IN SEARCH OF THE BORDER in 1978, passed Resolution 435, which proposed a alliance focused on trying to maintain control of ceasefire and democratic elections supervised by the southeast Angola against the MPLA and SWAPO. Jo Ractliffe UN. On both occasions, when instructed to with- South Africa’s 1975 invasion into Angola was a cru- (Stevenson Gallery) draw from Namibia, South Africa refused to do so. cial factor in Cuba’s decision to support the MPLA in It was against this backdrop that SWAPO (South Luanda. Contrary to the belief that Cuba was acting There are many myths about what is known to white West African People’s Organisation) and its military on Soviet recommendation, Fidel Castro launched South Africans as the ‘Border War’. Fought primar- wing, PLAN (People’s Liberation Army of Namibia), Operation Carlotta in response to a direct request ily in Namibia and Angola from the mid-1960s to launched an armed struggle against South African from a besieged MPLA in Luanda. The arrival of 7 the late 1980s, it engaged a series of conflicts that forces in Namibia. In what is generally considered 000 Cuban troops effectively halted the SADF ad- merged into one of the most complex and protract- to be the beginning of this 23-year conflict, the first vance, and on 11 November 1975, Agostinho Neto ed wars ever fought in Africa. Alongside its local major clash between SWAPO and a South African declared independence. In January 1976, the SADF raison d’êtres, the war in Angola also unfolded as police unit, supported by the SAAF (South African was compelled to withdraw from Angola. a proxy Cold War, mobilised by external interfer- Air Force), occurred on 26 August 1966. ences, secret partnerships and undeclared political However, the ‘Border War’ involved more than South Africa’s 1975 invasion into Angola was a and economic agendas. All of these manifested in a South Africa’s attempts to prevent SWAPO coming crucial factor in Cuba’s decision to support the range of deceptions, from the violation of formal in- to power in an independent Namibia. It also in- MPLA in Luanda. ternational agreements to illegal operations, secret volved conflicts between South Africa and many of funding and the provision of arms. It was a war of its frontline states as South Africa attempted to curb For the remainder of the 1970s, the SADF directed subterfuge; a fiction woven of half-truths and cover- the liberation struggle that was happening within its its efforts primarily towards keeping the war north ups. Even now, over twenty years later, many of its borders. Portugal’s withdrawal from Angola added of the ‘cut-line’, clearing a ‘free-fire’ buffer zone stories have yet to be told. another layer to the perceived threats against the along the Angolan border and displacing thousands For most Namibians it was a war of liberation, apartheid state. The possibility of a Marxist govern- of people in the process. It also conducted counter- a war fought to gain independence from South ment, sympathetic to the ANC (African National insurgency raids and pre-emptive strikes on SWAPO African rule, which had been ongoing since 1920 Congress) and SWAPO, propelled South Africa to bases, including the controversial raid on Cassinga when the League of Nations granted administration involve itself in Angola’s civil war. South African on 4 May 1978, in which over 600 people were killed. of Namibia (then South West Africa) to South Africa forces had ventured into Angola as early as 1967, But the 1980s marked a shift in South Africa’s pres- under a Class C Mandate. While apartheid policies, sending air force helicopters to support Portuguese ence in Angola. In an undeclared war with the gov- strictly speaking, were not applied till the late 1960s troops against UNITA (National Union for the Total ernment forces, FAPLA (People’s Armed Forces for in Namibia, the territory was subjected to harsh Independence of Angola). Less than ten years later, the Liberation of Angola), the SADF began to mount forms of segregation and a colonial labour system with the launch of Operation Savannah, the SADF continuous large-scale military operations inside that later fed into a growing nationalist move- (South African Defence Force) and UNITA – with Angola. The strategic aim was to maintain UNITA’s ment. After decades of pressure and various legal covert support from America – began a strategic dominance in the region and thus also undermine disputes, the United Nations (UN) revoked South and somewhat expedient alliance. Their inten- SWAPO’s ability to launch attacks from Angola Africa’s mandate in 1966 – a decision South Africa tion was initially to prevent the MPLA (Popular into Namibia. On 16 February 1984, South Africa ignored. In 1970, the UN Security Council declared Movement for the Liberation of Angola) from tak- and Angola signed the Lusaka Accord, a ceasefire South Africa’s presence in Namibia illegal and later, ing control of Angola at independence, but later the agreement aimed in part at resolving the issue of 106 The Salon: Volume Four Namibian independence in terms of Resolution 435. shelling from the SADF over the following few set out the principles for a ceasefire, the demilita- But in 1985 when FAPLA launched a successful at- months. risation of UNITA troops and the formation of a tack on UNITA and threatened to capture its strong- national army. It also laid out the process for the hold town of Mavinga, the SADF with support from In 1987 the war reached its final and decisive creation of a multi-party democracy with an elected the SAAF came to UNITA’s rescue. The war escalat- turning point with the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale government. But when the incumbent president and ed and for the first time, the South African govern- MPLA leader, José Eduardo dos Santos, defeated ment admitted it was supporting UNITA. During this time, Angolan and Cuban troops opened UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in the 1992 presiden- In 1987 the war reached its final and decisive a second front to the west. Mobilising a force of 40 tial elections, Savimbi contested the process and turning point with the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale, one 000 Cuban, 30 000 Angolan and 3 000 SWAPO rejected the results. The peace process unravelled of the most significant battles ever fought in Africa. troops with some 500 tanks and 1 000 anti-aircraft and once again the country was subjected to war. As Fidel Castro proclaimed: “From now on the his- weapons, supported by MiG-23 fighter jets, they ad- Alongside bitter fighting countrywide, the post- tory of Africa will have to be written before and after vanced towards the Namibian border. Castro drew election period also saw an unprecedented rise in Cuito Cuanavale”. The events leading to the battle on a boxing combination for this strategy: the defen- violent attacks on the national population, includ- were set in motion when FAPLA attempted to break sive left fist blocks the opponent at Cuito Cuanavale ing the indiscriminate killing of civilians in ideo- UNITA’s hold over southeast Angola and regain in the east, while the force of the right fist strikes in logical cleansings – known as limbeza – carried out control of the region. Launching a major assault the west. Over the next few months a series of clash- by armed civilians and special police in service to from Cuito Cuanavale, FAPLA targeted the UNITA es with South African forces occurred, including the the MPLA and UNITA. In an endeavour to end the stronghold of Mavinga and began to drive UNITA bombing of the dam at Calueque by the Cubans. As post-election conflict, both sides agreed to sign the south, inflicting heavy casualties in the process. But the SADF retreated into Namibia, the Cubans with- Lusaka Protocol in November 1994, which effective- in a series of debilitating skirmishes at the Lomba drew and the war ended. ly reinforced the principles and implementation of River, FAPLA was repelled by the SADF, which had In May 1988 the South Africans returned to the Bicesse Accord. But despite international moni- come to UNITA’s rescue. Forced to retreat back to the peace negotiations, which they had abandoned toring and peacekeeping, the fundamental mistrust Cuito Cuanvale, FAPLA was then besieged by the for two years. In a series of talks mediated by US between the MPLA government and UNITA led to combined forces of the SADF and UNITA. It was Assistant Secretary of State, Chester Crocker, the collapse of the protocol and war resumed. a critical moment, and one that many believe pre- Angola, Cuba and South Africa agreed to the with- In the late 1990s the war reached its most brutal sented an opportunity for the SADF to overrun drawal of Cuban and South African troops from the and destructive phase and threatened to reduce the FAPLA and take the town. The consequences of this region and the implementation of Resolution 435. country to a state of chaos. During this period, much were unthinkable for the Angolans and once again On 22 December that year, all parties signed a final of the country’s infrastructure, including schools, they appealed to Cuba for assistance. But the SADF peace accord in New York. Namibia celebrated its factories and medical centres, was destroyed. failed to seize the initiative: and with Cuban rein- independence in March 1990. Scorched earth tactics and the continuous laying of forcements, despite heavy bombardment from the mines resulted in the death and displacement of mil- SADF and UNITA, Cuito Cuanavale did not fall. But the war in Angola was not over.