Chapter 7. Natural Resources and National Security, 1950–1953 Our natural resources programs are being modified in order to make the greatest immediate contribution to our national security.1 —Harry S. Truman Beginning in July 1950, the United States slowly built up its forces in South Korea, as the major partner in the United Nations’ effort to repel North Korea’s invasion, while continuing to rearm at home and contain the Soviet Union abroad. The Truman administration proved woefully unprepared for a major war. The num- ber of men and women in the Nation’s armed forces, and their stores of equip- ment, had been reduced to dangerously low levels. At the end of 1948, 6 months after women were integrated into the military, the force totaled only 1.6 million and continued below authorized strength. Only the number of U.S. nuclear weapons rose significantly after World War II, to about 100, after Truman ordered increased production of bombs of the new design introduced in December 1948. The troops closest to Korea included 4 of the Army’s 10 active, but understrength, divisions in Japan and 1 regimental combat team on Okinawa. The Navy kept the three Midway-class aircraft carriers in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean to counter any Soviet aggression but sent to the Pacific, as additions or replacements, other major warships as soon as they could be transferred from other areas or readied for sea. The Navy also ordered USS Missouri to Korean waters and began reactivating the three other Iowa-class battleships, a fleet carrier, and other reserve vessels. On July 3–4, 1950, aircraft from USS Valley Forge and HMS Triumph struck North Korean airfields at Pyongyang and Haeju. These and subsequent sorties, and those by the U.S. Far East Air Forces, destroyed most of North Korea’s air force, but they did not interdict the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) columns moving south of the Han River. Early on July 5, U.S. troops began combat operations against the North Korean ground forces.2 The American infantry battalion, reinforced by additional crew-served weapons and a 105-millimeter (mm) howitzer battery, established a blocking position just north of Osan on the highway that connected Seoul and Suwon with Pusan. Although Task Force Smith lacked tanks, anti-tank mines, and air support, many of its members and military personnel elsewhere in South Korea and Japan expected an easy victory. The Americans valiantly tried but failed to stop two attacks by the main NKPA column, both led by Soviet-built T–34 tanks, as the U.S. 2.36-inch rocket launchers fared no better against the T–34s than they had against German Tiger tanks. The U.S. task force’s remnants retreated beyond Osan, having delayed the NKPA column by just 7 hours at the cost of more than 150 men dead, wounded, or missing. U.S. overconfidence disappeared as well. On July 7, as Lt. General Walton Walker arrived in Korea and President Tru- man asked the Selective Service System to resume the draft, the United Nations requested and approved General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, now the senior American officer on active duty, as overall commander of its forces in Korea. As additional Army battalions arrived piecemeal from Japan, they imposed additional Natural Resources and National Security, 1950–1953 317 delays before withdrawing to a position in front of Taejon (now Daejeon). NKPA units captured Taejon on July 20, as Truman asked Congress for $20 billion to rearm the United States and a mechanism to mobilize America’s resources to sup- port the United Nations (U.N.) effort in Korea. On the same day, the Senate com- mittee’s report called false the repeated charges by Senator Joseph McCarthy that the Federal Government was rife with Communists. The 8th Army slowed but did not halt the North Koreans’ thrust south to conquer the remainder of the peninsula and retreated toward Taegu (Daegu), where General Walker established his headquarters on July 13. Walker withdrew his units toward the Naktong (Nakdong) River, where, on July 29, he issued a stand-or-die order. Although up-gunned versions of U.S. medium tanks, 155-mm medium howitzers, and 3.5-inch rocket launchers arrived to bolster the defense, 10 North Korean divisions closed on the line held by 4 U.S. divisions and 5 divisions from South Korea (Republic of Korea, ROK). The Pusan Perimeter, completed by August 4, enclosed an area of some 250 square miles. The siege of the Pusan Perimeter began on August 8. The NKPA’s assaults were aided indirectly by Soviet efforts in the United Nations, where Yakov Malik returned to the Security Council on August 1 (New York time) and assumed the Council’s presidency. Thereafter, Malik vetoed every resolution about the conflict in Korea that the Soviet Union did not approve. To bypass Soviet opposition, the General Assembly, with Indonesia as its newest and 60th member as of Septem- ber 28, adopted on November 3 the U.S. uniting-for-peace resolution that enabled it to take any emergency action required but vetoed in the Security Council. The United States continued to commit more of its active forces to Korea, and Truman ordered the activation of additional Army and Marine units and individuals in the National Guard and the Reserves. The President then dealt with two pressing domestic issues. On August 25, 1950, Truman used a war-emergency law enacted in 1916 as the basis for order- ing the Army to seize America’s railroads to prevent the general strike the workers intended to call on August 28. The railroad workers decided not to walk out, but Truman did not return the railroads to the owners until May 1952. On August 28, 1950, he signed the Social Security Act Amendments, intended to “extend and improve the Federal Old-Age and Survivors System” and to modify the law’s “public assistance and child welfare provisions.”3 The statute increased the post- 1950 wage base for taxes to $3,600 per year, with a new schedule for payroll taxes; extended the system to more than 9 million people, including more of the elderly and those self-employed and those in the agricultural and home industries and in State and local governments; and hiked benefits by 70 percent. As the 8th Army and ROK forces struggled to defend the Pusan Perimeter, and Syngman Rhee’s government now in Pusan, more U.S. support personnel went into combat formations, South Koreans filled out American units, and reinforce- ments from other U.N. countries began to arrive in Korea. On September 1, 1950, Truman described the situation in Korea in a radio and television address to the Nation. The President reported that 30 U.N. members promised specific aid in Korea. Air and naval units from Australia, Britain, Canada, France, The Neth- erlands, and New Zealand were already participating in the conflict. Australia, Canada, France, Greece, the Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey, Truman added, also pledged additional ground-combat forces, while other nations promised medical, transport, or other combat-support units. The President reaffirmed U.S. policy in Korea by saying that the Nation would uphold the U.N. charter and South Korea’s right to be free. “We do not want the fighting in Korea,” Truman declared, “to expand into a general war,” and it would not if the Communist Chinese stayed out, as he hoped they would. The United States had no territorial ambitions in the Far East, the President added, and, although “[w]e do not believe in aggressive or 318 Natural Resources and National Security, 1950–1953 preventive war,” America would defend countries against external attacks. In Korea, Truman concluded, “[w]e want peace and we shall achieve it.”4 As the U.N. Command’s forces grew in Korea in 1950, the United States extended its efforts to contain Communism and defend the Pacific. The Govern- ments of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS) began consider- ing a security treaty for mutual defense and the peaceful settlement of any disputes between them. On September 1, 1950, the North Koreans launched another series of offensives around the Pusan Perimeter. The number of U.N. combat troops and supporting personnel within the perimeter rose by September 8 to numbers twice those of the overextended North Koreans. U.N. forces, now with a fivefold advan- tage in tanks, continued to control the air over and the sea around Korea. As U.N. forces defended the Pusan Perimeter, the emergency in Korea and requirements for continued containment of the Soviet Union elsewhere began to affect profoundly the work of the civilian as well as the military components of the Truman administration. As Truman’s actions in dealing with the Korean crisis won immediate support in the 81st Congress, national defense assumed priority over domestic issues. This change interrupted or delayed some activities by the Interior Department and other Departments and their bureaus but accelerated others. The renewed emphasis on and funding for national security forced a change in the orientation of programs by Interior and its agencies, as it did with the coming of American participation in World Wars I and II. The USGS, after a nearly 5-year effort to renew its research capital, again began shifting its regular mix of applied and basic studies to directing most of its operations to support the war in Korea, containment elsewhere, and military and civil-defense programs at home. The Geologic Division expanded and accelerated its investigations of strategic miner- als, including those containing fissionable material; operations in military geology; activities in geology abroad; and studies of urban geology.