Appendix 1: The Soviet Press and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1933-39 The revolution ofNovember 1917 resulted almost immediately in the seizure of the press as a vital instrument in the transformation of Russian society. "Hitherto", Lenin wrote in March 1918: our press has to a significant extent still been under the influence of old habits and old traditions of bourgeois society ... our press, like the old bourgeois press, continues to devote an inordinate amount of space and attention to petty politics and the question of personalities in the political leadership, with which the capitalists of every country attempt to distract the attention of the masses of the people from the really serious, the deep and fundamental issues affecting their lives. 1 The press therefore became "a weapon of socialist construction"2 in the hands of the Bolsheviks. As such it was transformed into a precisely fashioned prism through which the Russian people glimpsed the world outside; as such it mirrored the regime's attitude on the international situation. The raw material of Soviet news on foreign affairs came from several sources. A fairly limited source was the foreign depart­ ment, INOTASS, of the official Soviet news agency TASS. Its correspondents were stationed in most parts of the world of real interest to the Soviet regime. Its telegrams were classified on receipt in Moscow into two categories: "white TASS" (for publication) and "red TASS" (not for publication).3 Red TASS went to Central Committee members and at Litvinov's level. "But", as former head of the Narkomindel Press Department Gnedin writes, "at the beginning of 1939 much information was not included even in the 'red' summaries. The NKID and the 233 234 Appendix 1 Central Committee were sent a list of Politburo members who could be sent a daily summary of the more interesting telegrams from foreign correspondents. Thus it was by no means every member of the Politburo and government who received full information" .4 "Aside from official news from TASS, very modest in total, and the reports of information which were transmitted by radio from foreign telegraphic agencies", records a former member of /zvestiya's foreign department, "foreign newspapers were the source of our information." These broadcasts were picked up by special equipment- there were several systems- and, after being taped, they were then transcribed onto paper; this was facilitated by the fact that the most important transmissions were so slow that they could be recorded directly by hand.5 Another obvious and vital source of news was the Commis­ sariat ofForeign Affairs, particularly its press department. "The international specialists of /zvestiya were in constant touch with the Narkomindel. Not only its employees, but also those in charge, published their articles in the pages of the newspaper to explain the position of the Soviet Government on this or that question. We sought advice from them almost daily about material ready for publication", /zvestinets Kraminov recalls. "Personal contacts which had grown up between us made possible a more precise and up-to-date representation of events, which at that time unfolded with staggering speed and unexpected turns. From time to time they informed those running the newspaper, and those running the foreign department in particular, of the important moves made by Soviet diplomacy, so that we could judge what was right and what was wrong in the responses of the foreign press" .6 Guidance also came, of course, from Stalin's personal secretariat, though what is striking is the lack of authoritative directives from that quarter after Stalin's speech to the XVIII party congress and also after the signature of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact.7 The somewhat disorderly process by which the Party-state apparatus functioned had not been improved by the impact of the terror. Former head of the Narkomindel Press Department, Gnedin, relates an anecdote about Lejournal de Moscou, for which he held ultimate responsibility. Its editors disappeared one by one: Luk'yanov, Raevsky, Kin, etc. "When it was the turn of the next editor to be arrested", Gnedin relates, "I instructed that in the space on the first page where the name of the editor had hitherto appeared, the day of issue should now be specified. At Appendix 1 235 that time Litvinov was abroad. When he returned, I met him at the station. On greeting me, Maxim Maximovich said: 'Does this mean that the editor of Le journal de Moscou is now ... Tuesday?' " 8 Izvestinets Kraminov was posted to Stockholm in the autumn of 1939. Prior to departure Khavinson, then head of TASS, arranged for him to be briefed at the Narkomindel: at the department dealing with Scandinavian affairs, the Press Depart­ ment and by the Deputy Commissar responsible for the area. "There turned out to be no one amongst the 'Scandinavians' who had worked in Stockholm .... Comparatively recently a professor of philosophy had been appointed head of the Press Department [Gnedin's replacement], who had a very vague impression about the press in general and who knew nothing at all about the Swedish press, which he admitted to me with disarming frank­ ness. His two young and cheerful assistants had still not once crossed the frontier." The Deputy Commissar was not much more helpful either.9 With several ruthless strokes of the sword, the terror had physically liquidated the most valuable expertise accumulated over two decades' hard experience; this was a price that need not have been paid, and which cost the USSR dearly in international affairs. Appendix 2: The Soviet Union and the Defence of Leningrad, 1936-39 It is easy in retrospect to discount Soviet alarm at the prospect of a German advance through the Baltic. Indeed, at the time not only the British but also the Finns foolishly refused to acknowledge what to them appeared archaic geostrategic concerns expressed by the Soviet Government. The Russians expected the Germans to attack through the Baltic. The best account of their thinking on this can be found in publicist Ernst Henri's book, Hitler Over Europe?, published in 1936. Concurrently employed as an agent of Soviet military Intelligence, Henri (Rostovskii) almost certainly drew upon the Red Army's assessments about Germany's likely lines of advance. The map in the frontispiece to the volume illustrates two main lines of advance: "The March of the Southern Fascist Army", which does not concern us here, and "The March of the Northern Fascist Army"- from Berlin, via Kovno (Lithuania) and Pskov, to Leningrad, supported by the Baltic fleet and pincer movements on land via Finland and Estonia. It was assumed that Poland would stand at Germany's side. With respect to an attack on land, Henri focused on the danger of a "Memel war": "Memel is the lever to the isolated war with Lithuania, and the isolated war with Lithuania­ leading within twenty-four hours the disappearance of the Lithuanian army- is the lever to the military absorption of the whole of the Baltic by Germany" .1 With respect to sea defences, Henri broached the issue of the Aland islands and their proposed fortification by Finland and Sweden: "the German Admiralty, which since 1934--5 has been stirring up the waters of the Baltic, has turned its hand to the position here too" .2 The Russians did not take up the issue until April 1938 and by then Zhdanov's malign influence on Soviet 236 Appendix 2 237 foreign policy was increasingly overshadowing Litvinov's own position. On the 27 March Sweden's Dagens Nyheter dismissed denials that Finland was determined to fortify the islands and two days later the same newspaper said it was time the question was raised in the Riksdag.3 The first step was taken by the Russians on the 8 April, when Heidenstam, the Swedish envoy in Helsinki, learned from Derevyanskii, his Soviet counterpart, that the Russians had no objection to fortification provided the USSR could "control" construction so that it would not fall into German hands.4 In fact, as polpred Kollontai revealed in a telegram to Moscow on the l 0 April, Sweden had informed Finland that it would only consent to fortification if control lay in Swedish hands.5 It was against this background that Yartsev raised the issue in Helsinki on the 14 April, warning the Finns of the consequences of allowing German forces into their country and encouraging them to accept Soviet military and economic assis­ tance against Germany.6 The employment of a second secretary to relay such a warning suggests that this was an initiative circumventing normal channels, preliminary soundings which could be disavowed if they became public. But Litvinov could not long be excluded. On the 19 April he told Winther, Sweden's Minister in Moscow, that the Russians were totally opposed to any fortification of the Aland islands. The issue was further discussed at Geneva in May between Litvinov and Sandler, Sweden's Foreign Minister;7 and, in the knowledge that "in some form or other negotiations about Aland are evidently taking place" ,8 Kollontai reminded Sandler of Soviet opposition on the 27 July.9 No progress was made when Yartsev discussed the matter with Cajander, the Finnish Premier, at the end ofj une and on the ll J uly. 10 The Swedes continued to reassure the Russians, 11 but continued Soviet concern obliged Yartsev to offer concrete proposals to the Finns to forestall measures taken to Soviet disadvantage. The USSR wanted a written undertaking that Finland would "ward off all possible attacks and, to that end ... accept Russian military aid". Soviet policy now reverted to the position originally outlined by Derevyanskii on the 8 April: "Moscow can assent to fortification of the Aland Islands if Russia is enabled to take part in their arming and if it is permitted to send its own observer to follow the work and subsequently to maintain surveillance over the use of the fortifications." The Russians also sought Finland's consent to the erection of a fortified air and naval 238 Appendix 2 base on Suursaari Island.