Naval War College Review Volume 54 Article 19 Number 2 Spring 2001 The ecrS et War against Hanoi: Kennedy’s and Johnson’s Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam Richard Norton Richard H. Shultz Jr. Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Norton, Richard and Shultz, Richard H. Jr. (2001) "The eS cret War against Hanoi: Kennedy’s and Johnson’s Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam," Naval War College Review: Vol. 54 : No. 2 , Article 19. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss2/19 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Color profile: Disabled Composite Default screen Norton and Shultz: The Secret War against Hanoi: Kennedy’s and Johnson’s Use of Spie BOOK REVIEWS 147 Hue. George W. Smith offers a very good CNN claim that Operation TAILWIND in- perspective on what such street fighting volved killing U.S. deserters and the use is all about. of the nerve agent Sarin. Joseph Anderson Shultz begins his tale by explaining how Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army an aggressive Kennedy administration, Naval War College angered and humiliated by the Bay of Pigs, formally placed CIA-controlled co- vert operations against North Vietnam under military leadership. President Ken- nedy, his brother Robert, and other key Shultz, Richard H., Jr. The Secret War against Ha- advisors wanted immediate results, and noi: Kennedy’s and Johnson’s Use of Spies, Saboteurs, they ignored the fact that a covert opera- and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam. New York: tion takes time to achieve its desired ef- HarperCollins, 1999. 408pp. $27.50 fect. Nor was the military high command At its core, this is a remarkably well told ecstatic about gaining this new responsi- story of failure—heartbreaking failure to bility. A generic aversion to special oper- be sure, and failure despite the heroic ations, fear of where Kennedy might be efforts of some remarkable men to taking the Army, and distrust of many achieve success, but still failure. The U.S. involved in Special Operations, resulted covert war against Hanoi was, as this in a bureaucratic struggle of rare inten- book makes clear, patently unsuccessful. sity and duration. One of the tragic iro- That it could have been otherwise makes nies emerging from Shultz’s research is the story all the more compelling. that from the beginning, senior U.S. mili- A leading expert on low-intensity conflict tary and political leaders effectively pre- and covert warfare, Shultz has filled a gap vented SOG, which was charged with the that has troubled those who for decades new covert mission, from achieving its have been trying to understand the Viet- full potential. nam War. Using meticulously documented Thus, the cards were stacked against SOG research, and writing in a reader-friendly from the start. One obstacle was an ad- style, Shultz lays out the history of the ministration that, following President U.S. Military Assistance Command Viet- Kennedy’s assassination, seemed hesitant nam Studies and Observations Group to take advantage of apparent opportuni- (usually referred to simply as “SOG”) ties. Nor did SOG ever receive proper from 1964 to 1972. Such a book is argu- support from the military or CIA leader- ably long overdue, but classification of ship. Opposition from senior members of material and the lack of documented in- the State Department was at times fero- terviews with former SOG members crip- cious. In addition, SOG’s South Viet- pled previous attempts. At worst, the namese counterpart was never fully operations of SOG have suffered gross trusted, possibly with good reason. As a distortions, turning one of the war’s most result SOG rarely had the right mandate interesting features into farce and pulp or qualified people, operated under fiction. Happily, this is no longer the byzantine restrictions, and never case. Now, using newly declassified docu- achieved a rapport with the one organi- ments, Shultz lays to rest many of the zation that could have dramatically in- myths—including the now-infamous creased its effectiveness. Shultz also Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001 1 5/14/01 Monday, May 14, 2001 3:33:11 PM Color profile: Disabled Composite Default screen 148 NAVAL WARNaval COLLEGE War REVIEWCollege Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 2, Art. 19 points out that from time to time SOG operations right. The book explores the created its own problems. There was con- Vietnamese actions in some detail, much cern over discipline and, more problem- of it for the first time. This facet of the atic, security vulnerabilities of which the book makes fascinating reading. group seemed unaware. For students of U.S. national security de- Nonetheless, SOG managed to carve out cision making, this book is a superb case a role for itself, eventually running four study. Shultz not only discusses the oper- major types of operations against the ations of USMACVSOG but examines forces of the Democratic Republic of and describes how these issues were han- Vietnam: cross-border commando oper- dled in the Pentagon and the White ations in Laos and Cambodia, aimed at House. Furthermore, he does not limit observing and interdicting the Ho Chi his examination to the actions of cabinet Minh Trail; insertion of South Vietnam- members, military commanders, or key ese agents into North Vietnam to carry presidential advisors but sheds light on out resistance operations and deception; organizational structures, procedures, maritime interdiction and commando and lower-ranking action officers. This operations against the North Vietnamese aspect of the process is all too often coastline; and psychological warfare op- overlooked. erations aimed at North Vietnam. While There are many familiar names to be some of these, such as the insertion of found here. These include such Special agents into the North, were carried out Forces legends as Dick Meadows, who was only by Vietnamese personnel, others, to be responsible for advance ground re- such as actions against the Ho Chi Minh connaissance during the failed Iranian Trail, also involved Americans. Shultz ex- hostage rescue attempt; and Colonel “Bull” tensively covers these operations, and the Simmons, who led the brilliantly executed reader cannot help but be impressed by but unproductive prisoner-rescue raid the courage of those who carried them against the Son Tay prison. Secretary of out. However, because these efforts were Defense Robert McNamara and General never integrated into the overall strategic William C. Westmoreland both have plan (if ever such a plan truly existed), the their say, as do the general’s Navy and results were less effective than they might Marine Corps counterparts. Some read- have been. Yet despite it all, SOG came ers might feel that presenting these dispa- close enough to offer a tantalizing vision rate viewpoints is enough, but given the of what could have been done. This is failure of SOG to live up to its potential one of the most depressing and intrigu- and its losses in lives and treasure, rea- ing aspects of the entire book. soned judgments of responsibility and If Washington and Saigon did not take accountability should be made. Shultz SOG’s efforts seriously enough, the same does not shirk from this task, and his cannot be said of Hanoi. The North was conclusions are convincing. extremely sensitive to SOG’s actions and Richard Shultz wraps up with a masterful worked hard to counter them. In this the summation and analysis of the longest North Vietnamese were remarkably suc- U.S. covert campaign in wartime. He cessful. If the United States did not get also provides a brief overview of the covert operations right, the North Viet- status of the Special Operations com- namese certainly got counter-covert munity today. In doing so he poses https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss2/19 2 5/14/01 Monday, May 14, 2001 3:33:11 PM Color profile: Disabled Composite Default screen Norton and Shultz: The Secret War against Hanoi: Kennedy’s and Johnson’s Use of Spie BOOK REVIEWS 149 interesting questions for covert opera- Tom Brokaw has called “the greatest tions of the future. generation.” If this were all The Secret War against Although Bradley is neither a strategist Hanoi accomplished, it would be a signif- nor a military historian, he understands icant contribution to our understanding of the significance of Iwo Jima and places it the Vietnam conflict, thereby earning a properly in the context of World War II. place on our bookshelves. But Shultz has This is not revisionist historiography. also performed a long overdue and badly Bradley solidly affirms Truman’s deci- needed service in recognizing the tre- sion to drop the atomic bomb to save mendous human cost associated with American—and Japanese—lives, because SOG’s operations. The casualty figures the alternative would have been even are simply staggering. For example, of more horrific. The author’s depiction of approximately five hundred agents placed the training regimen, camaraderie, and in North Vietnam, apparently all were exploits of the U.S. Marine Corps will killed or captured; some were “doubled.” make all Marines proud. However, he is Only slightly less appalling are the casu- not so kind to other services, often por- alty rates suffered by the U.S.-led recon- traying them as weak willed, unprofes- naissance teams that operated against the sional, even incompetent.