7 August 2013 | Vol. 4, № 28. From the Editor’s Desk Dear FDI supporters, Welcome to the Strategic Weekly young blogger. Also in that region, we Analysis. This week’s edition begins with a look into the US$1 billion deal that will focus on Pakistan. The first article see the United Arab Emirates acquire examines the implications for Pakistani state-of-the-art military surveillance Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of the recent satellites from France. The UAE will be suicide bombing at the Indian Consulate only the second country in the region to in the Afghan city of Jalalabad. We then possess such a capability. assess the ability of incoming Pakistani President Mamnoon Hussain to play a role Coming closer to home, we conclude with a report on the latest economic news in improving relations between the two from Indonesia, where a rising inflation countries. rate is among several signs that the Next, we look at the continuing economy may be slowing down. importance to India of its longstanding Later this week, the Global Food and relations with Mauritius, which have been further cemented by India’s construction Water Crises Research Programme will of an Offshore Patrol Vessel destined for re-publish an Associate Paper from Lester Brown, founder and president of the the island state. Earth Policy Institute, examining the Moving across to Africa, we consider the threat that water shortages pose to future continuing concerns of neighbouring food security. countries about Ethiopia’s ambitious I trust that you will enjoy this edition of hydropower plans. the Strategic Weekly Analysis. In the Middle East, we evaluate changing attitudes among young Saudis to the Major General John Hartley AO (Retd) Institute Director and CEO country’s governance system, in light of Future Directions International the sentence recently handed down to a ***** Explosions at Indian Consulate in Afghanistan Cause Problems for Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan The explosions at the Indian consulate in Jalalabad are causing Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif unwanted concern, as he attempts to renew relations with India. Background On 3 August, three suicide bombers blew themselves up near the Indian consulate in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. While no Indians were hurt or killed in the blasts, the bombers killed at least eight children, who were at religious class in a nearby mosque, and four other people. Officials in New Delhi have blamed “Pakistani nationals” who, they allege, travelled from Pakistan to Kunar near Jalalabad, where they were provided with accommodation by “Arab terrorists”. This appears to be diplomatic speak for the Haqqani network and al-Qaida respectively. India has blamed the Haqqani network, which comes under the Taliban umbrella headed by Mullah Omar and the Quetta Shura Taliban, for previous attacks on its consulates in Afghanistan. If that assessment is correct, it leaves Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif with the unenviable task of reining in, or at least showing concrete signs of attempting to curb, the Haqqanis and the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of the Pakistani Army. Comment Recently-elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif acknowledges Pakistan’s dire economic situation, including its energy crisis. Reports indicate that he has called for renewed talks with India. He said that there is no other way that the two countries can scale back their arms expenditure, provide their governments with added resources to use for the welfare of their citizens. To achieve this, however, Sharif knows that there must be better relations between the two states, which have fought three wars since their independence in 1947. The attack on the Indian consulate, therefore, is not only an impediment to better relations, but also a setback to Sharif’s attempts to portray himself as a peacemaker and the legitimate ruler. If India is correct and the Haqqanis are behind the attack on the Jalalabad consulate, it would imply that, while Sharif may believe he is the rightful, elected head of Pakistan, there are forces in that country acting according to their own perceptions and needs. The Haqqani network was allegedly created by the ISI and subsequently controlled by it. This was acknowledged by former Director-General of the ISI, Lieutenant-General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, who claimed it was created to fight against the Soviets during their occupation of Afghanistan. This leaves Sharif with a pressing problem. He has to determine if the Haqqanis were indeed responsible for the Jalalabad attack and, if they were, determine whether they did so at the behest of the ISI. Any indication that the ISI was instrumental in the Jalalabad attack could demonstrate that Sharif is not in control of his own government and the armed forces. That could undermine his peace-making efforts entirely and show him to be a lame-duck Prime Minister. It would also indicate that, even if he is sincere in his efforts to bring about better Page 2 of 14 relations between the two countries, other more-powerful forces in Pakistan decide the direction of the country’s foreign affairs and relations, making his efforts inconsequential at least. An Indian official has put forward the view that the blasts may have been planned to sabotage Sharif’s dialogue initiatives with India. This would indicate that the long-standing power struggle between the various Pakistani administrations, the judiciary and the Army, has not been settled in any real sense, which would add to Sharif’s problems. The Supreme Court Justice, Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry, who has long been at odds with Pakistan’s various governments in his bid to retain the judiciary’s independence, is due to retire this year. It will be interesting to see who his successor will be and whether that person will antagonise the government, as Chaudhry often did. It will be just as interesting to see what course the Army will take if that happens. If the judiciary reasserts itself, will the relatively weakened Army also seek to do so. If it does, how will it be done and to what extent? Sharif is to meet his Indian counterpart, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, at the United Nations General Assembly in September. It will be instructive to see what solutions he brings to this meeting, assuming he can bring any at all. Lindsay Hughes Research Analyst Indian Ocean Research Programme [email protected] ***** What Role Will Pakistan’s New President Play? Apart from potentially acting as an icebreaker for India-Pakistan talks, Pakistan’s President-elect, Mamnoon Hussain, is unlikely to contribute significantly to Pakistani politics. The presidency has become largely ceremonial and he effectively achieved his office as a reward for his loyalty to Nawaz Sharif. Background On 30 July 2013 Mamnoon Hussain, a textile businessman turned politician and a known loyal ally of current Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) party, was easily elected as the twelfth President of Pakistan by the country’s electoral council. This result was widely seen as a forgone conclusion, with the PML-N dominant in most legislatures, the main opposition withdrawing its candidate and the rest of the opposition remaining divided. Hussain is due to be sworn in on 9 September. Page 3 of 14 Comment Given that the president’s role is largely ceremonial, Hussain’s ability to significantly contribute to Pakistan’s political scene is inherently limited. While Pakistan has a history of powerful presidents, they were either coup leaders or the heirs to the enhanced powers that military leaders granted to the presidency during their own terms. The Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, passed in 2010, rescinded many of the powers the presidency acquired under the rule of General Pervez Musharraf, returning power to the Parliament. In essence, this means that Hussain’s presidential duties will primarily revolve around signing legislation into law and heading formal events. Prior being elected president, Hussain held few important political roles, except briefly as the Governor of Sindh province, a position he held for less than half a year. He was expelled following General Musharraf’s coup for remaining loyal to Sharif. Therefore, Hussain owes his present position primarily to his loyalty to Sharif and the PML-N, rather than to any political constituency of his own. While Hussain has resigned his PML-N membership, in a gesture to indicate his intention to be non-partisan, it is unlikely that a longstanding PML-N loyalist, who has articulated few policies of his own, will do much apart from providing a supporting role to Sharif’s agenda. Nonetheless, there are several areas where Hussain could play an important role. Being an established businessman, he can provide advice, or at least insight, into the many economic problems facing Pakistan and could even lend support to the petitions of various business lobbies. There have also been calls in the Pakistani media for him to strengthen the democratic process in Pakistan by remaining aloof from the day-to-day politics of the country and bringing a sense of respectable professionalism back to the office. Thus far, Hussain’s words and actions indicate that he is willing to heed these calls. He publicly resigned his PML-N membership and stated that the president’s job is to ‘act on the advice of the Prime Minister and be a facilitator in accordance the law.’ In addition, Hussain is also the first Karachi-based politician to be elected to the presidency, in a political scene traditionally dominated by Punjabis. Consequently, he has the potential to at least be a true symbol of national unity in Pakistan’s notoriously fractured federation. What may be Hussain’s most significant legacy, however, is the role he can play in India- Pakistan relations.