PROOFS U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy UNCORRECTED PROOFS UNCORRECTED Independent Task Force Report No. 62 William J. Perry and Brent Scowcroft, Chairs Charles D. Ferguson, Project Director U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business execu- tives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. 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This report may not be reproduced in whole or in part, in any form beyond the reproduction permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law Act (17 U.S.C. Sections 107 and 108) and excerpts by reviewers for the public press, without express written permission from the Council on Foreign Relations. For information, write to the Publications Office, Council on Foreign Relations, 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10065. This report is printed on paper certified by SmartWood to the standards of the Forest Stewardship Council, which promotes environmentally responsible, socially beneficial, and economically viable management of the world’s forests. Task Force Members Task Force members are asked to join a consensus signifying that they endorse “the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation.” They partic- ipate in the Task Force in their individual, not institutional, capacities. Spencer P. Boyer Arnold Kanter Linton F. Brooks Ronald F. Lehman II† Ashton B. Carter* Jack F. Matlock Jr. John Deutch† Franklin C. Miller Charles D. Ferguson George R. Perkovich† Michèle A. Flournoy* William J. Perry John A. Gordon Mitchell B. Reiss Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty Lynn Rusten Eugene E. Habiger Scott D. Sagan† J. Bryan Hehir Brent Scowcroft Laura S. H. Holgate† Benn Tannenbaum† Frederick J. Iseman *Carter and Flournoy participated in the Task Force under their affiliations with Harvard University and the Center for a New American Security respectively. As current administration officials, they have not been asked to join the Task Force consensus. †The individual has endorsed the report and submitted an additional or dissenting view. v Contents Foreword ix Chairmen’s Preface xi Acknowledgments xvii Acronyms xix A Note on Definitions xxi Task Force Report 1 Executive Summary 3 The Need for a New Policy Assessment 7 The New Security Environment 22 U.S.-Russia Relations 29 U.S.-China Relations 42 Preventing Proliferation 46 Security Practices and the Future of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex 67 Recommendations 81 Additional or Dissenting Views 97 Endnotes 101 Task Force Members 107 Task Force Observers 117 Foreword On his first trip to Europe as president, Barack Obama stood in Prague and reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to a world free of nuclear weap- ons: “As the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act. We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it, we can start it.” President Obama also outlined a series of near-term steps to support this long-term goal, including the negotiation of a new nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia and measures to strengthen the international nuclear nonprolif- eration regime. The question of whether and how to move toward the elimination of nuclear weapons has emerged as a central foreign policy issue. But that vision remains just a vision. President Obama himself has acknowl- edged that “this goal will not be reached quickly—perhaps not in my lifetime.” Meanwhile, there are critical questions to be addressed about nuclear weapons and policy. The Council on Foreign Relations convened an Independent Task Force to assess these questions of nuclear weapons and make recom- mendations concerning U.S. forces and policies. The report notes that in the near term nuclear weapons will remain a fundamental element of U.S. national security. For this reason it emphasizes the importance of maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable deterrent nuclear force and makes recommendations on this front. The report also offers measures to advance important goals such as preventing nuclear terrorism and bolstering the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The report notes that because of the impending Nonproliferation Treaty Review and the U.S. government’s nuclear posture review, the Obama administration has a unique opportunity to examine exist- ing policies and agreements and take new steps in a number of areas. Although Task Force members disagreed on the practicality and desirability of eventual nuclear abolition, the report supports deeper ix x Foreword reductions in U.S. and Russian arsenals. The Task Force also calls for a revived strategic dialogue between the United States and Russia, as well as renewed military-to-military discussions with China to encour- age transparency on both sides on strategic and nuclear security issues. In addition, it favors ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and recommends a halt to the production of fissile material for weapons. Finally, the report calls on the United States to reaffirm security assur- ances to its allies and puts forth a set of best security practices for all states that have nuclear weapons and weapons-usable fissile material. On behalf of the Council on Foreign Relations, I wish to thank Task Force chairs and distinguished public servants William J. Perry and Brent Scowcroft, whose knowledge, insight, and standing were integral to leading this effort. CFR is also indebted to the individual Task Force members, who each contributed their significant experience and exper- tise to the report. My thanks go as well to Anya Schmemann, director of CFR’s Task Force program, who guided this project from start to finish. I also thank Charles D. Ferguson, CFR’s Philip D. Reed senior fellow for science and technology, for ably and patiently directing the project and writing the report. The hard work of all those involved has pro- duced an important study that outlines a responsible agenda for U.S. nuclear policy in an era that poses unprecedented nuclear threats but also historic opportunities. Richard N. Haass President Council on Foreign Relations April 2009 Chairmen’s Preface Every day during the Cold War, the world faced the possibility of a nuclear exchange that could have resulted in the end of civilization. With those times past, the danger of a nuclear holocaust might seem remote. But the end of the Cold War did not also bring about the end of history. History is being written every day, in the streets of Baghdad, in the nuclear test ranges of North Korea, in the nuclear labs of Iran, in the council chambers of the Kremlin, and in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. So, although the world no longer lives under the threat of a nuclear holocaust, these remain dangerous times. American service person- nel are still being killed in Iraq. The Taliban is resurging in Afghanistan and Pakistan. North Korea has tested a nuclear bomb and Iran is not far behind. Russia’s relations with the United States have become strained, with the tension reaching dangerous levels during the crisis in Georgia in 2008. The first decade after the Cold War ended was one of euphoria, but that has faded.