interests of those ‘just about managing’ rather than ‘the privileged few’. But what does the outcome of the Brexit referendum—in the context of plummeting support for the UK Independence Party just a year later in the 8 June 2017 general election, indicate about the state of populism in the UK? This is another case, like the Netherlands and Sweden, where populist clothes have been stolen by center-right parties. Under David Cameron and Theresa May’s leadership, the Conservative government’s policies towards Europe and immigration have been profoundly influenced by strategic attempts to placate their own Eurosceptic wing, and to prevent a substantial electoral breakthrough by the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). Even though UKIP stock has fallen, populism seems alive and well in mainstream UK parties, the tabloid press, and in public opinion. Multiple ‘supply-side’ and ‘demand-side’ factors contributes towards the outcome of Brexit and voting support for UKIP – including competition for power among party leaders, the institutional rules of the game, and public opinion. 7 After considering these issues, this paper examines survey evidence testing alternative ‘demand-side’ explanations, focusing on the heated debate about the role of economics and culture in explaining the electorate’s decisions over Brexit and their support for UKIP. 8 Some argue that the Leave-Remain divide, the Brexit outcome, and UKIP’s initial rise were driven mainly by economic factors, emphasizing the role of the economically ‘left-behinds’ who had not experienced the instrumental benefits of EU membership in jobs or wages – observing that Remain votes were strongest among educated professionals, financial managers, and stockbrokers in prosperous metropolitan London. By contrast, the Leave vote was exceptionally strong in the struggling areas of the North of England, the Midlands, and Wales that were historically dependent on mills and mines, as well as in places with poor households, few college graduates, and unemployment.9 Others emphasize cultural factors such as the long-term British suspicion about the European Union project, public disgust with the political class at Westminster,10 anxiety about the effects of the refugee crisis and migration from other EU countries, and opposition to the government’s austerity cuts on NHS funding, schools, and public services.11 These theories can also be regarded as complimentary rather than rivals, for example if economic deprivation catalyzed resentment about immigrants and the rejection of open borders. To examine these issues, Part I sets out the electoral context and historical background in the run up to Brexit – and its implications for party competition in the UK. Drawing upon a larger study, Part II sets out the arguments based on economic and cultural theories about the British electorate. Part III describes the evidence 2 APSA 2018 - Understanding Brexit- Norris and Inglehart 7/30/18 2:40 PM from the British Election Study panel surveys, which allows us to examine the factors dividing supporters in the Leave and Remain camps in the 2016 Brexit referendum, as well as those predicting support for UKIP from 2015-17. Part IV examines the evidence including the impact of demographic control factors like age and sex, indicators of economic grievances, and the cultural profile of voters in their authoritarian and populist values,