Written evidence submitted by Mark Barry, Professor of Practice in Connectivity at Cardiff University’s School of Geography & Planning (RIW0001) Thank you for inviting me to present evidence to the Welsh Affairs Select Committee’s investigation of Rail Infrastructure and Investment in Wales1. As many of you know, I have been involved in Rail Policy and Rail Development in Wales since 2010, much of that related to the South Wales Metro. My roles and publications have included: Author of 2011 report, “A Metro Wales Capital City Region2” commissioned by the Cardiff Business Partnership and published by the Institute of Welsh Affairs Submitted and presented evidence to the Westminster Transport Committee’s review of High-Speed Rail in 20113 Author of, “A Cardiff City Region Metro: transform | regenerate | connect4” in 2012/3 developed with the Metro Consortium Led development of the 2013 Welsh Government commissioned, “Metro Impact Study5” Led development of South Wales Metro for Welsh Government (PT) Nov 2013 – Jan 2016 Prepared, “The Rail Network in Wales – The Case for Investment”, for WG in 20186 Presented evidence to the Senedd Economy and Transport Committee re: the procurement of the W&B franchise in 20187 Prepared Welsh Government’s Rail Enhancement priorities8 in 2020 and the supporting analysis of rail investment in Wales9 Helped prepare Cardiff Council’s Transport White Paper and the Cardiff Crossrail proposals10 Prepared advice and suggestions to the South East Wales Transport Commission11 Developed the concept of a Swansea Bay Metro now being progressed via TfW. I am now acting as a Strategic Advisor to TfW (part time) and am helping, in an independent capacity, the Cardiff Capital Region prepare a rail vision. I am also (again part time) Professor of Practice in Connectivity at Cardiff University (since April 2016) and have run events and published reports and articles related to Metro, most notably the “Metro and Me12” report and event held on 8th October 2018 (in partnership with Cardiff University, Capital Law, IWA and Arup). To note: the views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of Mark Barry and no other person or organisation. 1 Railway Infrastructure in Wales - Committees - UK Parliament 2 Barry M (2011), “A Metro for Wales’ Capital City Region – Connecting Cardiff, Newport and The Valleys”, Cardiff Business Partnership/Institute of Welsh Affairs. iwa-metroreport.pdf 3 House of Commons - Transport Committee - Written Evidence (parliament.uk) 4 Barry M & Metro Consortium (2013), A Cardiff City Region Metro: transform | regenerate | connect, Institute of Welsh Affairs. 5 Barry M & Metro Consortium (2013), Metro Impact Study, Welsh Government. South Wales Metro: impact study | GOV.WALES 6 The Rail Network in Wales (gov.wales) 7 Article (senedd.wales) 8 Mainline railway enhancement requirements | GOV.WALES 9 Historical investment in rail infrastructure enhancements [HTML] | GOV.WALES 10 Cardiff Transport White Paper – Mark Barry (swalesmetroprof.blog) 11 A Public Transport Grid for the M4 Corridor… – Mark Barry (swalesmetroprof.blog) 12 Various, “Metro & Me (2018), IWA, Capital Law, Arup, Cardiff University, Mark Barry, Geraint Talfan Davies Metro & Me, October 2018 – Mark Barry (swalesmetroprof.blog) The Committee has set out a number of questions; I have tried to answer each below and would note that much of the supporting data and analysis is covered in the various documented references on the first page. I would also point committee members at a number of relevant “blogs” I have published in the last three years: In respect of Wales and HS2 from January 202013 which I think effectively sets out the systemic institutional failings in respect of long-term investment by UK Government in Wales rail infrastructure. My public transport proposals for the M4 corridor14 as an alternative to more “road capacity” and the inherent need for all of us to reduce our car use – most of which were reflected in the final report of The South East Wales Transport Commission15 My article supporting the WG Case for Investment in Wales’ Rail Network in 201816 The need for innovation in developing rail schemes in some parts of Wales17. Where does responsibility lie for rail infrastructure in Wales? The Welsh rail network apart from, since early in 2020 the Core Valley Lines (CVL) north of Cardiff, is the responsibility of the UK Government via the Department of Transport (DfT) and Network Rail (NR). How effectively do the UK and Welsh Governments cooperate with one another in the management, and funding, of rail infrastructure in Wales? Historically this ranges from poor to not at all; the rail industry ecosystem and decision-making processes are designed around the centre of gravity of Whitehall and population density in SE England. For example, a review of the “Passenger Demand Forecasting” guidance for new schemes vs actual observed demand has over estimated demand for schemes in London by approx. 50% and underestimated demand for schemes elsewhere in the UK by approximately 50%. This has resulted in a disproportionate allocation of enhancement investment to the London/SE England. This is another contributory factor for why, in my view, Wales’ rail network has and continues to be systematically disenfranchised in respect of enhancement investment. For example, even with the interest secured in 2009/10/11 for electrification of the GWML and valley lines, the UK Government ultimately stepped back and dropped proposals for Swansea and the Valley lines. It was only WG who took on the Metro proposal by committing a significant proportion of funding required. Without WG I can very confidently assert there would be no valley line electrification and South Wale Metro. As set out in the various referenced document, Wales has a more “depreciated” rail asset vs the UK average. Should responsibility for railway infrastructure in Wales be fully devolved? Yes, no question. Building from the last question, it is clear to me, that the organisation best able and capable of developing and leading the implementation of new rail schemes in Wales is 13 Wales and HS2… – Mark Barry (swalesmetroprof.blog) 14 A Public Transport Grid for the M4 Corridor… – Mark Barry (swalesmetroprof.blog) 15 South East Wales Transport Commission: final recommendations | GOV.WALES 16 Wales’ Rail Network – The Case for Investment – Mark Barry (swalesmetroprof.blog) 17 A Metro in North West Wales…? – Mark Barry (swalesmetroprof.blog) Transport for Wales. Network Rail may retain a delivery and operational role for those parts of the network for which it is Infrastructure Manager but should be subservient to WG/TFW in respect of strategy and investment priorities. This is the arrangement that has been in place in Scotland since 2006. Even before the difficult discussions re rail devolution are resolved, TfW should be acknowledged as the organisation responsible for business case and scheme development (and not DfT or NR); TfN enjoys such status in England. I am hoping the Williams Review will come to the same conclusion. I would also point out that the recent transfer of the CVL to WG was wrapped in unnecessary bureaucracy and costs for what was already a public asset in Wales. Traditionally, such transfers e.g. Metrolink in Manchester and earlier the Tyne and Wear Metro, were I believe subject to a nominal £1 fee. However, the current NR/DfT price tag for the CVL of ~£400M (I dont know the exact figure) reflects a bizarre and frankly challengeable valuation based on Network Rail’s Regulatory Asset Base (RAB). The RAB was established in the 1990s after privatisation, to allow Railtrack to issue bonds to fund further rail enhancement. However, whilst the debt related to the RAB was spread evenly across the network to “value” the asset, the funds generated through the bond sales were not (and Wales has received very little of that despite its network being apportioned the debt via the RAB). Even after the inclusion of NR debt on the Governments balance sheet since 2014/15, this “suspect” accounting practice still survives. Very crudely, network valuation = last year’s network value - depreciation of asset + apportioned enhancement spend (irrespective of where those enhancement actually were); there is also a factor based upon discounted future cash flows for income received from an asset (e.g. Track Access Charges). If one looks at the details and notes of NR’s 2018 accounts18 one can see that this “methodology” was really retained to support valuation of NR asset that could be sold to private companies. It should not be applied to transfer of a public asset between governments – especially when the publicly owned asset is located in the geography of the “purchasing” public body as was the case with the CVL. The final agreement on the ongoing OMR value will be interesting. I am not sighted on that. Whilst the CVL transfer is now done and whilst I understand WG were held harmless financially by UK Treasury, we now have a precedent set for such asset valuations which I view as completely inappropriate. What share of investment has Wales secured in its rail infrastructure since privatisation came into effect in 1994, and how sufficient is this level of investment? I have undertaken an analysis for WG which looked back to 2001 and out to 2029 and found that at least £100Bn has or will have been invested by UK Gov in enhancement to the UK rail network in that period. The most generous interpretation of the enhancements UK Gov has funded in Wales over the same period is £2.2Bn. This highlights a shortfall in Wales Vs UK average of at least £2.9Bn (based on the most conservative set of assumptions); a more even-handed analysis would generate a bigger shortfall. I can also confidently assert, that in the period from 1994 to 2001, there were no significant enhancements investments on the Welsh rail network.