A RELATIONAL METAPHYSIC STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION volume 4 1. FREUND, ELSE-RAHEL. Franz Rosenzweig's Philosophy of Exis­ tence: An Analysis of The Star of Redemption. 1979. ISBN 902472091 5. 2. OLSON, ALAN M. Transcendence and Hermeneutics: An Inter­ pretation of the Philosophy of Karl Jaspers. 1979. ISBN 902472092 3. 3. VERDU, ALFONSO. The Philosophy of Buddhism: A "Totalistic" Synthesis. 1980. ISBN 90 247 2224 1. A RELATIONAL METAPHYSIC by HAROLD H. OLIVER Boston University •1981 MAR TINUS NIJHOFF PUBLISHERS THE HAGUE/BOSTON/LONDON Distributors: for the United States and Canada Kluwer Boston, Inc. 190 Old Derby Street Hingham, MA 02043 USA for all other countries Kluwer Academic Publishers Group Distribution Center P.O. Box 322 3300 AH Dordrecht The Netherlands This volume is listed in the Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data ISBN-13: 978-94-009-8252-9 e-ISBN-I3: 978-94-009-8250-5 DOl: 10.1007/978-94-009-8250-5 Copyright © 1981 by Martinus Niihoff Publishers, The Hague. Sojicover reprint ofthe hardcover 1st edition 1981 All rights reserved. No part of this pUblication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher, Martinus Niihoff Publishers P.O; Box 566,2501 CN The Hague, The Netherlands. To Martha and our Daphne Ann CONTENTS Preface xi Introduction PART ONE: A NEW PARADIGM IN PHYSICS AND METAPHYSICS INTRODUCTION TO PART ONE 7 I. THE SUBJECT-OBJECT PARADIGM AND ITS DEBT TO CLASSICAL PHYSICS 11 A. Newton versus Leibniz: Physics and Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century 11 1. Newton's "Laws" 11 2. Absolute Time and Space 14 3. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 18 B. Kant's Critical Philosophy and Its Roots in Physics 24 1. Kant's Pre-critical Philosophy 28 2. Kant's Critical Philosophy 30 C. The Newtonian Era in Science and Philosophy 38 II. THE EMERGENCE OF A RELATIONAL PARADIGM IN MODERN PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY 40 A. The Collapse of the Newtonian World and Its Paradigm 40 B. The Emergence of a Relational Paradigm 43 1. In Modern Physics 43 a. Special and General Relativity 43 b. Quantum Theory 46 2. In Modern Metaphysics 58 a. Alfred North Whitehead: His Physics and Metaphysics 59 i. The Mathematical-Physical Foundations 59 viii A RELATIONAL METAPHYSIC ii. Whitehead's Metaphysical Vision 68 b. Systems Philosophy 75 i. General Systems Theory: von Bertalanffy 76 ii. A Systems Metaphysic: Laszlo 79 (a) Fundamentals 79 (b) Universe as Systems Matrix 90 CONCLUSION TO PART ONE 95 PART TWO: FOUNDATIONS OF A RELATIONAL METAPHYSIC INTRODUCTION TO PART Two 99 III. A RELATIONAL AxIOM: THE DOCTRINE OF UNIVERSAL INTERNALITY 101 A. The Modern Debate on Internal versus External Relations 102 1. F .H. Bradley: "All Relations Are Internal" 102 2. Bertrand Russell: "All Relations Are External" 105 3. G.E. Moore: "Some Relations Are Internal, Some External" 109 4. An Interlude: A.C. Ewing 112 B. Contemporary Options 114 1. Charles Hartshorne: "A Logic of Ultimate Contrasts" 115 2. Brand Blanshard: "The Coherent World" 124 C. A Relational Axiom: The Thesis of Universal Internality 130 IV. A STEP "BEYOND": RELATION Is FUNDAMENTAL 131 A. Relational Ontology in statu nascendi 132 1. Ludwig Feuerbach 133 2. Martin Buber's Ontology of "das Zwischen" 140 3. Syed A.R. Zaidi: "Towards a Relational Metaphysics" 146 B. A Relational Metaphysic 151 1. The Law of a Relational Metaphysic 151 2. Fundamental Tenets of a Relational Metaphysic 154 a. The RelationallParadigm: RELATIONS AND PERSPECTS 154 i. Relations are fundamental 154 ii. The terms of relations, i.e. the "relata," are derivatives of experience which, because they arise from bi-perspectival viewing, are called "Perspects" 1 56 b. The Hierarchy of Relations and Their Perspects 157 i. Simple Relations and Their Bi-Perspects: A Paradigm for a Relational Ontology 158 CONTENTS ix ii. Composites of Relations and Their Compound Perspects 158 (a) Composites of Relations 159 (b) Compound Perspects 160 (1) The Subject Self 162 (2) Object-Things 163 (3) Object-Selves 164 iii. The Totality of Relations and Their Omni~erspects 166 (a) The Totality of Relations 166 (b) The Ornni-Perspects: GOD and WORLD 168 (1) The Ingressive Omni-Perspect: GOD 168 (2) The Effective Omni-Perspect: WORLD 172 v. FUNDAMENTALS AND PSEUDO-FuNDAMENTALS 176 A. The Phenomenological Disclosure of Fundamentals 177 B. The Genesis of Pseudo-Fundamentals (i.e. Derivatives) 182 1. The Rational Objectivation of Myth 182 2. The Visual Bias 184 3. Epistemological Bifurcation 185 CONCLUSION TO PART Two 187 Notes 189 Bibliography 209 Name Index 217 Subject Index 221 PREFACE C.S. Peirce's indictment that "the chief cause of [metaphysics'] backward condition is that its leading professors have been theo­ logians" (Collected Papers 6:3) falls heavily at my door. For it was out of reflection upon religious experience and its meaning that the present relational metaphysic was conceived. My hope, however, is that its scope is sufficiently wider than its theological origins to justify its appearance as a work in philosophy. Having been nurtured in existential philosophy and having reached some measure of maturity with the wise counsel of Professor Dr. Fritz Buri, of Basel, I came to feel that theology as a modern discipline had reached an impasse owing to its overextended commitments to a subject-object paradigm of thought. Even those theologians who despaired of these ties seemed unable to find an independent alternative idiom for their ideas. A second tension in my thinking resulted from the inordinate neglect by theologians of the natural world. Also, my natural interest in physical understanding seemed unfulfilled within the narrow confines of theology, even of philosophical theology as then practiced. As I turned decisively toward the study of modern physics, and especially of cosmology, a new world seemed to open up to me. After extensive study with prominent astronomers and physicists, it began to dawn on me that the new physics has devised conceptual paradigms of thought which could be generalized into a metaphysical system of universal interest. One man in particular played the principal role in suggesting to me the fruitfulness of a relational model of reality. This person was Dr. Michael Ovenden, Professor of Geophysics and Astronomy at The University of British Columbia, who, like myself,' was a Visiting Fellow at The Institute of Theoretic~l Astronomy (now The Institute of Astronomy) in Cambridge, England, in 1971. In xii A RELATIONAL METAPHYSIC view of my deep intellectual indebtedness to Professor Ovenden, it is appropriate that a statement of his, lifted from a taped con­ versation, should introduce Part I. He has kindly consented to this use of his statement. Professor Ovenden has read most of the earlier draft and graciously advised me at various points. It is only fair to say that his version of relational thought finally differs from my own. Nevertheless, I should like to make as a matter of public record my gratitude to him for his material assistance over the years. For all my debt to him, I must absolve Ovenden of responsibility for any technical errors or poor theoretical con­ structs which may remain. My debts to others are numerous. I am able to mention only a few persons whose encouragement and support have made the writing of this essay possible. Particularly, I would thank Professor Sir Fred Hoyle, then Director of The Institute of Theoretical Astronomy, for the confidence shown in me as evident in my appointment as Visiting Fellow for the year 1971-72. The cama­ raderie and intellectual stimulation of the Cambridge astronomers made the year a highlight of my life. It was through their persist­ ence that I became a Fellow of the Royal Astronomical Society (London). In the early stages of my thinking which led to this essay, I received valuable assistance from the former Cambridge astronomer, The Reverend Dr. David Peat (now at York), and his former graduate student, Dr. Michael Edmunds (now at Cardiff). To my students at Boston University I remain grateful. The first two chapters were written for a seminar entitled "What Is a Thing?" held in the Fall Semester of 1973; the students who attended those sessions provided such initial support and encouragement, as well as criticism, that I am honored to list their names: Bruce E. Camber, N. Dana Daniels, Clyde C. Holler III, Dwight Hutchison, Russell Kleinbach, William C. Trench, and Lawrence G.B. Willson. I must also mention with gratitude the assistance of Christopher Keller, who accompanied me in a deeper study of Feuerbach. My graduate students have shown unusual interest in this project, and have been of immeasurable assistance in so many ways: among them (now Professor) Lawrence G.B. Willson, who followed my developing interest in the sciences and very incisively criticized earlier drafts of this essay from the vantage point of PREFACE xiii his former commitment to the thought of Charles Hartshorne; also, Bruce E. Camber, Karl Squier, David Odell-Scott, Matthew Ritter, Alan Previto, and the Reverand Ronald L. Carter, Dean of Student Life at Boston University. In addition, James M. Bank, Stephen A. Metz, Bruce Chapman, and Sara Marble Cashion performed unselfish service in bringing this project to its termin­ ation. It was Sara who called my attention to the extremely pertinent lines from E.E. Cummings which introduce Part II. I cannot begin fully to recount the valuable assistance and encouragement of colleagues in theology and philosophy at Boston University, in the Boston Theological Institute, and elsewhere. I remember with special delight the extremely fruitful dialogues which I have had in recent years with Professors Alan M.