Human Responsibilities: A Relational Account of Human Rights Christine Susienka Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2017 © 2017 Christine Susienka All rights reserved ABSTRACT Human Responsibilities: A Relational Account of Human Rights Christine Susienka What is and should be the scope of our appeals to human rights? To what desiderata should our theory of human rights adhere? On my proposal, human rights (i) are inherently relational, and (ii) play an important background role in our broader normative practices. Human rights derive from a foundational community relationship that human beings stand in with one another qua human beings. They are not, as naturalistic conceptions have it, grounded in the possession of any specific capacities such as high levels of rationality. They are also not, as political or practical conceptions claim, grounded in more specific relationships such as those between state and citizen. Unlike the current approaches, my relational approach offers both a non-derivative justification for recognizing all living human beings as human rights bearers and all human agents as duty bearers. Rights holder status and duty bearer status both have their source in this basic relationship shared by human beings. As such, neither precedes the other. The relationship gives rise to both. As an upshot, the view accounts for a variety of cases where we ordinarily do not invoke human rights even when their content is relevant, such as in cases of violent crimes or in interpersonal relationships. In turning to these examples, I consider not merely under what conditions human rights exist, but also under what conditions they ought to be invoked. Thus while they have a universal scope, we need not always appeal to them as human rights in order to fulfill them. My inquiry into the grounds of human rights begins with a paradox that emerges for both naturalistic and political conceptions of human rights. Namely, even though human rights have their place in social and political relations, they are often conceived in ways that are blind to the basic role that these relations play in constituting them. While they inhere in individual human beings, the function and content of human rights is largely dependent on facts about human relationships. This paradox is particularly striking in the case of anti-discrimination rights, which many naturalistic views struggle to include as these rights derive not from any particular capacity, but from a comparative egalitarian premise. Instead, a relational view can point directly toward the damaging effects of severely unequal social attitudes–of failures to recognize one another as fellow human beings. Despite these differences, there are ‘natural’ and ‘political’ elements to my proposal as well, though both notions get reinterpreted. The natural, insofar as it figures in my account, is the relational framework in which individual human beings live their lives. The political consists in these overlapping networks of social relations. Thus the natural and the political coincide, and in effect my approach falls in neither of the two traditional camps. Instead, by focusing on the relationship between all human beings and conceiving of this relationship as both natural and social/political, I aim to formulate a genuinely new account of human rights. TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ii INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 1: 10 A Relational Approach to Human Rights CHAPTER 2: 46 The Human Community CHAPTER 3: 79 Valuing Our Humanity CHAPTER 4: 115 Invoking Rights and Communicating Wrongs CONCLUSION: 146 Human Rights Fulfillment BIBLIOGRAPHY 161 i ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I have been fortunate to work with amazing people over the last several years. With their feedback, guidance, and support, I have come out of my dissertation with a much stronger sense of who I am as a philosopher, as an educator, and as a human being. First of all, thank you to Katja Vogt, my advisor, who has consistently gone above and beyond, offering extensive feedback on multiple drafts of every chapter, pushing me to refine my arguments, and for standing by my project from the beginning. I have learned so much from her critical engagement with my work and her attention to both the big picture and the details of my particular arguments. Through discussion with Katja, I have come to appreciate the various ways of framing my project and to develop a deeper sense of my philosophical identity. I could not have asked for a better advisor. Thank you, too, to my dissertation and defense committees for taking the time to read my dissertation and for offering such insightful comments and discussion. The final product is far better as a result. To Carol Rovane, for consistently pressing me to further flesh out what is distinctive about rights. To Matthew Liao, for encouraging me to give greater attention to the motivation for and force of the capacities view. My understanding and appreciation for the nuances in the human rights literature is far stronger as a result of Matthew’s influence. To Robert-Gooding Williams, for challenging me to think in greater depth about what it means to value one’s membership in a community. To Michele Moody-Adams, whose questions always encourage me to see my arguments in new ways, and who has inspired me to consider the value of positive social attitudes such as hope and trust in the context of human rights fulfillment. I have learned so much from each of you. ii Over the last few years, I have had the opportunity to present my work at a variety of conferences and have received invaluable feedback. I am especially indebted to those who participated in The Future of Human Dignity Conference at Utrecht University, the St. Andrews International Political Theory Conference on Political Responsibility, the SWIP Analytic Women in Philosophy Conference at the CUNY Graduate Center, the Columbia University Work in Progress Workshop in Contemporary and Ancient Ethics, and the Sorbonne/Columbia Values and Agency Workshop. The questions and comments that I received at these presentations elevated the quality of the project, especially Chapters Two and Four. To my fellow graduate students in the Columbia University Philosophy Department for countless discussions over the years, and for reading many works in progress. Special thanks to Katherine McIntyre, Zack Al-Witri, Jorge Morales, Rush Stewart, Usha Nathan, and Alison Fernandes. Learning more about all of your work and discussing mine has been an invaluable part of the process. To Maudemarie Clark, for cultivating my love of philosophy back in my undergraduate days and for offering me guidance in the years since. I am extremely grateful. To the Mellon Foundation, for workspace, the opportunity to present works in progress to a multidisciplinary audience, and for monetary support for conferences. In particular, thank you to William McAllister, Audrey Augenbraum and the 2014-2016 Mellon INCITE Fellows, especially Abigail Coplin, Maria John, Elizabeth Marcus, Yumi Kim, Elizabeth Sperber, and Emily Yao. I have a better appreciation for challenges to human rights stemming from a variety of fields, and I am eager to pursue multidisciplinary collaboration moving forward. I have a deeper understanding of my own field as a result of our conversations. To the Columbia Writing Center, and especially to Sue Mendelsohn, Jason Ueda, Matthew Rossi, and Linh An. I have iii learned so much about my writing process through discussion with each of you. This project is far clearer, richer, and complete as a result of your ongoing support. Last, but certainly not least, to the family and friends who have provided me with a constant support system and in doing so taught me what it means to value my relationships. To Susan and Joseph Susienka, my parents, for always encouraging me to make my own path and for being there for me throughout this process. To my grandparents, Stacia Susienka, Joseph Susienka, Eugenia Pierce, and Leonard Pierce, for inspiring me. To Ian Maron-Kolitch, Dara Mitchell, Cori Schattner, and Charley Burkly, for reminding me that there is life outside of academia. To Glenda Chao, with whom I went through every stage of the Ph.D. process, and from whom I have learned a great deal. To Joshua Batts, who was by my side even as I made my final revisions, and who offered stalwart support each step of the way. This final product would not have been possible without what each of you brought to it. Thank you. iv INTRODUCTION Human rights are often described as claims that we hold against one another in virtue of our shared humanity. Since the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948, and especially since the 1970s, they have become a prominent part of our political, legal, and moral discourse.1 This way of framing human rights conjures up the image of human beings standing in opposition to one another, making demands on each other, and especially doing so in the context of international law. This image helpfully brings out the degree to which human rights are inherently tied to action. We recognize them; we claim them; we fulfill them. Human rights require us to take action, and they require us to regard one another as equal bearers of rights. Beyond our actions, their fulfillment makes demands upon our attitudes; we have a responsibility to regard our fellow human beings as equals worthy of dignity and respect. What this image obscures is the degree to which human rights have a relational component. They need not be overly individualistic, as the antagonistic phrasing ‘holding against’ suggests. The common depiction of human rights in the international legal context does not alleviate this impression.